We review an order denying a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18A(J)(1)(A); Vickery v. Vickery, 999 S.W.2d 342, 349 (Tex. 1999) (op. on reh'g); Drake v. Walker, 529 S.W.3d 516, 528 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2017, no pet.); In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, pet. denied).An abuse of discretion exists when a court's decision is arbitrary or unreasonable.

We review an order denying a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion. See In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied); Sommers v. Concepcion, 20 S.W.3d 27, 41 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). We examine the totality of the circumstances and will not reverse an assigned judge's ruling if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement.

We review an order denying a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion. SeeIn re H.M.S. , 349 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) ; Sommers v. Concepcion , 20 S.W.3d 27, 41 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) ; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(j)(1).

The movant of a motion to recuse bears the burden of proving recusal is warranted, and the burden is met only through a showing of bias or impartiality to such an extent that the movant was deprived of a fair trial. See In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d 250, 253-54 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). The test for recusal is "whether a reasonable member of the public at large, knowing all the facts in the public domain concerning the judge's conduct, would have a reasonable doubt that the judge is actually impartial."

We review an order denying a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion. See In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied); Sommers v. Concepcion, 20 S.W.3d 27, 41 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). The movant bears the burden of proving recusal is warranted, and the burden is met only through a showing of bias or impartiality to such an extent that the movant was deprived of a fair trial.

(citing Tex.R.Civ.P. 18a(j)(1); In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, pet. denied); Sommers v. Concepcion, 20 S.W.3d 27, 41 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)). The movant bears the burden of proving recusal is warranted, and the burden is met only through a showing of bias or impartiality to such an extent that the movant was deprived of a fair trial.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1), (2). Morgan had the burden to prove recusal was warranted, and such a burden is only met through a showing of bias or impartiality to such an extent that he was deprived of a fair trial. In the Interest of H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). A judicial ruling alone almost never constitutes a valid basis for a motion to recuse based on bias or partiality.

As factfinder at the sanctions hearing, Judge Moore was entitled to believe the objection was clearly brought to delay, unnecessarily, the September 12 hearing, which would have allowed the once-extended temporary restraining order to expire.See In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d 250, 258 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (holding no abuse of discretion in finding party brought motion to recuse solely for purpose of delay). A temporary restraining order is generally not appealable.

Nevertheless, assuming this issue was properly before us, the movant bears the burden of proving recusal is warranted and that burden is met only through a showing of bias or partiality to such an extent that the movant was deprived of a fair trial. See In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). A trial judge's rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for recusal based on bias or partiality.

The probate court had the inherent authority to assess sanctions against Ross, Laura, and Brittany to "deter, alleviate and counteract [their] bad faith abuse of the judicial process" and protect the effectiveness of judicial functions and the dignity, independence, and integrity of the judiciary. In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d 250, 256 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (citing Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Tex. 1979)). Appellants were only sanctioned for their bad faith filing of the second motion to recuse.