Opinion
358896 358897
06-23-2022
In re Herron/Russell, Minors. In re Russell, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 2020-000579-NA, 2020-000579-NA
Before: Boonstra, P.J., and Gadola and Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 358896 of these consolidated appeals, respondent-mother appeals by right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her five minor children, KCH, MGH, JAR, JR, and JVR. In Docket No. 358897, respondent-father appeals by right the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to his three minor children, JAR, JR, and JVR. We affirm in both dockets.
In re Herron/Russell Minors, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 19, 2021 (Docket Nos. 358896 and 358897).
The father of KCH and MGH was also a respondent in the trial court proceedings and his parental rights were also terminated; he is not a party to this appeal.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 2020, Children's Protective Services (CPS), a division of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), received a report of physical abuse, medical neglect, improper supervision, and an unfit home arising out of JAR's May 2020 visits to Children's Hospital of Michigan (the hospital). According to JAR's medical records, respondent-mother took JAR, aged 19 months at the time, to the Emergency Department of the hospital on May 23, 2020 to have a piece of broken glass removed from his left foot. Respondent-mother brought JAR back to the emergency room on May 25, 2020, after JAR developed a fever of 103.6 degrees and his entire right leg became swollen from the knee down. According to JAR's medical records, respondent-mother reported that JAR had stepped on broken glass on May 22; however, respondent-mother also reported that JAR had begun to walk "abnormally" approximately two weeks before she took him to the hospital, and that "around this time" she had noticed a blister on JAR's right thigh that was draining clear fluid. During JAR's examination, hospital staff found an earlier clavicle fracture, which was noted as a suspected nonaccidental injury; hospital staff also noted that the blister or abscess on JAR's right thigh could have resulted from a burn, such as from a cigarette. JAR had a severe bone infection in his right leg, and was hospitalized for nine days and given numerous medical interventions, including surgical draining of the abscess and insertion of a chest catheter to provide intravenous antibiotics. Imaging scans of JAR's right leg revealed evidence of numerous points of injury to his right leg, which led the examining physician to note "significant concern for non-accidental trauma." JAR was also noted as being behind on his immunizations.
Throughout JAR's treatment, respondent-mother provided inconsistent dates and explanations for JAR's injuries. For example, respondent-mother reported to hospital staff that JAR had been intermittently feverish for a week; however, respondent-mother later told Kimberly England (England), a CPS investigator, that JAR's fever began over a month before his hospital visit, and that respondent-mother had attempted to treat JAR with Tylenol. Respondent-mother was unable to provide an explanation for JAR's clavicle fracture or abscess on his right leg, and provided hospital staff with inconsistent reports about how and when JAR's glass injury had occurred and the duration of JAR's fever.
As a result of the nature of JAR's injuries, his delay in immunizations, and respondent-mother's inconsistent explanations, hospital staff suspected medical neglect and physical abuse, and Brenda Barilla (Barilla), the hospital's social worker, reported the suspected abuse to CPS. Respondent-father, who did not reside in the home, also did not know how any of JAR's injuries or fever had occurred, but stated to England that JAR had reported falling off his bike. England investigated the allegations and filed a petition requesting termination of respondents' parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing. The petition alleged that respondent-mother had medically neglected JAR by failing to treat his injuries and fever; the petition additionally alleged that respondent-mother was homeless and that her children were temporarily in the care of her brother. The petition alleged that respondent-father, a noncustodial parent, did not provide care or support for his children and had failed to protect JAR from severe physical injury. The petition also noted respondents' prior CPS involvement, including that respondent-mother had previously had a child who died from unsafe sleep, and that respondent-father's parental rights to three other children (with another woman) had been terminated based on physical abuse.
Because JVR had not yet been born, the initial petition related only to the four older children.
The children were removed and placed in licensed non-relative foster care. In March 2021, JVR was born testing positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the active ingredient in marijuana; England subsequently filed an amended petition additionally seeking the termination of respondents' rights to JVR. JVR was also placed in non-relative foster care. From the preliminary hearing until the adjudication and initial dispositional hearing on September 15, 2021, respondents were given weekly visitation with their respective children, but respondent-mother failed to visit her three youngest children during the two-month period before the adjudication. Respondents also underwent a best-interest evaluation with the Clinic for Child Study, which recommended termination of their parental rights.
The majority of these visits were conducted over videoconferencing software due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The trial court terminated respondents' parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing, determining that (1) respondents had a history with CPS; (2) respondent-father's rights to three other children had previously been terminated and the conditions that led to those terminations had not been rectified; (3) respondent-father had not provided for his children financially; (4) both respondents were homeless and had been homeless for years; (5) respondents had failed to provide timely medical care for JAR; and (6) respondents would be unable to meet the special needs of the children. The trial court also found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination was in the best interests of the children. These appeals followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews for clear error whether a trial court properly found statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in the children's best interests. In re Williams, 286 Mich.App. 253, 271; 779 N.W.2d 286 (2009)." 'A finding is "clearly erroneous" [if] although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" In re Rood, 483 Mich. 73, 91; 763 N.W.2d 587 (2009), quoting In re Miller, 433 Mich. 331, 337; 445 N.W.2d 161 (1989). "This Court gives deference to a trial court's special opportunity to judge the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses who appear before it." TK, 306 Mich.App. at 710. We also review for clear error whether DHHS made reasonable efforts at reunification. In re Fried, 266 Mich.App. 535, 541; 702 N.W.2d 192 (2005).
III. DOCKET NO. 358896
In Docket No. 358896, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights, because statutory grounds for termination were not established by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent-mother also contests the trial court's determination that termination was in her children's best interests. We disagree with respondent-mother's arguments.
A. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Under MCL 712A.19b(3), a trial court "may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence" that at least one statutory ground has been proven by DHHS. MCR 3.977(A)(3); In re Trejo, 462 Mich. 341, 350; 612 N.W.2d 407 (2000). In particular, "a court may terminate parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that there 'is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.'" In re Pops, 315 Mich.App. 590, 599; 890 N.W.2d 902 (2016), quoting MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)." 'If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights.'" In re VanDalen, 293 Mich.App. 120, 139; 809 N.W.2d 412 (2011), quoting MCL 712A.19b(5).
The trial court terminated respondents' parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (b)(i), (b)(ii), (i), (j), (k)(i), and (k)(ii). Under MCL 712A.19b(3):
We note that the trial court did not indicate whether all of these statutory grounds were proven for all respondents, or whether certain statutory grounds only applied to certain respondents. However, because there were no allegations that respondent-mother had deserted any of her children for 91 days, we presume that the finding of statutory grounds under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) was not intended to apply to her. Further, respondent-mother had not previously had her parental rights to any other children terminated, rendering MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) inapplicable to her. We will therefore not analyze those statutory grounds with respect to respondent-mother.
(3) The court may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
(a) The child has been deserted under either of the following circumstances:
* * *
(ii) The child's parent has deserted the child for 91 or more days and has not sought custody of the child during that period.
(b)The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or physical or sexual abuse under 1 or more of the following circumstances:
(i) The parent's act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent's home.
(ii) The parent who had the opportunity to prevent the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse failed to do so and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent's home.
(i) Parental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have been terminated due to serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and the parent has failed to rectify the conditions that led to the prior termination of parental rights.
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.
(k) The parent abused the child or a sibling of the child, the abuse included 1 or more of the following, and there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will be harmed if returned to the care of the parent:
(i) Abandonment of a young child.
(ii) Criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted penetration, or assault with intent to penetrate. [MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (b)(i), (b)(ii), (i), (j), (k)(i), and (k)(ii).]
We agree with respondent-mother that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence supporting the termination of her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b) or (k). Although the hospital suspected that someone had abused JAR, petitioner did not present sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that respondent-mother had perpetrated abuse upon JAR or his siblings. Medical neglect of an injury or illness is not sufficient to support termination under MCL 712Ab(3)(b). See In re LaFrance, 306 Mich.App. 713, 725; 858 N.W.2d 143 (2014). In LaFrance, the petitioner sought termination of the respondent-father's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (i), (g), and (j), because the respondent-father's infant child had become dangerously dehydrated and suffered severe but temporary kidney damage requiring intensive hospital treatment while in the respondent-father's care. Id. at 715. This Court analyzed MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) in relation to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) and (3)(b)(iii), and determined that "for injury to fall within MCL 712A.19b(3), it must be caused by a 'parent's act' or a 'nonparent adult's act' and not merely contributed to by an unintentional omission." Id. at 725. This Court further determined that MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) was intended to address a parent or nonparent adult who was not an abuser but who failed to protect the child from abuse; it rejected the argument that subsection (b)(ii) applied "merely to a negligent failure to respond to an accidental injury or naturally occurring medical condition not caused by an 'act' of a parent or other adult." Id. at 725. This Court concluded that the trial court erred by determining that medical neglect may constitute failure to prevent physical harm under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii); however, this Court also determined that medical neglect could constitute statutory grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Id. at 726.
Given this Court's decision in LaFrance, respondent-mother is correct that her medical neglect may not serve as a basis to terminate her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) or (ii). Similarly, clear and convincing evidence was not presented that respondent-mother had abused JAR or his siblings and that the abuse had involved either abandonment or sexual abuse. MCL 712A.19b(3)(k) is therefore also inapplicable to her.
However, a trial court need only find that "at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and convincing evidence" to terminate a respondent's parental rights. And respondent-mother's medical neglect of JAR does support the termination of her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). In re Keillor, 325 Mich.App. 80, 85; 923 N.W.2d 617 (2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Respondent-mother argues that the record does not support terminating her parental rights on the basis of "a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parents, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent." MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Respondent-mother argues that only one of her five children was injured and that the doctrine of anticipatory neglect, which "recognizes that [h]ow a parent treats one child is certainly probative of how that parent may treat other children[,]" does not support termination of respondent-mother's parental rights. In re Kellogg, 331 Mich.App. 249, 259; 952 N.W.2d 544 (2020), citing In re AH, 245 Mich.App. 77, 84; 627 N.W.2d 33 (2001). We disagree.
"[A] parent's treatment of one child is probative of how that parent may treat other children." Kellogg, 331 Mich.App. at 259, citing LaFrance, 306 Mich.App. at 713. The original petition alleged that JAR had a fever that lasted between one week and one month, glass in his foot, and a bone infection requiring surgery to treat, as well as evidence of other past injuries that were suspicious. With respect to the other children, the petition alleged there was a reasonable likelihood, based on the suspected physical abuse of JAR and respondent-mother's medical neglect of JAR, that all of the children would be harmed if returned to respondent-mother's care. The petition further alleged that respondent-mother had failed to provide all of her children with adequate food, clothing, shelter or medical care. Although many of the allegations in the petitions related to JAR's injuries, a trial court may make inferences regarding how a respondent will care for all of her children on the basis of her conduct toward one child. Kellogg, 331 Mich.App. at 259.
Further, while "the probative value of such an inference is decreased [where there are] differences between the children, such as age and medical conditions[,]" the children in this case are generally similarly situated. Id. (citation omitted). Most of the children are close in age, and all of the children have special needs that require attention. At the time of termination, JVR was about six months old, JR was almost two years old, JAR was almost three, KCH was about five, and MGH was about nine years and eight months old. JAR, who had been diagnosed with cerebral palsy, had special needs requiring special medical attention, such as speech therapy and weekly physical therapy appointments. The other children were similarly situated to JAR, in that they all had some special need requiring attention-KCH and JR requiring weekly or biweekly therapy sessions for speech delays, and JVR participating in weekly physical therapy for a diagnosis of torticollis. MGH received weekly trauma counseling and twice-weekly counseling sessions through his school. The record reflects that respondent-mother failed to: (1) show concern for JAR when he was diagnosed with cerebral palsy; (2) provide medical care for JAR in a timely manner; (3) take JAR to follow up medical appointments; (4) keep JAR's vaccinations current; (5) inquire about the well-being of her children; and (6) provide a stable residence. Because of the closeness of the children's ages and the similarity of all of the children's needs, and because respondent-mother had repeatedly failed to timely provide JAR with the medical care he required, it was appropriate for the trial court to apply the doctrine of anticipatory neglect.
The trial court terminated respondent-mother's parental rights under MCL 712A.19(b)(3)(j) because respondent-mother had failed to provide timely medical care, including for JAR's persistent fever during the height of a COVID-19 pandemic in which fever was a common symptom. The trial court also determined that respondent-mother was unable to meet the special needs of the children "because [she] failed to do so on a regular basis." The trial court noted that JAR was behind on his required immunizations and the lack of timely medical care had led to an infection that required surgery. This substantial medical neglect supports the termination of respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19(b)(3)(j). LaFrance, 306 Mich.App. at 726.
Although respondent-mother argues that she did not medically neglect JAR, England and respondent-mother herself testified that JAR had a fever for up to one month before respondent-mother took him to see a doctor. The medical records reflect that respondent-mother gave the hospital staff inconsistent stories regarding the fever and the history of JAR's injuries, and further reflect that JAR had a fever for at least seven to 10 days and had not been eating solid foods for a week before respondent-mother took him to the hospital. Respondent-mother also testified that she did not take JAR to the hospital until at least one week after she learned that JAR had stepped on glass. The medical records also indicate that respondent-mother gave inconsistent recollections regarding JAR's injuries; however, it appears that respondent-mother was aware of a blister on JAR's right thigh for several weeks before he received treatment, despite being at least intermittently feverish. JAR ultimately required significant hospitalization and treatment for a severe infection in his right leg.
Moreover, the record shows that respondent-mother has not had a stable residence since 2015 or 2016, and at the time of termination did not have reliable transportation. Although respondent-mother expressed a willingness to care for the special needs of the children, England testified that respondent-mother did not inquire about her children's well-being during visits, even after learning that JAR had been diagnosed with cerebral palsy. Despite respondent-mother having previously had a child die from "unsafe sleep," England testified that during her investigation she observed JR also sleeping in a manner that was unsafe. Further, a foster-care worker testified that respondent-mother was unable to supervise all of her children during her in-person visitations, which often resulted in JR running away from the group and suffering minor injuries. Given the evidence in the record, the trial court did not clearly err by determining that the children would be at risk of harm if placed in respondent-mother's care, and therefore did not err by terminating respondent-mother's parental rights. MCL 712A.19(b)(3)(j); VanDalen, 293 Mich.App. at 139.
B. BEST-INTEREST DETERMINATION
Respondent-mother also argues that the trial court erred by determining that the termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of her children. We disagree. In determining whether termination is in a child's best interests," '[t]he focus . . . has always been on the child, not the parent.'" In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson Minors, 311 Mich.App. 49, 63; 874 N.W.2d 205 (2015), quoting In re Moss, 301 Mich.App. 76, 87; 836 N.W.2d 182 (2013). Moreover, "[b]est interests are determined on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence." LaFrance, 306 Mich.App. at 733. Factors that may be considered by a trial court in making a best-interest determination include
the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality . . . the length of time the child was in care, [and] the likelihood that the child could be returned to her parents' home within the foreseeable future, if at all. [Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson Minors, 311 Mich.App. at 63-64 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]The trial court may also consider "the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being in care, and the possibility of adoption." White, 303 Mich.App. 701, 714; 846 N.W.2d 61 (2014) (citations omitted). "[I]f the interests of the individual children significantly differ, the trial court should address those differences when making its determination of the children's best interests." Id. at 715.
