Opinion
No. 5-695 / 05-1303
Filed November 9, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Nancy S. Tabor, Judge.
A mother and father appeal from the termination of their parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Timothy Tupper, Davenport, for appellant mother.
Christine Frederick of Zamora, Taylor, Frederick, Alexander Woods, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Gerda Lane, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Lucas Valainis, Davenport, for minor child.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Zimmer, JJ.
I. Background facts Proceedings.
G.R. was born in November 2003. W.R. and S.R. are her parents.
After G.R. was twice hospitalized and diagnosed with failure to thrive, the juvenile court issued an ex parte removal order placing G.R. in foster care on February 11, 2004. On February 12, 2004, the State filed a petition alleging G.R. was a child in need of assistance, citing evidence that G.R. was physically abused or neglected by her parents; parental failure to exercise reasonable care and supervision; as well as parental failure to provide adequate food, clothing, or shelter. Iowa Code § 232.2(6)(b), (c)(2) and (g) (2005).
Following a hearing on the merits of the State's CINA petition, the court found:
That the evidence establishes by clear and convincing evidence that this child was born to a family whose other two children were already adjudicated children in need of assistance due to failure of supervision. There are other issues relating to parenting deficiencies, failure to keep safe, hygienic, and sanitary shelter for the children. The parents are always on the edge of violence, primarily due to the father's hostility and anger problems. This child was twice admitted to the hospital because of weight loss and was diagnosed by her pediatrician as failure to thrive. On both occasions in the hospital, the child did gain weight, and she also has gained weight upon removal from the parents' custody and placement in foster care. The parents tried to feed the child in the manner that they are instructed, but she spits up a lot, and they have trouble getting her to eat the amount of food that is recommended. The difficulties they experience in feeding the child are not experienced in foster care, nor were they experienced in the hospital. The parents are volatile, easily distractible, and visitation is chaotic, whether it occurs in the home or in the office of the service provider. [G.R.] does seem to be fascinated with her siblings, and she is easily distracted by their activities. The parents have difficulty managing the behavior of the children, and the parents respond to the chaos by yelling or even on occasion with violence. Social workers describe observing several violent interactions between the parents and the children. Supportive and rehabilitative services have been offered to the parents through the hospital and the Visiting Nurses Association, as well as the service provider at Lutheran Services of Iowa. The court has to consider the fragility of the child by virtue of her age and weight and the high risk of the child's safety due to the potential loss of weight in the parents' custody. The court considers that risk to be an imminent risk at this time.
Based on these findings, the juvenile court adjudicated G.R. a child in need of assistance on the grounds cited in the State's February 12, 2004, petition. The adjudicatory order also continued G.R.'s placement in foster care. W.R. and S.R. were directed to undergo mental health and substance abuse evaluations pending completion of the department's predisposition report. The juvenile court's adjudication order was affirmed on appeal. In re G.R., No. 04-1412 (Iowa Ct.App., October 27, 2004).
Following completion of the dispositional hearing on August 26, 2004, the juvenile court found that the circumstances resulting in G.R.'s adjudication were unresolved and accordingly ordered her to remain in foster care. The order also provided for continued services intended to facilitate G.R.'s reunification with her parents. As a result, W.R. and S.R. were provided family centered services; counseling and treatment for mental health, domestic violence, and substance abuse issues; as well as housing, employment, and medical assistance.
On March 11, 2005, the State filed a petition requesting termination of W.R.'s and S.R.'s parental rights with respect to G.R. The State alleged that the parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (child is three or younger, child CINA, removed from home for six of last twelve months, and child cannot be returned home). In the juvenile court's findings of fact entered following a hearing on the merits of the State's petition, the court determined that, despite provision of the earlier recited services, the nutritional and other parental deficiencies necessitating G.R.'s adjudication remained unresolved. Based on these findings, the court terminated W.R.'s and S.R.'s parental rights.
On appeal, both W.R. and S.R. challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court's order terminating their parental rights.
II. Standard of Review.
The scope of review in termination cases is de novo. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). The grounds for termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 661 (Iowa 2000). Our primary concern is the best interests of the children. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997).
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
To terminate parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h), the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a child is three years of age or younger, the child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance, the child has been removed from parental custody for at least six of the last twelve months for at least six consecutive months, and the child cannot be returned to parental custody. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h). The fighting issue here is whether G.R. can be returned to parental custody.
W.R. argues that G.R. can be returned to his custody, citing his genuine efforts to comply with the department's recommendations for needed treatment and education. We disagree.
Contrary to W.R.'s claims, his visitation record is unsatisfactory, both in terms of quality and frequency. As a result, social workers report that he has not bonded with G.R. Additionally, W.R.'s compliance with recommended training and treatment is fairly described as minimal or at best incomplete. For example, W.R. has only attended fourteen of twenty-four batterer's education sessions. He has also missed mental health sessions and discontinued medication without first consulting his physician. Moreover, social workers reported that W.R. continues to threaten and demean S.R., indicating that he has failed or refused to benefit from instruction or participation in the court-ordered batterer's education program.
S.R. argues that G.R. can be returned to her care because she has been responsive to the services provided by the department. She cites her ability to prepare appropriate meals for G.R. Additionally, she notes that she has completed batterer's education and has a safety plan developed in conjunction with that program. Lastly, S.R. maintains that her willingness to comply with the court-ordered services and bonding with G.R. and G.R.'s siblings during visitation are evidence that G.R. can be returned to her care.
The record belies S.R.'s claims concerning reunification. Like W.R., S.R. has not faithfully attended therapy sessions or batterer's education. Her relationship with W.R., as described by social workers, indicates that she is unable to protect the children from further domestic violence. Lastly, we note that both W.R. and S.R. have failed in their efforts to obtain residential or financial stability. Under these circumstances we, like the trial court, conclude that G.R. cannot be returned to parental custody. The State has met its burden to terminate W.R.'s and S.R.'s parental rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h).
IV. Best Interests.
Even if the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights are established, the court need not terminate parental rights if such action is not in the child's best interests. In re M.M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994). In considering a child's best interest, we look to the child's long-range as well as immediate best interests. In re C.K., 588 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997).
As noted earlier, G.R.'s parents have been offered and received a variety of services intended to facilitate her return to parental custody. None have been completely availing. The circumstances necessitating G.R.'s removal and adjudication continue to pose a risk to her safety and well being. We have repeatedly said that "[a] parent does not have an unlimited amount of time in which to correct his or her deficiencies." See, e.g., In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997).
Under these circumstances, we conclude G.R.'s best interests are served by terminating parental rights. The juvenile court's order terminating W.R.'s and S.R.'s parental rights is accordingly affirmed in its entirety.