Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-1755 Section: "R" (4)
January 16, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is claimant Dennis Meadors' petition for cure. Meadors asks this Court to compel petitioner Gulf South Marine Transportation, Inc. to authorize payment for psychological counseling as part of its cure obligations. For the following reasons, the Court denies claimant's motion.
I. Background
On or about December 16, 2000, Dennis Meadors allegedly suffered a severe and disabling back injury while working on a vessel, which resulted in his undergoing several back surgeries at the L4-5 and L5-S1 levels. He filed suit against Gulf South Marine Transportation, Inc., the owner and operator of the vessel, alleging negligence under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness under general maritime law. He seeks maintenance and cure, as well as monetary damages for pain and suffering, loss of earnings, and mental anguish. Gulf South is currently paying maintenance and cure obligations.
Meadors claims that since he has been unable to work since the accident, he has been suffering from anxiety about his inability to meet his child support payments and the possibility of jail time for such failure. His treating physician referred him to a psychologist. (Mot. for Cure, Ex. A.) Meadors attempted to set up an appointment to see the psychologist but was informed that Gulf South refused to authorize payment for such treatment. (Mot. for Cure, Ex. C.) Claimant now brings this motion asking the Court to compel Gulf South, as part of its cure obligation, to furnish claimant with psychological treatment.
Claimant also moved the Court to compel Gulf South to pay for a lumbosacral corset. That claim is now moot as petitioner has since provided claimant with the corset.
Gulf South makes two arguments opposing claimant's motion for cure. First, it argues that claimant's motion is procedurally defective. Second, Gulf South contends that Meadors' anxiety about his inability to pay child support and fear of returning to prison for such failure predated the accident and stems from a history of family neglect over two decades.
II. Discussion
A. Procedure
The parties dispute the type of proceeding before the Court. Defendant argues that the motion is procedurally defective because Louisiana rules of procedure prohibit the use of a summary procedure on maintenance and cure claims. See Perry v. Allied Offshore Marine, Corp., 618 So.2d 1033, (La.App. 1 Cir. 1993). The Court rejects defendant's argument. The Court notes that these proceedings are governed by federal procedure, not state procedure. Also, the Perry decision addressed the use of "summary proceedings" under Book V of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, not the use of "summary judgment." See Richard v. Garber Bros., 644 So.2d 682, *3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1994) (recognizing plaintiff's right to summary judgment on issues of maintenance and cure).
Plaintiff insists that this is a motion to reinstate cure and asserts that it is not governed by the summary judgment standard. In support, he points to Sefcik v. Ocean Pride Alaska, 844 F. Supp. 1372, 1373 (D. Ak. 1993). The Court disagrees. In Sefcik, the issue before the court was whether plaintiff had achieved maximum cure before defendant stopped payments or whether defendants were required to continue paying cure. Id. See Johnson v. Marlin Drilling Co., 893 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1990) (same issue). This case is not about whether plaintiff has reached maximum cure, but instead is whether defendant's cure obligations extend to paying for psychological treatment. Indeed, the Court notes that neither party has submitted any evidence on the question of whether claimant has reached maximum cure.
Here, claimant asks the Court to find that he is entitled to cure for psychological treatment. Matters outside of the pleadings have been presented to and not excluded by the Court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(C). Such a motion is construed as a one for summary judgment. See, e.g., Bodden v. Professional Divers of New Orleans, Inc., 2001 WL 1223589, *1 (construing motion compelling shipowner to authorize payment of medical expenses as a motion for summary judgment).
B. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). Accordingly, a court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party. In other words, "if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its burden." Beck v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 2000).
Initially, the moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. If the dispositive issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Summary judgment is mandated if the nonmovant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential on which it bears the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54; Rushing v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 505 (5th Cir. 1999).
C. Analysis
Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to cure because his anxiety about being unable to pay his child support payments resulted from the physical injury he sustained that left him unable to work. He asserts that before the accident he did not suffer from anxiety because he was able to work and pay his child support obligations. The record reflects that plaintiff had a long history of being derelict in child support, which predates his injury. See Def. Ex. A at p. 162; Ex. B; Ex. C and Ex. G.
A seaman who is injured or falls ill while in the service of his ship is entitled to the remedy of maintenance and cure from his employer. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 42, 63 S.Ct. 488, 491 (1943); Caufield v. AC D Marine, Inc., 633 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1981). "Cure" is the seaman's right to necessary medical services. See Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1499 (5th Cir. 1995). The Fifth Circuit has found that cure includes the shipowner's duty to pay for psychological treatment. See Harrell v. Air Logistics, Inc., 805 F.2d 1173, 1174 (5th Cir. 1986).
Cure is due regardless of the cause of the seaman's injuries. See Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1499 ("When a seaman becomes ill or injured while in the service of his ship, the shipowner must pay him maintenance and cure regardless of whether the shipowner was at fault or whether the ship was unseaworthy."); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law, § 6-28 (2d ed. 1994) ("The duty to provide maintenance and cure is without regard to fault, and negligence and causation are not relevant."). Employers are obliged to furnish maintenance and cure with respect to pre-existing illnesses. See Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527, 58 S.Ct. 651, (1938).
Before plaintiff can recover cure, he bears the burden of alleging and proving the following facts: (a) his engagement as a seaman, (b) that his illness or injury occurred, was aggravated or manifested itself while in the ship's service, (c) the wages to which he may be entitled, and (d) the expenditures or liability incurred by him for medicines, nursing care, board and lodging. Foster, III v. Brian's Trans. Serv., et al., 1993 WL 114528, *2 (E.D. La. 1993) (citing MARTIN NORRIS, 2 THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 26.21, at 53 (Supp. 1992)). This burden of proof, however, is light, and the Court resolves ambiguities and doubts in the seaman's favor. See id. (citing Vaughan v. Atkinson, et al., 369 U.S. 527, 532, 82 S.Ct. 997, 1000 (1962)).
The central dispute in this case is whether claimant's psychological injury, secondary to claimant's primary physical injury, arose while claimant was "in the service of his ship." Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 318 U.S. 724, 726, 63 S.Ct. 930, 932 (1943). Unlike other cases in which courts have required shipowners to provide cure for psychological treatment, such as for post-traumatic stress disorder or mental illness, in this case, plaintiff allegedly suffers from a generalized anxiety arising out of his inability to work. Compare Armstrong v. Trico Marine, 923 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1991) (remanding to the district court for a determination of whether seaman was entitled to maintenance and cure for post-traumatic stress disorder); Nelsen v. Research Corporation of the University of Hawaii, 805 F. Supp. 837, 846, 853 (D. Haw. 1992) (citations omitted) (finding that twenty-five percent of claimant's later diagnosed depression was attributable to his service on the ship). Plaintiff points to no legal authority, and the Court can find none that requires shipowners to make cure payments to treat anxiety arising from purely financial concerns.
Further, Meadors presents no evidence beyond his own assertions to establish that his alleged psychological injury was related to his physical injuries. See Roberts v. The City of New York, 1987 WL 14469 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding shipowner not required to furnish cure for psychological counseling after medical evidence showed that plaintiff suffered from emotional problems unrelated to his injury); Biesemeyer v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 382, 383 (N.D. Cal. 1950) (finding evidence insufficient to show that plaintiff's mental neurosis accompanied the physical injury). The only medical evidence in the record is a progress note written by claimant's treating physician, an orthopedic surgeon, in which the doctor merely restates claimant's claim that he is "fairly stressed" about his failure to pay child support. (Mot. for Cure, Ex. A.) The physician, however, does not state anywhere in the referral form that the anxiety accompanied injuries plaintiff allegedly suffered on the ship or indeed arose as a result of anything that happened on the ship. Nor is the statement a diagnosis of anxiety. Plaintiff does not submit medical records or physician testimony. Compare DiBenedetto v. Williams, 880 F. Supp. 80, 87 (D.R.I. 1995) (finding plaintiff entitled to cure where medical records supported a finding that carpal tunnel syndrome caused by work injury rather than as a result of being handcuffed by police); Lirette v. KB Boat Rentals, 579 F.2d 968, 979 (5th Cir. 1978) ("When the award is supported by physician's testimony, however, court have granted future maintenance, including: psychological treatments. . . .") (citations omitted). Indeed, the Court finds a single note written by an orthopedic surgeon insufficient evidence to show that claimant in fact suffers from medical anxiety.
Because of the lack of legal authority cited by plaintiff in support of this claim and the scarcity of the medical evidence in the record, the Court denies plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of cure.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies claimant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of his entitlement to cure for psychological treatment.