In this case, the trial court found that termination was in the children's best interests because respondent-mother had failed to provide the children with housing, medical care, and financial support, and the trial court did not believe that further services would remedy the situation. The trial court further found that the children all had special needs and that respondent-mother had failed to demonstrate that she could meet the children's needs, and concluded that it was "not willing to risk the life of a child to see if the parents cooperate or if they do what they're supposed to do." The trial court also considered the bond that existed between respondent-mother and her children, but ultimately concluded that it was outweighed by the risk of harm to the children.
The trial court's determination was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Moss, 301 Mich.App. at 87. The trial court relied on the testimony and exhibits proffered at the initial dispositional hearing, which indicated that respondent-mother had failed to provide timely medical care for JAR, did not possess a stable home for the children, and had not demonstrated that she could appropriately supervise her children during visits. The trial court also noted the egregious nature of respondent-mother's medical neglect of JAR with respect to his prolonged fever and injuries, both of which respondent-mother was aware of for a significant period of time before she finally sought medical attention for her child.
Nonetheless, respondent-mother argues that the Clinic for Child Study report contained inaccuracies upon which the trial court relied. Regardless of the accuracy of the report, the trial court never mentioned it specifically when making its determination. It did acknowledge that it had had "the opportunity to review exhibits submitted at trial," which included the Clinic for Child Study report. However, in making its factual determinations, the trial court relied on various testimony and information provided in the medical records. Respondent-mother has not demonstrated that the trial court relied in any significant way on the report as a whole, much less on any purportedly inaccurate information contained in it.
Given the evidence in the record, the children's need for stability, and the fact all of the children were, at the time of adjudication, placed in homes that provided for their needs, and all of the homes except KCH's were preadoptive homes, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that it was in the children's best interests for respondent-mother's parental rights to be terminated. VanDalen, 293 Mich.App. at 139.
IV. DOCKET NO. 358897
In Docket No. 358897, respondent-father argues that DHHS should have provided him with services to improve his parenting abilities and that the trial court erred by holding that statutory grounds for termination of his parental rights had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent-father also argues that the trial court erred by holding that termination of his parental rights was in his children's best interests. We disagree.
A. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
The only arguments respondent-father makes with respect to the statutory grounds for termination is that DHHS should have offered him services to improve his parenting abilities and that the record does not support the trial court's determination that JAR, JVR, and JR would be harmed if placed in his care. We disagree with respondent-father's arguments.
With respect to DHHS's responsibility to provide services, we note that petitioner sought termination of respondent-father's parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing. Generally, the petitioner is required to make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions that caused the children's removal by providing services to a respondent before seeking termination, unless aggravating circumstances are present. See MCL 712A.19a(2); In re HRC, 286 Mich.App. 444, 463-465; 781 N.W.2d 105 (2009).
Respondent-father does not specifically challenge the presence of aggravating circumstances; in any event, the record is clear that respondent-father's parental rights to three other children, not associated with this appeal, were terminated in 2013 on the basis of improper supervision, domestic violence, physical abuse, physical neglect, lack of income, lack of safe and stable housing, and failure to complete and benefit from a court-ordered treatment plan. In the proceedings that led to those prior terminations, respondent-father was offered services to rectify issues of physical abuse, domestic violence, physical neglect, and untreated mental health issues, but respondent-father failed to complete those services; moreover, it was clear at the time of termination that respondent father had not rectified his anger issues, had only recently started mental health treatment, and remained unmedicated despite his diagnoses of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Respondent-father made repeated threats of violence toward CPS and DHHS workers during the proceedings below, and had not sought any specific anger management or domestic violence treatment. DHHS is permitted to seek termination of a respondent's parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing when "[t]he parent has had rights to the child's siblings involuntarily terminated and the parent has failed to rectify the conditions that led to that termination of parental rights." MCL 712A.19a(2)(c). DHHS was therefore not required to offer respondent-father services aimed at reunification before seeking to terminate his parental rights. HRC, 286 Mich.App. at 463-465.
