5. SeeSampson, 997 F.2d at 722–723 (stating that “the label attached to an obligation does not control.... ‘a bankruptcy court must look beyond the language of the decree to the intent of the parties and the substance of the obligation’ to determine whether the obligation is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support.”) (citing Goin, 808 F.2d at 1392) (emphasis in Sampson). See also,Goss v. Goss (In re Goss), 131 B.R. 729, 731 (Bankr.D.N.M.1991) (“To determine if the obligation is nondischargeable alimony or support or if it is merely designated as such in the document, the initial inquiry must be to determine the intent of the parties at the time they entered into their agreement.”) (citing In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir.1986)); Phegley v. Phegley (In re Phegley), 443 B.R. 154, 158 (9th Cir. BAP 2011) (stating that “[a] divorce decree's characterization of an award as maintenance or alimony does not bind a bankruptcy court but is however a starting point for the determination of the award's intended function.

See Sampson, 997 F.2d at 722–723 (stating that “the label attached to an obligation does not control.... ‘a bankruptcy court must look beyond the language of the decree to the intent of the parties and the substance of the obligation’ to determine whether the obligation is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support.”) (citing Goin, 808 F.2d at 1392) (emphasis in Sampson). See also, Goss v. Goss (In re Goss), 131 B.R. 729, 731 (Bankr.D.N.M.1991) (“To determine if the obligation is nondischargeable alimony or support or if it is merely designated as such in the document, the initial inquiry must be to determine the intent of the parties at the time they entered into their agreement.”) (citing In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir.1986)); Phegley, 443 B.R. at 158 (stating that “[a] divorce decree's characterization of an award as maintenance or alimony does not bind a bankruptcy court but is however a starting point for the determination of the award's intended function.”) (citations omitted). FN15. Johnson v. Hamblen (In re Hamblen), 233 B.R. 430, 434 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1999) (stating that “most courts have narrowed the inquiry down to one or more of three main factors: (1) the language and substance of the dissolution decree or separation agreement; (2) the relative financial circumstances at the time of the dissolution; and (3) the degree to which the obligation enables the recipient to maintain daily necessities.”) (citations omi

Indeed, some courts have found that the parties' statements of their intent regarding the nature of a particular obligation are virtually conclusive under principles of collateral estoppel or contract law.See, Goss v. Goss, 131 B.R. 729 (Bankr.D.N.Mex. 1991); Clark v. Clark, 105 B.R. 753 (Bankr.S.D.Ga. 1989), aff'd, 113 B.R. 797 (S.D.Ga. 1990), rev'd in part and vacatedin part w/o published opinion, 925 F.2d 1476 (11th Cir. 1991); Leslie v. Hart, 130 B.R. 817 (Bankr.N.D.Ind. 1991); Long v. Long, 102 N.C. App. 18, 401 S.E.2d 401 (1991); Ferebee v. Ferebee, 129 B.R. 71 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1991). Neither the principles of collateral estoppel nor principles of contract law, such as the parol evidence rule, were argued in this case.