Opinion
No. 74-816
Decided April 9, 1975.
Criminal procedure — Accused committed to Lima State Hospital — Habeas corpus — Writ denied, when — Appeal — Pre-indictment commitment — Jurisdiction of Common Pleas Court.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Allen County.
Petitioner, Anna Horvath, was charged by affidavit with first degree murder and arrested on August 21, 1972. At her arraignment in Municipal Court, she pleaded not guilty. The Municipal Court found probable cause, and she was bound over to the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County and committed to the county jail.
On the suggestion of counsel that she was not then sane, petitioner was referred, on August 22, 1972, for examination to the county psychiatric clinic, where she was examined by the county psychiatrist.
On August 24, 1972, following a sanity hearing on the psychiatric clinic report, the court found petitioner to be not sane and ordered her committed to Lima State Hospital, until restored to sanity, pursuant to R.C. 2945.38.
Subsequently, on September 12, 1972, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted petitioner for murder in the first degree.
In response to an order of the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, petitioner was discharged from Lima State Hospital on November 2, 1973, and transferred to the Common Pleas Court where she was referred to the psychiatric clinic for treatment and observation.
A few days later, counsel for petitioner filed motions to set bail, for transfer of commitment to a private hospital and for discharge, all of which were denied. A sanity hearing was held on the psychiatric examination report, and petitioner was found to be not sane and unable to stand trial. She was ordered committed to Lima State Hospital, where she has remained since November 27, 1973.
On June 12, 1974, petitioner filed this habeas corpus action in the Court of Appeals for Allen County, seeking her release from Lima State Hospital on the ground that her continued commitment pursuant to R.C. 2945.38 is a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it is unlikely she will be able to stand trial in the foreseeable future.
A hearing was held by the Court of Appeals, at which further evidence was introduced. The court found that petitioner was not entitled to release, and dismissed the complaint.
An appeal as of right brings the cause to this court for review.
Mr. William L. Blake, for appellant, Anna Horvath.
Mr. William J. Brown, attorney general, and Mr. Frederick L. Ransier, for appellee, Paul W. Watkins, Superintendent, Lima State Hospital.
Petitioner makes two arguments before this court. She maintains, first, that the Common Pleas Court lacked jurisdiction to commit her to Lima State Hospital before her indictment by a grand jury. In Burton v. Reshetylo (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 35, a case in which there was no information or indictment against petitioner, either before or after his commitment to Lima State Hospital, petitioner attacked his pre-indictment commitment. This court held that "a Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction over an accused pursuant to R.C. 2945.37 and 2945.38 when a magistrate's transcript has been filed against the accused." In the case now before this court, the Common Pleas Court had jurisdiction to commit petitioner to Lima State Hospital before indictment, after an affidavit had been filed against her.
The principal contention of petitioner is that her commitment to Lima State Hospital by reason of her inability to stand trial offends her right to due process because, she claims, it is unlikely she will be able to be tried in the foreseeable future.
Petitioner relies on Jackson v. Indiana (1972), 406 U.S. 715. Jackson was charged with robbery. A pretrial competency hearing was held, and the court found that Jackson lacked "comprehension sufficient to make his defense" and committed him to the state Department of Mental Health until such time as "the defendant is sane." Jackson filed a motion for new trial, arguing that there was no evidence that he would ever be competent to stand trial and that, therefore, his commitment was unconstitutional. That motion was denied, and, on appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Jackson's incompetency commitment violated his due process and equal protection rights.
Medical and other evidence before the trial court in Jackson showed that petitioner would never be able to comprehend the charges against him or be able to participate in his defense. The United States Supreme Court noted (page 726) that "there is nothing in the record that even points to any probability that Jackson's present condition can be remedied at any future time," and held (page 738) that "a person charged * * * with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future."
At his competency hearing, Jackson was represented by counsel who cross-examined the testifying doctors and called witnesses.
Jackson was described as a "mentally defective deaf mute with a mental level of a pre-school child" who could not "read, write, or otherwise communicate except through limited sign language." There was evidence that it was extremely unlikely that he could ever learn to read or write.
The court declined to "prescribe arbitrary time limits," but said only that Jackson was confined "on a record that sufficiently establishes the lack of a substantial probability that he will ever be able to participate fully in a trial."
Until the time of the crime she is accused of committing, petitioner, Horvath, had no history of mental disturbance. The only witness, a doctor on the staff of Lima State Hospital, testifying at the hearing before the Court of Appeals was asked on direct examination, on cross-examination and by the court whether it was reasonable to expect that petitioner would have the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable future. The witness responded that petitioner "has a reasonable expectation of going into remission, becoming restored, if you will, within a reasonable future"; "there is a reasonable expectation of her recovery in the reasonable future"; and "there is. Foreseeable." Petitioner offered no evidence to the contrary. Her evidence consisted solely of a copy of the appearance and execution docket, her motions before the Common Pleas Court and the hospital records from which the witness testified.
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petition and ordering that petitioner remain in the custody of respondent, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, CORRIGAN, STERN, CELEBREZZE, W. BROWN and P. BROWN, JJ., concur.