Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. No. INJ020314 Charles Everett Stafford, Jr., Judge.
Lori Shellenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Rhonda Cartwright-Ladendorf and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RAMIREZ P. J.
Minor G.R. challenges three conditions of his supervised probation on constitutional grounds. He argues these conditions must be modified because they are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A petition filed in juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleged minor committed a robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) on October 24, 2008. The juvenile court held a contested hearing on the petition from April 22, 2009 through April 24, 2009. At the hearing, the 16-year-old victim testified he and his friends were outside together about 8:00 p.m. Standing nearby was another group of boys he did not know. One of the victim’s friends aggravated the other group of boys by yelling at them. The other group of boys then began to chase the victim and his friends.
When they caught up with the victim, one of the boys from the other group held him against a fence. Minor then punched the victim once on his left cheek, once on his right cheek, and a third time on the left side of his head. During this incident, minor also yelled at the victim, wanting to know why the victim was talking badly about his gang. Minor then grabbed the victim’s iPod, which was attached to his pants, took it, and ran off. The victim borrowed someone’s phone and called 911.
A responding police officer saw minor jump over a fence near the location of the reported robbery. He detained minor because he matched the description of the assailant provided to him over the radio. At a curbside line-up, the victim was able to identify minor as the one who took his iPod.
Following the contested jurisdictional hearing, the court found there was sufficient evidence under the reasonable doubt standard to find minor committed a second degree robbery. The court set five years as the maximum term and referred the matter to the probation department for a report and recommendation. On August 27, 2009, the court adjudged minor a ward of the court, continued custody by the parents, and placed minor on probation subject to various terms and conditions.
DISCUSSION
Minor contends three conditions of his probation are unconstitutionally vague and overly broad, because they do not contain an express knowledge requirement. The three challenged conditions of probation read as follows:
“# [6] Not have direct or indirect contact with anyone known to be disapproved by parent(s)/guardian(s)/probation officer, staff.”
“# [7] Not have direct or indirect contact with any non relative on probation or parole unless approved by Probation Officer.”
“# [22] Not wear, display, or possess clothing or paraphernalia known to be gang-related, including but not limited to: hats, handkerchiefs, shoelaces and belts.”
The People agree that condition No. 7 is unconstitutionally vague because it does not contain an express knowledge requirement; however, condition Nos. 6 and 22 are constitutionally sufficient as written.
“[C]onditions of probation that impinge on constitutional rights must be tailored carefully and ‘reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation.... [Citation.]” (People v. Delvalle (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 869, 879.) To withstand a constitutional challenge based on vagueness apparent on the face of a probation condition, the condition “ ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated.’ ” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) The minor in Sheena K. was placed on probation, subject to the condition that she not “associate with anyone ‘disapproved of by probation.’ ” (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court agreed with the minor that the condition was unconstitutionally vague and overly broad because it did not include an express knowledge requirement. (Id. at pp. 890-891.)
Based on Sheena K., we agree with minor that the challenged conditions are unconstitutionally vague or overly broad because they do not include an express knowledge requirement. Although condition Nos. 6 and 22 include the word “known, ” it is not clear who must have knowledge. We therefore agree minor is entitled to a modification of these conditions.
DISPOSITION
Probation condition No. 6 is modified to read as follows: “Minor shall not have direct or indirect contact with anyone known by minor to be disapproved by parent(s)/guardian(s)/probation officer, staff.”
Probation condition No. 7 is modified to read as follows: “Minor shall not have direct or indirect contact with any non-relative known by minor to be on probation or parole unless approved by Probation Officer.”
Probation condition No. 22 is modified to read as follows: “Minor shall not wear, display, or possess clothing or paraphernalia known by minor to be gang-related, including but not limited to: hats, handkerchiefs, shoelaces and belts.”
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: HOLLENHORST J. MILLER J.