Opinion
No. 341006
05-17-2018
In re GREGORY, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED Oakland Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 2015-831263-NA Before: O'CONNELL, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and K. F. KELLY, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to the two minor children, JG and DG, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and (j) (likelihood of harm). Because the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with the children, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Respondent's oldest son, JG, was born in 2013. In mid-2014, respondent gave birth to a second son, KG. In November 2014, Children's Protective Services (CPS) opened an investigation into the family after receiving complaints of domestic violence between respondent and the children's biological father. The CPS referral also included complaints of improper supervision. Several services were offered, but respondent refused to participate in substance abuse or mental health treatment. Tragically, in February 2015, KG died while in respondent's care. An autopsy later revealed that KG died from accidental positional asphyxiation. After KG's death, JG was placed in the care of a relative pursuant to a CPS safety plan. However, respondent violated the safety plan when she took JG out of the relative's home. JG was formally removed from respondent's care, and DHHS filed a petition in March 2015 requesting that the trial court take jurisdiction of JG.
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the children's father, but he has not appealed that order and is not a party to this appeal. --------
After the filing of the petition, several months elapsed while the trial court confirmed that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 USC 1901 et seq., did not apply. In the meantime, DHHS offered services to the parents and provided parenting time. In October 2015, following an adjudication trial, the court assumed jurisdiction over JG and ordered respondent to participate in services that included a substance abuse assessment, drug screens, parenting classes, and a psychological evaluation, among others.
In April 2016, respondent gave birth to her third son, DG. At the time of his birth, DG tested positive for marijuana. Thereafter, CPS removed DG from respondent's care and placed him with his brother, JG, in the home of their paternal grandmother. Eventually, the trial court also found statutory grounds to take jurisdiction of respondent's youngest child.
After DG's birth, respondent continued to refuse to participate fully in services. Over the course of several dispositional review periods spanning 11 months, the trial court granted respondent additional time to work toward reunification. In March 2017, DHHS sought to terminate respondent's parental rights. The trial court entered an order on September 28, 2017, terminating respondent's parental rights to her two children.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, respondent does not challenge the trial court's findings that there existed statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights and that termination was in the children's best interests. Instead, respondent asserts that the trial court erred when it found that DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, particularly because DHHS failed to address the grief she suffered following the death of her infant son, KG. This Court reviews a trial court's finding that "reasonable efforts were made to preserve and reunify the family" for clear error. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542-543; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). After reviewing the record, we conclude that respondent has failed to demonstrate that the trial court clearly erred when it found that DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
Before a court may contemplate termination of a parent's parental rights, DHHS must make reasonable efforts to reunite the family. MCL 712A.19a(2). "The adequacy of [DHHS's] efforts to provide services may bear on whether there is sufficient evidence to terminate a parent's rights." In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 89; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). "While the [DHHS] has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to participate in the services that are offered." In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). In In re Hicks, 500 Mich 79; 893 NW2d 637 (2017), our Supreme Court considered whether DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify an intellectually disabled parent with her children in light of obligations imposed by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq. The Supreme Court noted that "the ADA requires that 'no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.' " Id. at 86, quoting 42 USC 12132. The Supreme Court held that DHHS's "efforts at reunification cannot be reasonable under the Probate Code if the Department has failed to modify its standard procedures in ways that are reasonably necessary to accommodate a disability under the ADA." Id. With these principles in mind, the record does not support respondent's argument that DHHS failed to provide services designed to address her mental health issues.
There is no dispute that respondent had mental health issues that were exacerbated by the tragic and accidental death of her child. Regarding implementation of the case plan, the caseworker testified that he was aware that respondent had a learning disability, which he took into account when drafting the treatment plan. Further, before the caseworker provided any paperwork to respondent, he always gave a copy to respondent's attorney so that the attorney could also explain the documents to respondent. Nonetheless, respondent did not comply with the case service plan.
Early on, the trial court recognized respondent's disdain for the system and for her caseworker. In an effort to provide respondent with an advocate who might be perceived as more neutral, the court appointed a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) volunteer. In addition, the caseworker referred respondent to a life skills coach, who provided respondent with weekly, face-to-face, hands-on guidance. The life skills coach sought to help respondent find a therapist, acquire housing, set a budget, manage her anger issues, and improve her parenting skills. Despite this intensive weekly assistance, respondent failed to participate in any meaningful way in counseling services.
Regarding the substance of the case service plan, respondent's caseworker testified that the treatment plan was tailored to address respondent's mental health issues, including grief counseling. DHHS referred respondent for a psychological evaluation on three separate occasions. The results of this evaluation would have provided the necessary guidance into the types of referrals appropriate to assist respondent. DHHS and the life skills coach gave respondent assistance in scheduling, and the CASA volunteer offered to drive respondent to an appointment. Despite these efforts, respondent refused to submit to the evaluation until a fourth appointment scheduled for July 21, 2016, 16 months after removal of the children from respondent's care and nine months after adjudication.
After the July 21, 2016 evaluation, the psychologist recommended that respondent participate in counseling that included grief therapy, among other things. The psychologist further recommended that respondent be evaluated by a psychiatrist to determine whether her symptoms of depression could be reduced through psychotropic medications. Respondent had the benefit of medical insurance. The caseworker and life skills coach explained to respondent several times that she must use the telephone number on the back of her insurance card to request the name of a therapist. Respondent refused to follow through with these directions. In addition, respondent refused to attend treatment because of the psychologist's recommendation of a referral for the consideration of psychotropic medications. DHHS also gave respondent bus passes, but she lost some and used some for purposes other than attending counseling sessions.
DHHS also sought to facilitate parenting time between respondent and the children. When parenting time supervised by the paternal grandmother became contentious, respondent had the opportunity to identify her own designees to supervise the visits. When these individuals proved unreliable, DHHS offered to supervise the visits. Respondent refused the offer and became irate because parenting time was not held on her terms. As a result of her own actions, respondent missed valuable parenting time with her children. Finally, in an effort to avoid overwhelming respondent, the caseworker tried to minimize the requirements on respondent by focusing on counseling. Respondent would not even comply with this bare minimum.
Moreover, respondent has failed to address how additional services would have affected the outcome. Considering respondent's history of noncompliance with services, even if additional referrals had been made, it is unlikely that respondent would have cooperated with these efforts. Respondent's life skills coach, the one person with whom respondent built a trusting relationship, concluded that respondent was not motivated to seek therapy. Indeed, respondent candidly disclosed to the coach that she had no intention of cooperating with DHHS's efforts. Further, when respondent was first evaluated in July 2016, the psychologist noted respondent's rejection of grief therapy, stating that she did not appreciate the trial court's order that she attend grief therapy. Thirteen months later, respondent's receptiveness to participating in grief therapy had not changed. At the time of the termination hearing, the children had been in care for more than two years. During this time, respondent had multiple opportunities to participate in grief therapy. She rejected these opportunities at every turn.
Respondent faults DHHS for failing to provide services designed to address her mental health issues. DHHS sought to address respondent's mental health issues, but respondent failed to comply with and benefit from the services offered. Respondent refused to participate in the initial services that would have assisted DHHS in identifying her needs and thereafter making the necessary referrals. Respondent did not take responsibility in participating in services offered. We cannot conclude that DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family or failed to appropriately modify those services to respondent's specific needs. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that DHHS's efforts toward family reunification were reasonable.
We affirm.
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly