As addressed below, the State Court Judgment became a final judgment under California law prior to the Defendant-Debtor commencing his bankruptcy case. Plaintiff asserts that the Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted because the State Court Judgment meets the requirements for Issue Preclusion as stated in Harmon v. Kobrin (In re Harmon) , 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001), and In re Solario , 611 B.R. 327, 340-41 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2020). Plaintiff asserts the following points.

In California, application of issue preclusion requires that: (1) the issue sought to be precluded from re-litigation is identical to that decided in a former proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the former proceeding; (3) the issue was necessarily decided in the former proceeding; (4) the decision in the former proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom preclusion is sought was the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. Harmon v. Kobrin (In re Harmon), 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001), citing Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.3d 335, 341 (1990); see also, Baldwin v. Kilpatrick (In re Baldwin), 249 F.3d 912, 917-918 (9th Cir. 2001). 6. California places an additional limitation on issue preclusion: courts may give preclusive effect to a judgment "only if application of preclusion furthers the public policies underlying the doctrine."

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant is estopped from denying any of the allegations in the California Complaint in this bankruptcy proceeding because the State of California accords collateral estoppel effect to default judgments. Courts have held that "[t]he ordinary rules of collateral estoppel and res judicata apply in most actions in the bankruptcy court, including adversary proceedings under § 523(a) to except debts from discharge." McCory v. Spigel (In re Spigel), 260 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n.11 (1991); FDIC v. Shearson-American Express, Inc., 996 F.2d 493, 497 (1st Cir. 1993)); see Harmon v. Kobrin (In re Harmon), 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001); Baldwin v. Kilpatrick (In re Baldwin), 249 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 2001); Backlund v. Stanley-Snow (In re Stanley-Snow), 405 B.R. 11, 18 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2009); Chapman v. Tracey (In re Tracey), 250 B.R. 468, 471 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000).

" To prevail on a § 523(a)(2)(A) claim, a creditor must establish five elements: "'(1) misrepresentation, fraudulent omission or deceptive conduct by the debtor; (2) knowledge of the falsity or deceptiveness of his statement or conduct; (3) an intent to deceive; (4) justifiable reliance by the creditor on the debtor's statement or conduct; and (5) damage to the creditor proximately caused by its reliance on the debtor's statement or conduct.'" Oney v. Weinberg (In re Weinberg), 410 B.R. 19, 35 (9th Cir. BAP 2009) (quoting Turtle Rock Meadows Homeowners Ass'n v. Slyman (In re Slyman), 234 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also Harmon v. Kobrin (In re Harmon), 250 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001); American Express Travel Related ServicesCo. Inc. v. Hashemi (In re Hashemi), 104 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir.1996). Notwithstanding the weighty burden, a creditor bears the burden of proof to establish each of the five elements by a preponderance of the evidence.

The party asserting preclusion bears the burden of establishing the threshold requirements. Harmon v. Kobrin (In re Harmon), 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001). This means providing " a record sufficient to reveal the controlling facts and pinpoint the exact issues litigated in the prior action."

The party asserting preclusion bears the burden of establishing the threshold requirements. Harmon v. Kobrin (In re Harmon), 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001). This means providing "a record sufficient to reveal the controlling facts and pinpoint the exact issues litigated in the prior action."

The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in dischargeability proceedings to preclude the relitigation of state court findings relevant to exceptions to discharge. Harmon v. Kobrin (In re Harmon), 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001); T & D Moravits & Co. v. Munton (In re Munton), 352 B.R. 707, 712 (9th Cir. BAP 2006). Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, we apply the preclusion law of the state in which the judgment originates.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in dischargeability proceedings to preclude the relitigation of state court findings relevant to exceptions to discharge. Harmon v. Kobrin (In re Harmon), 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001); T & D Moravits & Co. v. Munton (In re Munton), 352 B.R. 707, 712 (9th Cir. BAP 2006). Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, we apply the preclusion law of the state in which the judgment originates.

Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. . . . The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these requirements. In re Harmon, 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.3d 335, 341 (1990)). If all of the threshold requirements are met, the court then must decide whether application of collateral estoppel would "further the policy interests underlying the doctrine."

In California, "courts will apply collateral estoppel only if certain threshold requirements are met, and then only if application of preclusion furthers the public policies underlying the doctrine."In re Harmon, 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001). There are five threshold requirements: