Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Diego County Super. Ct. No. HCN921
McCONNELL, P. J.
PROCEEDINGS in habeas corpus following Governor Schwarzenegger's reversal of a grant of parole. Relief denied.
INTRODUCTION
In 1981 petitioner Richard Haugen pleaded guilty to first degree felony murder with the personal use of a firearm. The trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 27 years to life, which included two years for the firearm enhancement. On appeal, we reversed the firearm enhancement because during the plea colloquy Haugen denied personally shooting anyone. Therefore, we concluded the firearm enhancement lacked a sufficient factual basis. We affirmed the trial court's judgment as to the first degree felony murder conviction, but reversed the trial court's judgment as to the firearm enhancement and remanded the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings. (People v. Haugen (Oct. 4, 1982, 4 Crim. No. 13343) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the trial court struck the firearm enhancement, reducing Haugen's sentence to 25 years to life.
Haugen became eligible for parole in October 1995. At a parole hearing in October 2006, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) found him suitable for parole. However, the Governor reversed the Board's decision, finding Haugen's release "would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society at this time."
Haugen petitioned for habeas relief and, after considering respondent's informal response and Haugen's informal reply, we issued an order to show cause why the relief requested should not be granted. We also appointed counsel to represent Haugen and permitted Haugen to file a supplemental petition. At the Attorney General's request, we then stayed the matter pending the California Supreme Court's decisions in In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181 (Lawrence) and In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241 (Shaputis), which clarify the standards for judicial review of parole decisions. The Attorney General subsequently filed a supplemental response and Haugen filed a traverse discussing the application of Lawrence and Shaputis to this case.
Applying the standards articulated in Lawrence and Shaputis, we conclude the record contains some evidence to support the Governor's decision. We, therefore, deny Haugen's requested habeas relief.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Circumstances of the Commitment Offenses
1. Board's and Governor's Versions
In order to avoid the filing of special circumstances allegations, Haugen pleaded guilty before having a preliminary hearing. Consequently, both the Board's and the Governor's decisions rely upon the summary of facts contained in the probation officer's report. According to the report, "[o]n December 7, 1980, sometime between 7:00 and 7:45 p.m., the defendant and two co-defendants entered the Rudy Sahagun Ranch near El Camino Real Highway in Carlsbad. According to [San Diego County Sheriff's Department and Carlsbad Police Department] reports, such a plan had been discussed the night before. They confronted a group of undocumented alien workers with the intention of taking money from them. Two of the subjects were armed – one with a rifle, the other with a handgun. In subsequent testimony from the co-defendants, it was stated that co-defendant Kennan had the rifle and that defendant, Haugen, possessed the pistol. According to some of the victims, the two carrying guns were also wearing ski masks. They pointed their guns at the victims and demanded money. Panic ensued and some of the migrant workers tried to run away. At this time, gunshots were fired. One victim thought [he] heard about five shots fired. One victim, Carmello Rosales Tecomulapa, was shot in the right upper buttocks and soon after died at the scene... The bullet removed from the victim's body, according to a Laboratory service report... 'was probably fired from [the handgun].'
The autopsy report indicated the bullet entered Tecomulapa's abdominal area and he died from a build up of blood in the lining of his abdomen.
"Victims testified that during this melee, they were robbed and beaten. One, Armando Lopez, stated to the officer that as he fled the shelter where they had gathered, he was caught by one of the suspects. The suspect then struck him over the head with the butt of his weapon, removed the victim's boots and attempted to remove his pants (which he believed was for the purpose of searching for money). Another victim, Benigno Cervantes, stated that a masked suspect threw him against the wall and shouted, 'money, money.' The suspect pointed the handgun at him. Cervantes removed his wallet and gave it to one of the suspects. They removed, he estimated, about $80 from his wallet."
2. Haugen's Version
Haugen's version of events varies situationally. At the change of plea hearing, he testified he and his crime partners "planned to go up and rob some aliens in Carlsbad." He then admitted to being armed at least for awhile and that one of the migrant workers was killed during the robbery. He also admitted he shared in the proceeds of the robbery, which he thought was about $87.
Haugen later told a probation officer that one of his crime partners suggested robbing migrant workers and both crime partners told him they knew of a place where they could do so. He claimed he was against the idea and instead suggested they try to make money by offering to transport the migrant workers to Los Angeles. He also claimed he did not know of and was not involved in a prior planning discussion to rob the migrant workers.
Haugen admitted to the probation officer he purchased the handgun with one of his crime partners, but he claimed that since his crime partner had put up all of the money for the gun, he told him to keep it. He also denied using the handgun during the robbery. Instead, he claimed the crime partner possessed and used the weapon during the robbery. He further denied hitting, robbing, or even encountering any of the aliens. Although he heard the gunshots, his crime partners assured him no one had been hurt or shot. He claimed he did not know about the murder until he was arrested. When the probation officer asked him why he participated in the plan, he replied, "I always do what other people tell me."
Haugen subsequently testified at his sentencing hearing and admitted he had lied to the probation officer several times. (People v. Haugen, supra, (4 Crim. No. 13343) [nonpub. opn.].) Based on his testimony and the information contained in the probation officer's report, the trial court stated emphatically it had no doubt Haugen fired the fatal shots. (Ibid.)
The record does not indicate which of Haugen's statements to the probation officer were false.
In January 2000 the trial court wrote a letter to the Board supporting a grant of parole for Haugen. It is clear from the letter the trial court continued to believe Haugen was armed during the robbery. Nevertheless, the trial court supported a grant of parole in part because Haugen pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity, he was young when he committed the crime, he did not have a prior history of violence, he had not planned to murder Tecomulapa, and his crime partners were committed to the California Youth Authority and released after serving seven-year sentences.
During a 2003 mental health evaluation, Haugen told a prison psychologist he thought his crime partners' suggestion to rob the migrant workers was stupid and he wished he had stood up and told them so. This version of events was confirmed during a 2005 mental health evaluation prepared for Haugen's 2006 parole hearing.
Conversely, in Haugen's version of events contained in a 2006 life prisoner evaluation, also prepared for Haugen's 2006 parole hearing, Haugen claimed he told his crime partners their plan to rob the migrant workers was a bad idea because most of the migrant workers send their money to their families in Mexico. Instead, he suggested they ask the migrant workers if they wanted to be transported past the then-existing San Clemente immigration checkpoint and claimed they went to the migrant camp with this intention. He further claimed the rifle and handgun were for self-protection.
Yet, at his 2006 parole hearing, Haugen admitted participating in a conspiracy to rob the migrant workers. As he has in the past, he denied confronting any of the migrant workers or using a firearm during the robbery. He told the Board that, when the migrant workers took off running, his crime partners pursued them, but he did not. Instead, he fled down a hill and waited in some bushes until his crime partners came by and the three walked back to their car. Although he did not see anyone take anything from anyone, his crime partners told him they had taken approximately $80.
B. Criminal History and Postconviction Conduct
Haugen's juvenile criminal history includes true findings for four burglaries as well as resisting arrest, petty theft, joy riding, and vandalism. His adult criminal history includes convictions for possessing over one ounce of marijuana and second-degree burglary. Haugen was on probation for the burglary conviction at the time of the commitment offense. He told the Board he committed the burglary to get money to "pay rent and that kind of stuff" "[i]nstead of getting a decent job."
During his incarceration, Haugen has received seven or eight disciplinary actions, and seven disciplinary counselings. Haugen's most recent disciplinary action was for using his prison work computer for personal business without authorization. His others were for theft, hotwiring, treating staff disrespectfully, engaging in disruptive behavior, failing to follow telephone protocol, and failing to report to work. Although the Board noted none of the disciplinary actions were for violent behavior, the Board regarded two of the disciplinary actions as serious because they resulted in a loss of conduct credit. Further, as we discuss below, many of the disciplinary actions, particularly those for unauthorized use of a prison computer, theft, and hotwiring, involve behavior analogous to the behavior underlying the commitment offense and Haugen's other crimes.
The Board noted seven disciplinary actions at Haugen's 2006 parole hearing. The Governor's decision reversing Haugen's grant of parole notes eight. We cannot resolve the discrepancy because the disciplinary actions are not included in the record.
C. Education, Vocational Training, Work Experience
While incarcerated, Haugen has obtained an Associate of Arts degree in General Education from Chapman University. In addition, he has completed vocational training in landscaping, drafting and design, and computer assisted drafting. He has also completed extension courses from Sacramento State College for water treatment and waste water treatment. At the time of his parole hearing, he was working for the prison as an engraver making signs, nameplates, nametags, trophies, and plaques. He has consistently received above average to exceptional performance ratings and his position saves the prison an estimated $45,000 annually by avoiding the need to outsource the work.
D. Social History and Parole Plans
Haugen remains in contact and has a good relationship with his parents. Although he is married, he and his wife are separated and he expects they will divorce in the future. He has two adult children with whom he remains in contact.
Once paroled, he may accept a part-time job offer from NST, Inc., a fabric manufacturing company in San Ysidro, to update their computer database. He may also open a yoga studio with his sister. In addition, his family members and friends have offered to provide him with housing as well as financial and other support.
E. Substance Abuse History, Self-Help Participation, and Mental Health History
Haugen told the probation officer he drank "lots" of vodka before the commitment offense, but did not take any drugs. According to his version of events in the 2006 life prisoner evaluation, he drank beer and vodka and consumed one Quaalude before the commitment offense. He told the prison psychologist who prepared the 2003 mental health evaluation that he had taken some Quaaludes, drank some vodka, and smoked some marijuana before the commitment offense. He also told the psychologist using drugs was the main focus of his life at the time of the commitment offense. At his 2006 parole hearing, he testified his substance abuse history includes using marijuana, Quaaludes and cocaine. However, he claims he has not used drugs since his arrest for the commitment offense. Nothing in the record contradicts this claim. Moreover, the record indicates that since December 2000, he has participated in Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous programs and plans to continue participating in these programs upon parole.
Haugen has also participated in numerous other self-help programs during his incarceration. His more recent activities include programs related to interpersonal relations, victim awareness, conflict resolution, and violence prevention. In addition, he participates in various mentoring programs and volunteers to work with psychiatrically impaired inmates. He credits his mentoring and volunteer work for sparking his rehabilitation efforts and hopes to continue this work, as well as his participation in violence prevention programs, upon parole.
Prison psychologists have diagnosed Haugen with polysubstance abuse, which is in remission, and antisocial personality disorder, which is improved. The 2005 mental health evaluation indicates Haugen's risk of engaging in future violence in the free community is low to moderate. This conclusion is based on the results of three assessment instruments: the Hare Psychopathy Checklist – Revised (PCL-R), the Historical, Clinical, Risk – 20 (HCR-20), and the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG). On the PCL-R, Haugen scored low, indicating psychopathy and its associated risk for violent recidivism is not a factor for him. On the HCR-20, which evaluates both dynamic and historical factors, Haugen scored in the low range. On the VRAG, which evaluates only historical factors, Haugen scored in the moderate range. According to the 2005 mental health evaluation, historical factors have more predictive value than dynamic factors in determining the risk of future violence.
F. Board Decision Granting Parole, Governor's Reversal, and Petition for Habeas Relief
After considering the circumstances of the commitment offense, Haugen's criminal history, personal history, prison programming, parole plans, and mental health history, as well as opposition to parole from the San Diego District Attorney's Office and the San Diego County Sheriff's Department, the Board determined Haugen was suitable for parole and his release would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or threat to public safety. The Board based its decision on several factors, including: Haugen's lack of a juvenile record for assaultive crimes, his stable social history and continuous relationships with family members, his education and vocational training, his excellent prison work history, and his extensive participation in self-help programs. The Board also noted the commitment offense was the only violent event in Haugen's background. The Board further determined Haugen had realistic parole plans and his growth, maturation, insight, remorse, and advanced age reduced his probability of recidivism.
The Governor subsequently reviewed and reversed the Board's decision because of the gravity of the commitment offense and because inconsistencies in Haugen's versions of events undermine his claims that he has accepted responsibility and is remorseful for his actions. Haugen contends the Governor's decision violates his due process rights because the decision is not supported by some evidence showing he poses a current threat to public safety.
II
DISCUSSION
The California Constitution empowers the Governor to review parole decisions involving inmates who have been convicted of murder and sentenced to indeterminate prison terms. (Cal. Const., art. V, § 8, subd. (b).) The Governor may affirm, modify, or reverse a parole decision based on the same statutory and regulatory factors the Board is required to consider. (Ibid.; see also, Pen. Code, § 3041.2; Shaputis, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1258; In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 660 (Rosenkrantz).) These factors include the circumstances of the commitment offense as well as the inmate's motivation for the commitment offense, criminal history, record of violence, age, social history, mental health, institutional behavior, parole plans, and signs of remorse. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subds. (b)-(d).) The Governor has the discretion to determine how to balance these factors, resolve any evidentiary conflicts, and determine the weight to be given the evidence. (Shaputis, supra, at p. 1260; Rosenkrantz, supra, at p. 677.) Moreover, because the Governor's review is independent and de novo, the Governor may be more stringent or cautious than the Board in deciding whether an inmate's release will pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. (Shaputis, supra, at p. 1258; Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1204; Rosenkrantz, supra, at pp. 660, 686.) When reviewing a decision by the Governor to reverse a grant of parole, our role is to determine whether there is some evidence in the record, meaning at least a modicum, to support the conclusion the inmate is unsuitable for parole because the inmate is currently dangerous. (Shaputis, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1254; Lawrence, supra, at p. 1191.)
Here, the Governor reversed the Board's parole decision primarily based on the gravity of the commitment offense, which the Governor considered to be especially heinous because it involved multiple victims. The fact that multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed is an indication that a commitment offense is especially heinous. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (c)(1)(A).) Moreover, the probation officer's report provides some evidence there were multiple victims in this case. Nonetheless, the circumstances of the commitment offense are not sufficient to justify a decision to deny parole unless the circumstances, when considered in light of the other facts in the record, demonstrate the inmate is currently dangerous. (Shaputis, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1254-1255.)
The Governor also reversed the Board's parole decision because of concerns about the genuineness of Haugen's acceptance of responsibility and expressions of remorse. An inmate's acceptance of responsibility and signs of remorse may be considered in determining the inmate's suitability for parole. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (d)(3); Shaputis, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1246.) In addition, to the extent these factors show an inmate lacks insight into and understanding of the behavior precipitating the commitment offense, they can support a conclusion the inmate is currently dangerous. (Shaputis, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1260.)
We recognize an inmate cannot be required to discuss the circumstances of the commitment offense or to admit guilt in order to be found suitable for parole. (Penal Code, § 5011; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2236.) However, if an inmate chooses to discuss the circumstances of the commitment offense, or the inmate's responsibility and remorse for an offense, the Board and Governor may consider the inmate's remarks to the extent the remarks are relevant to the inmate's parole suitability. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (b) ["All relevant, reliable information available to the panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole."].)
Expressions of insight and remorse will vary from inmate to inmate and there are no special words for an inmate to articulate in order to communicate he or she has committed to ending a previous pattern of violent or antisocial behavior. (Shaputis, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1260, fn. 18.) Haugen most clearly articulated his acceptance of responsibility and expression of remorse in his closing remarks at the parole hearing. He stated, "I would never even say it was anything other than a cowardly act. It was and it's despicable and it's something that I – that it's just terrible, deep down inside what happened to [Tecomulapa]. It's what I use to keep me on the right track. And for me to try to make excuses or try to say that look, I'm not the guy who pulled the trigger and took [his] life, you know what, it doesn't make any difference. You know, in reality, the fact of the matter is I'm responsible in my heart for the death of [Tecomulapa]. It doesn't matter – It doesn't matter what my crime partner did."
Haugen's remarks, although apparently sincere, are largely undercut by current inconsistencies in his versions of events. While Haugen has consistently denied being the shooter, his versions of events in the probation report, the 2003 mental health evaluation, the 2006 life prisoner evaluation, and his testimony before the Board are incompatible with one another on the key points of his level of participation in planning the robbery, whether he did anything to attempt to dissuade his crime partners from committing the robbery, and whether he went with his crime partners to the migrant workers' location intending to rob the migrant workers or intending to offer them transportation past an immigration checkpoint. Because the 2006 life prisoner evaluation was prepared for and the 2003 mental health evaluation was updated for Haugen's 2006 parole hearing, they presumably reflect Haugen's current thoughts about these key points. Consequently, their inconsistency on these key points is inexplicable and provides some evidence that Haugen lacks insight into and understanding of the behavior that led to Tecomulapa's death.
Nothing in the record indicates Haugen has disputed their accuracy on these key points.
Haugen's prison disciplinary history further supports this conclusion. While none of Haugen's prison disciplinary actions involved violent behavior, many of them, including his most recent disciplinary action in 2001 for unauthorized use of a prison computer, involved Haugen taking or using things without entitlement. Analogous behavior led to the commitment offense and most of Haugen's other crimes. Haugen's continued engagement in this type of behavior 20 years after his incarceration, coupled with the inconsistencies in his versions of events tends to show Haugen has not committed to ending his previous pattern of antisocial behavior and, therefore, provides ample evidence to support the Governor's conclusion Haugen is currently dangerous and his release would pose an unreasonable public safety risk. (Shaputis, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1260; Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1228.)
DISPOSITION
Relief denied.
I CONCUR, IRION, J.
McDONALD, J., Dissenting.
I would grant the relief requested in Richard Haugen's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. I do not find some evidence in the record to support the Governor's reversal of the grant of parole by the Board of Parole Hearings (Board).
The Governor relied primarily on his perceived gravity of then 20-year-old Haugen's 1980 offense, which resulted in a prison sentence of 25 years to life. The Governor's reversal of the Board stated: "The gravity of the first-degree murder committed by Mr. Haugen is alone sufficient for me to conclude presently that his release from prison would pose an unreasonable public safety risk." The Governor also referred to Haugen's prison discipline on eight occasions during more than 26 years of incarceration (now 29 years), none of which were for violent conduct, and to his alleged inconsistent descriptions of the offense, although Haugen has accepted responsibility for the offense and is remorseful for his conduct, as factors supporting the Governor's decision to reverse the Board's grant of parole.
At least since the decisions in In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181 (Lawrence) and In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241, judicial review of denial of parole by the Board, or reversal by the Governor of the Board's grant of parole, to an inmate incarcerated for an indeterminate life sentence is limited to a review of the record to determine whether there is some evidence the inmate currently is a danger to public safety if released on parole. The majority opinion finds some evidence of Haugen's current dangerousness and denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
In Lawrence, the court, recognizing that the legislative scheme contemplates "an assessment of an inmate's current dangerousness" (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1205), resolved the conflict among the lower courts by clarifying that the analysis required when reviewing a decision relating to a prisoner's current suitability for parole is "whether some evidence supports the decision of the Board or the Governor that the inmate constitutes a current threat to public safety, and not merely whether some evidence confirms the existence of certain factual findings." (Id. at p. 1212.) Lawrence clarified that the standard for judicial review, although "unquestionably deferential, [is] certainly... not toothless, and 'due consideration' of the specified factors requires more than rote recitation of the relevant factors with no reasoning establishing a rational nexus between those factors and the necessary basis for the ultimate decision--the determination of current dangerousness." (Lawrence, at p. 1210, italics added.) Indeed, it is Lawrence's numerous iterations of the requirement of a "rational nexus" between the facts underlying the unsuitability factor and the conclusion of current dangerousness that appear to form the crux of, and provide the teeth for, the standards adopted in Lawrence to clarify and illuminate "the precise contours of the 'some evidence' standard." (Id. at p. 1206.)
The implementation of a rational nexus standard finds confirmation in Lawrence's numerous references to that standard or to functional equivalents of that standard. For example, in at least two other places in the opinion, Lawrence reiterated the requirement that there be a "rational nexus" between the facts relied on by the Governor and the conclusion of current dangerousness. (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1213 [suggesting court applied inappropriate standard when it affirmed denial of parole "without specifically considering whether there existed a rational nexus between those egregious circumstances and the ultimate conclusion that the inmate remained a threat to public safety"] & p. 1227 ["mere recitation of the circumstances of the commitment offense, absent articulation of a rational nexus between those facts and current dangerousness, fails to provide the required 'modicum of evidence' of unsuitability"].)
Additionally, other critical passages in Lawrence reinforce the requirement of some rational connection between the facts relied on and the conclusion of dangerousness. (See, e.g., Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1211 ["If simply pointing to the existence of an unsuitability factor and then acknowledging the existence of suitability factors were sufficient to establish that a parole decision was not arbitrary, and that it was supported by 'some evidence,' a reviewing court would be forced to affirm any denial-of-parole decision linked to the mere existence of certain facts in the record, even if those facts have no bearing on the paramount statutory inquiry"], italics added.)
Lawrence's "rational nexus" requirement is echoed by its repeated references to a slightly different variant of that concept: whether the factor relied on to deny parole is probative of current dangerousness. (See, e.g., Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1212 [factors will "establish unsuitability if, and only if, those circumstances are probative to the determination that a prisoner remains a danger"], p. 1214 ["the aggravated nature of the crime does not in and of itself provide some evidence of current dangerousness to the public unless the record also establishes that something in the prisoner's pre- or post-incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor and mental state, indicates that the implications regarding the prisoner's dangerousness that derive from his or her commission of the commitment offense remain probative to the statutory determination of a continuing threat to public safety"], & p. 1221 [the "relevant inquiry for a reviewing court is not merely whether an inmate's crime was especially callous, or shockingly vicious or lethal, but whether the identified facts are probative to the central issue of current dangerousness when considered in light of the full record"].) Because evidence is "probative" only when it has some "tendency in reason to prove" the proposition for which it is offered (see, e.g. People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 16, 29, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 582, fn. 5), the Lawrence court appears to have employed the terms "rational nexus" and "probative" interchangeably.
After clarifying the applicable standard of review, Lawrence then turned to and specifically addressed how one "unsuitability" factor--whether the inmate's commitment offense was done in a particularly heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner--can affect the parole suitability determination, and whether the existence of some evidence supporting the finding that the offense was particularly heinous, atrocious, or done in a cruel manner is alone sufficient to deny parole. Lawrence concluded that when there has been a lengthy passage of time, reliance on the nature of the commitment offense as a basis to deny parole is permissible only when there are other facts in the record, such as the prisoner's history before and after the offense or the prisoner's current demeanor and mental state, that provide a rational nexus for concluding an offense of ancient vintage continues to be predictive of current dangerousness. (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1211, 1214, 1221.)
In the present case, paraphrasing Lawrence, "[a]lthough the [Governor] alluded to other possible grounds for denying petitioner's parole, [he] expressly relied... upon the nature of petitioner's commitment offense to justify petitioner's continued confinement, because [he ruled that] 'the gravity [of Haugen's crime is] alone... sufficient... to conclude presently that [Haugen's] release from prison would pose an unreasonable public safety risk.' " (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1222.) The Governor expressly declared that the circumstances of Haugen's crime constituted the paramount basis for finding current dangerousness. However, as the majority opinion points out, "the circumstances of the commitment offense are not sufficient to justify a decision to deny parole unless the circumstances, when considered in light of the other facts in the record, demonstrate the inmate is currently dangerous."
The Governor refers to Haugen's conduct during his 26 years of incarceration, including being disciplined eight times and being counseled seven times for minor misconduct. However, none of the referenced offenses involved violent conduct and the most recent event occurred over 10 years ago. The Governor's reference to this discipline makes no attempt to articulate any nexus between those events and his finding of Haugen's current dangerousness to society if released on parole.
With regard to the Governor's reference to Haugen's various descriptions of his offense given to authorities over the years, the Governor concedes Haugen currently accepts responsibility for the offense and is remorseful that his conduct has caused trauma to the victim's family and friends and to his own family and friends. Considering Haugen's current undisputed acceptance of responsibility and remorse, and that for years his psychological evaluations have concluded he is in the low range of danger to society, there is no nexus articulated by the Governor between Haugen's various descriptions of the offense over the years and the conclusion he is currently a danger to society.
In my opinion, there is not some evidence to support the Governor's reversal of the Board's decision to grant Haugen parole and I would grant the relief requested in his petition for writ of habeas corpus.