Regarding statutory grounds for termination, the trial court found that the children were at risk of harm because respondent-father has not met their basic or special needs. The trial court specifically determined, on the basis of medical records, the Clinic for Child Study report, respondent-father's criminal background, and the testimony presented at adjudication, that respondent-father had failed to ensure that JAR was properly immunized and had failed to address JAR's fever and provide JAR with timely medical care. The trial court also noted that respondent-father had "failed to address his mental health until 2020," after JAR, JR, and JVR were in DHHS's care, and that his mental health was part of the reason for his earlier terminations. In addition, the trial court stated that respondent-father "continues to be homeless" and "hasn't provided for his children." In light of those findings, the trial court terminated respondent-father's parental rights.
The trial court's findings are supported by the record. Respondent-father testified that he was staying in hotels and the homes of various family members at the time of termination. Further, he did not seek mental health treatment until 2020, when DHHS recommended therapeutic services to him. England testified that respondent-father's parental rights to his other children had been terminated, in part, because of physical abuse, neglect, and untreated mental health issues.
Respondent-father testified that he saw JAR every day at the that time of his leg injuries and fever, yet that he was unaware of any problem, did not believe that JAR looked sick, and had not noticed JAR walking abnormally. The medical records and respondent-mother's testimony indicate, by contrast, that JAR had a fever for a significant period of time and was walking abnormally for two weeks before respondent-mother took JAR to the hospital. Based on this evidence, the trial court did not err by finding that, by virtue of respondent-father's failure to provide medical care for JAR and to protect JAR from respondent-mother's neglect or provide him with needed medical care despite having the opportunity to do so, the children were at risk of harm if placed in respondent-father's care. MCL 712A.19(b)(3)(j). As discussed, the children each have special needs that require ongoing medical and therapeutic attention, and given respondent-father's treatment of JAR when he required medical attention, the trial court did not err by determining that respondent-father would be unable to care for the children. LaFrance, 306 Mich.App. 713, 730; 858 N.W.2d 143 (2014). In addition, respondent-father did not have a stable home, and there was no indication that he would be able to provide the children with one in the near future. Therefore, the trial court did not err by terminating respondent-father's rights on the basis that the children would be harmed if placed in respondent-father's care. MCL 712A.19(b)(3)(j); VanDalen, 293 Mich.App. at 139.
B. BEST-INTEREST DETERMINATION
Respondent-father also argues that the trial court erred by holding that the termination of his parental rights was in the children's best interests. We disagree.
The trial court found that termination of respondent-father's parental rights was in the best interests of JAR, JR, and JVR because respondent-father had failed to provide the children with housing, medical care, and financial support, and the trial court concluded that services would not remedy the situation. In considering the special needs of all of the children, the trial court determined that respondent-father had failed to demonstrate that he could meet those needs and stated that "the Court is not willing to risk the life of a child to see if the parents cooperate or if they do what they're supposed to do." As respondent-father acknowledges, the trial court considered respondent-father's bond with each of the children, but ultimately concluded that respondent-father's bond with JAR and JR was outweighed by the earlier-mentioned factors, and that he had no bond with JVR. The trial court also relied, in part, on its findings regarding the statutory grounds for termination, concluding that the children would be at risk of harm if placed in respondent-father's care. The trial court also noted that the children were similarly situated, in that most of them were very close in age and they all had special needs that required medical or therapeutic attention.
The trial court's holding is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Moss, 301 Mich.App. at 87. The trial court relied on testimony and the exhibits provided at the termination hearing, which indicated that respondent-father had failed to provide timely medical care for JAR, was homeless, did not provide financially for the children, had his parental rights to three other children terminated in part because of his mental health issues, but did not seek mental health treatment until 2020, after this case was initiated. Throughout the proceedings, respondent-father failed to understand the severity of his children's special needs. Given the severity of JAR's injuries, respondent-father's failure to secure proper housing in which he could raise the children, the children's need for stability, the children's special needs, and respondent-father's history, the trial court did not err by finding that termination of respondent-father's parental rights was in the best interests of JAR, JVR, and JR. VanDalen, 293 Mich.App. at 139.
Affirmed in both docket numbers.