Opinion
No. 05-07-01764-CV
Opinion Filed April 23, 2008.
Original Proceeding from the Probate Court No. 3, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 07-01-MI.
Before Justices WRIGHT, O'NEILL, and LANG.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this original proceeding, relator Green Oaks Hospital Subsidiary, L.P. d/b/a Green Oaks Hospital (Green Oaks) contends the trial court entered an illegal "Cost Order." Because we conclude any controversy regarding the trial court's cost order is not yet ripe for review, we dismiss Green Oaks's petition for writ of mandamus.
Green Oaks provides psychiatric care to patients committed under the Texas Health and Safety Code. The judge of the probate court number three sent Green Oaks and other health care facilities in the Dallas area a "Standing Order Regarding Court Costs in Mental Illness Cases." The first two paragraphs of the order contain provisions for assessing purported costs against private mental health facilities. The first paragraph applied only to private mental health facilities "making application" for court-ordered involuntary commitment. This portion of the order required such facilities to pay a $494 per patient "court cost deposit" at the time of filing. It is undisputed that the "ordinary filing fees" for an involuntary commitment proceeding are $174. The trial court apparently included in the deposit other anticipated "court costs and fees," presumably representing future expected reasonable fees for a private attorney and a master for a probable cause hearing. The amount to be charged was a set fee without reference to the particular case and before any such costs accrued. Rule 146 of the rules of civil procedure generally allows for a court cost deposit, but only against a party and only in an amount sufficient to pay the accrued costs. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 146; see Dilmore v. Russell, 519 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
Regardless, paragraph one is applicable only if the health care facility was the actual applicant for a court-ordered involuntary commitment. There is nothing in the mandamus record to show Green Oaks has ever made application for court-ordered mental health services. In fact, based on its petition for mandamus, such applications are prosecuted by the District Attorney in the name of the State of Texas. Green Oaks only asserts it treats these patients and "participates" in the involuntary commitment proceedings. Thus, the first paragraph of the order would not appear to apply to Green Oaks and Green Oaks has not alleged or shown otherwise.
The second paragraph of the order, on the other hand, applies to all private mental health facilities providing mental health services. While Green Oaks provides mental health services to patients, it claims it does so as a public facility. The second paragraph of the order states a private facility shall be "subject to a judgment" for "court costs" in the amount of $494 per case. The order does not explain how such a judgment would or could be entered against a third party. The order does, however, state that a failure to pay a "bill for such costs" by the "due date" shall result in the facility being placed on a cash-only basis. The second paragraph does not state what the "due date" for any such "judgment" or bill would be and it does not appear any such judgment has ever been entered against Green Oaks. Nor does the order set out the consequences of being on a cash only basis.
While Green Oaks's chief executive officer stated in an affidavit that his "understanding" of the cost order is that the elected judge of the probate court would refuse to hold a hearing on an involuntary commitment if Green Oaks did not pay costs before they were incurred, there is nothing to show the trial court has or would refuse to hold a hearing on any application. There is nothing in the order to suggest the trial court would apply the order in a manner that would determine the merits of any matter. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 3a (no order or practice of any court, other than a local rule that fully complies with rule 3a, shall ever be applied to determine the merits of any matter). Nor is there anything in this record to show the county clerk would refuse to file a petition for a purported failure to pay costs before they were incurred. We will not presume the probate court would refuse to hold a hearing on a petition for involuntary commitment. Nor will we presume the county clerk would refuse to file an application for involuntary commitment.
Ripeness, like standing, is a threshold issue that implicates subject matter jurisdiction. Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston SE Tex., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998). Standing focuses on who may bring the action while ripeness focuses on when the action may be brought. Id. Ripeness asks whether the facts have developed sufficiently so that an injury has occurred or is likely to occur, rather than being contingent or remote. Id. Ripeness focuses on whether the case involves "uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." Id.
As of the time the mandamus was filed, Green Oaks had not yet "tested" the order. Indeed, in this mandamus, Green Oaks, by virtue of certain contracts with Dallas County, is claiming it is not a private facility for purposes of the commitment proceedings. Arguably, therefore, the probate court may not apply this order to Green Oaks. Further, there is nothing in this record to show the county clerk refused to file any applications where the statutory filing fee had been paid, but supposed costs or the "court cost deposit" had not. Nor is there anything in the record to show the probate court ever refused to hold a hearing on an application for court-ordered mental health services. Finally, there is nothing in this record to show the probate court has actually assessed any costs against Green Oaks, or how it might do so. A case is not ripe when its resolution depends upon contingent or hypothetical facts, or upon events that have not yet come to pass. This Court is presented only with a standing order without any evidence of the practical effect of that order on Green Oaks. Green Oaks's complaints concern its speculation regarding how this order will be applied. We conclude Green Oaks's complaints about the order are not ripe for review at this time. We dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus.