Opinion
No. 353064
04-15-2021
In re I. M. GOLDER, Minor.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Bay Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 18-012554-NA Before: CAMERON, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and M. J. KELLY, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to the minor child, IG, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Finding no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.
IG's father executed a release of his parental rights. Accordingly, he is not a party to this appeal, and our reference to "respondent" refers solely to the mother of the child. The initial petition included IG's half-sister, AG, but AG was dismissed from the petition in January 2019, and cared for by her non-respondent biological father.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In December 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) provided services to the family of IG to prevent removal of the child. Respondent successfully completed services and provided negative drug screens. However, in March 2018, child protective services received a report of domestic violence by IG's father upon respondent while she held the child. Although respondent received an eye wound, the couple asserted that it was an accidental injury sustained when respondent attempted to prevent IG's father from leaving the home when he was suicidal. In proximity to this event, both parents tested positive for cocaine. The trial court assumed jurisdiction and imposed a safety plan, but allowed IG to remain in respondent's care.
However, in early April 2018, the police were called to a domestic dispute between the couple that resulted in property damage to respondent's vehicle and the discovery of illegal drug use and paraphernalia. The court ordered preparation of a service plan and supervised visits, and the child was placed in the care of a paternal great-aunt. In May 2018, respondent made admissions to the petition that she argued and conflicted with IG's father and tested positive for cocaine on two occasions. The case service plan sought to address the barriers of substance abuse, mental health, domestic violence, and housing.
Respondent's progress with the case service plan was poor, and she continued to test positive for cocaine. However, she frequently denied drug use and asserted that contact with cocaine residue or intimacy with a cocaine user may have caused a false positive test result. Respondent entered inpatient services in September 2018, and January 2019, but left unsuccessfully. She participated in an inpatient rehabilitation program in March 2019, but she tested positive for cocaine after her discharge. Although respondent began to regularly attend mental health and substance abuse counseling, she continued to struggle with toxic relationships with men. She continued her on-and-off relationship with IG's father for the majority of the time that the case was pending despite repeated domestic altercations. However, respondent then downplayed her next relationship with a recovering addict who provided respondent's address as his residence to his probation officer. Ultimately, respondent claimed that she ended this relationship after learning of his extensive history with DHHS.
Despite requests by DHHS and the guardian ad litem (GAL) to change the plan from reunification to adoption, the trial court retained a concurrent plan for reunification and adoption while acknowledging respondent's lack of progress. However, IG had been placed in care for over a year, she called and viewed her caretaker as "mom," and she began to act out following the visits with respondent. In August 2018, DHHS was authorized to file a supplemental petition for termination of parental rights. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found that reasonable efforts were made to reunify IG and respondent, but those efforts were unsuccessful. The trial court also concluded that statutory grounds existed to support the termination of respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j) and that termination of respondent's parental rights was in IG's best interests. This appeal followed.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent alleges that DHHS failed to engage in reasonable efforts to reunify respondent and IG and the trial court clearly erred by finding clear and convincing evidence to support the statutory grounds for termination. We disagree.
"In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met." In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). We review for clear error "a trial court's factual findings as well as its ultimate determination that a statutory ground for termination of parental rights has been proved by clear and convincing evidence." In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). A finding is clearly erroneous when "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
A. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Respondent asserts that the trial court erred by finding that DHHS expended reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with IG. To preserve an issue regarding whether reasonable efforts for reunification were made, a respondent must raise the issue when the services are offered. In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 247; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Because respondent failed to object to the services provided when offered, this unpreserved challenge to the trial court's findings regarding reasonable efforts are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App at 135. Additionally, this issue is not properly before this Court because respondent failed to explain how the efforts DHHS made were inadequate, and therefore, this issue is abandoned. Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).
Nonetheless, respondent failed to demonstrate plain error affecting substantial rights because the record amply supports the trial court's finding that DHHS provided numerous services to respondent and made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent and IG. The foster care worker testified that respondent received services for infant mental health, medication management, case management, and therapy and mental health, and that she was referred for a psychological evaluation and domestic-violence counseling. Respondent was given the opportunity to participate in rehabilitation programs on three occasions, but was unable to abstain from drug use. Therefore, the record does not support respondent's contention that DHHS failed to engage in reasonable efforts to reunify her with IG.
B. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)
Termination of a respondent's parental rights is proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) when 182 days have elapsed since the issuance of the initial dispositional order, and the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that "[t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age." The continuation of conditions that led to adjudication can be demonstrated by showing that the totality of the evidence supports the conclusion that a respondent has "not accomplished any meaningful change in the conditions" that led to the adjudication. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009).
In this case, the initial dispositional order was entered on June 18, 2018. The last date of the termination hearing was December 19, 2019, thereby satisfying the requirement that 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of the initial dispositional order. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c). The trial court found that the conditions that led to removal and adjudication were substance abuse, domestic violence, toxic or abusive relationships, mental health issues, and respondent's inability to provide care and custody for IG as a result of those issues.
Respondent submits that there was evidence that she was benefiting from substance abuse services. Indeed, in proximity to the termination hearing, respondent began to engage in her case service plan by attending drug and alcohol sobriety programs. However, she continued to test positive for cocaine throughout the pendency of this case, even after April 2019, when she restarted regular treatment for her substance abuse issues. During the four-day termination hearing, she tested positive for cocaine on four separate occasions. Nonetheless, respondent maintained that she had stopped using cocaine in December 2018 and attempted to present medical opinion evidence that the test results were false positives. However, DHHS also presented medical evidence, including testimony from a toxicologist, to refute respondent's claim. The trial court resolved this evidentiary dispute in favor of DHHS, and we are required to defer to the trial court's finding that respondent tested positive for cocaine because she continued to use cocaine. See In re LaFrance Minors, 306 Mich App 713, 723; 858 NW2d 143 (2014). Respondent did not sufficiently comply with the case service plan because she failed to benefit from the services and continued to abuse cocaine. See In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 676; 692 NW2d 708 (2005) ("[I]t is not enough to merely go through the motions; a parent must benefit from the services offered so that he or she can improve parenting skills to the point where the children would no longer be at risk in the parent's custody.").
Respondent also contends that her issues with domestic violence and toxic relationships had been addressed because she had ended her relationships with violent, addicted men. The trial court found that respondent's issues with toxic relationships were unresolved despite the fact that, as respondent testified, she had ended those relationships. The trial court found that respondent lacked insight into how her relationships would impact her child, and noted that it took court testimony addressing her relationship with a recovering addict with significant contacts with DHHS for her to gain insight that she should end this relationship. The trial court did not clearly err by finding that respondent lacked insight into toxic relationships and the impact on IG.
For almost two years after IG's removal, respondent failed to accomplish any meaningful change in the conditions that led to the court's exercise of jurisdiction over IG. Williams, 286 Mich App at 272. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time considering IG's age. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
Because we have concluded that at least one ground for termination existed, we need not specifically consider the additional grounds upon which the trial court based its decision. In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). Nevertheless, we have reviewed those grounds and conclude that, for similar reasons, termination was also appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). --------
III. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent alleges that the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in IG's best interests. We disagree.
We review for clear error a trial court's decision that termination is in the child's best interests. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). A decision is clearly erroneous when "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. at 41 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
After a trial court has found that there is a statutory ground for termination, it must find that "termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." Id. at 40. For purposes of the best-interests analysis, the focus is on the child and not the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 87; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). A trial court's decision that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 90.
A trial court should "weigh all the evidence available to determine the children's best interests." In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). A variety of factors may be considered by the trial court, including "the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The court may also consider a parent's compliance with the case service plan, "the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." Id. at 714.
In this case, the trial court identified the following factors that support its finding that termination of parental rights was in IG's best interests:
[T]he age of the child; the length of . . . time the child has been in foster care; the opinion of the caseworker and lawyer-guardian ad litem; the child's need for stability and permanency; the history of domestic violence and lack of insight; the likelihood of the child to be adopted.
Respondent submits that the trial court failed to consider her bond with IG and did not adequately consider IG's loss of her relationships with her maternal grandmother and adult half-sister. First, the trial court did consider the fact that respondent loved IG and wanted to be part of IG's life. Although respondent had a bond with IG, and IG's maternal relatives may have been able to support that bond, a parental bond is only one factor in the best-interests analysis. Id. at 713. Respondent also contends that her "substantial compliance" with the parent-agency agreement should have entitled her to more time to demonstrate that she had become a fit parent. Although respondent may have complied with DHHS recommendations by attending substance abuse treatment and mental health counseling, she did not benefit from the substance abuse services. She also failed to address her inappropriate relationships with men. Further, the trial court noted that permanency was a major priority, and that the permanency IG needed could not occur without termination of respondent's parental rights. IG's great-aunt testified that IG had begun struggling before and after visits with respondent and that the child's behavior indicated a need for permanency. IG called her great-aunt "mom," and looked to her for support, and the great-aunt was willing to adopt IG, a child she had essentially raised for over eighteen months. The GAL asked for respondent's parental rights to be terminated because IG needed the permanency she received in her current household.
Respondent's failure to completely comply with and benefit from the case service plan and IG's need for permanence clearly outweighed respondent's bond with IG. We conclude that the trial court did not err by concluding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in IG's best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Michael J. Kelly