Opinion
772 WDA 2023 773 WDA 2023 J-A29037-23
01-09-2024
IN RE: G.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: A.S., MOTHER IN RE: M.T., A MINOR APPEAL OF: A.S., MOTHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered June 1, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Orphans' Court at No. 63-22-1368, No. 63-22-1369
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM
MURRAY, J.
A.S. (Mother) appeals from the orders granting the petitions of the Washington County Office of Children & Youth (the Agency), and terminating Mother's parental rights to G.M. and M.T. (Children). We affirm.
The orphans' court terminated the parental rights of each child's father. M.T.'s father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights and has not appealed. G.M.'s father, R.M. (Father), has filed an appeal at 775 WDA 2023, which is also before this panel.
CASE HISTORY
M.T. was born in October 2019, and G.M. was born in January 2021. The orphans' court explained:
While having previous contact and involvement with [Mother], the actions relevant to the present [termination] petition were initiated by the Agency when Mother gave birth to G.M. in January of 2021. At the time of G.M.'s birth, M.T. was fifteen (15) months [old]. Mother and G.M. tested positive for Buprenorphine, Amphetamines, Methamphetamines and Cocaine.
On February 6, 2021, G.M. was discharged to the care of Mother and Father [(Parents)]. Thereafter, the Agency attempted to contact Parents and access the home from February 6, 2021, through June 22, 2021. During this time, the Agency received additional information alleging parental substance abuse, including a report that Mother was in active addiction and injecting suboxone. The Agency asserts that [it] attempted to make contact … nineteen (19) times through home visits, telephone calls and text messages. In addition, the Agency alleges that after a multitude of failed attempts to reach the family, the Agency hired a private investigator. The Agency further asserts that on June 21, 2021, they learned … G.M. had not been seen by a pediatrician since February 23, 2021; M.T. had not been seen by a pediatrician since November 23, 2020; and the family was non-compliant with services through Pressley Ridge and Southwestern Pennsylvania Human Services, Inc. (SPHS). On the same date, Mother and Father were determined to be in their home and refusing entry by police, [Agency] representatives, and SPHS housing representatives for several hours. As a result and in response to Parents' continued substance abuse, medical neglect of G.M., and lack of cooperation, the Agency sought and received a verbal shelter order.
A shelter hearing was held on June 25, 2021, and … the Hearing Officer [] ordered the [] Children returned to the home …. The family was referred for services through Justice Works Youth Care (JWYC) and STOPP services were implemented on the same date.
[T]hrough July 1, 2021, the Agency made seven (7) unsuccessful attempts to "contact and engage" the Parents. On July 2, 2021, an adjudication hearing was held and the Children were adjudicated dependent and removed from the home []. The Order of Adjudication found safety concerns in the home as a result of parents' continued refusal of services and grounded the finding of dependency on the Children being without "proper care or control, subsistence, education, as required by law, or other care or control necessary for their physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals."
The Adjudication Order granted Mother and Father supervised visitation three (3) times a week for two (2) hours per visit and placed the Children in Kinship Foster Placement. The Order further required that Mother:
• Complete a drug and alcohol assessment and follow all recommendations;
• Submit to random drug and alcohol testing a minimum of twice per month and at the discretion of the Agency;
• Complete a psychological and interactional evaluation, [and] follow[] all treatment recommendations;
• Complete parenting education and follow all recommendations, including a curriculum involving substance abuse on parenting and protective capacity;
• Live a clean and sober lifestyle;
• Obtain and maintain sobriety; and
• Maintain safe and stable housing appropriate for reunification.Orphans' Court Opinion, 8/4/23, at 2-3 (footnote omitted).
In addition to adjudicating Children dependent, the court found aggravated circumstances because Mother's parental rights to another child had been terminated. Id. at 4.
A permanency review hearing was scheduled for November 23, 2021, but postponed after Mother was injured in a car accident. Id. at 5. On January 11, 2022, the dependency court held a review hearing. The court found Mother in "minimal compliance and no progress with the [c]ourt-ordered permanency plan." Id. The court conducted another review hearing on May 17, 2022. The court again "determined that Mother had minimal compliance but no progress." Id. at 7.
Termination Action
The Agency's forensic psychologist, Dr. Neil Rosenblum, initially evaluated Mother, Father, and Children in August 2021. Dr. Rosenblum conducted a second evaluation, which included Children's foster parents, in August 2022. Shortly thereafter, on September 8, 2022, the Agency petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights. On September 13, 2022, the court held the previously scheduled review hearing, and concluded "Mother was inconsistent in her compliance with the permanency plan." Orphans' Court Opinion, 8/4/23, at 8.
With respect to the termination petitions, the orphans' court held four days of hearing on December 8, 2022, and January 11, January 25, and March 3, 2023. The court heard testimony from more than 10 witnesses, including Dr. Rosenblum; three Agency caseworkers; three family service providers; a police officer; Mother; Father; maternal grandmother; and Children's foster mother.
On June 1, 2023, the orphans' court entered orders terminating Mother's parental rights at each child's docket. Mother filed timely notices of appeal and Pa.R.A.P. 1925 concise statements. This Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte. See Order, 7/27/23.
Although Children were represented by a guardian ad litem (GAL) throughout the orphans' court proceedings, the GAL did not appear for oral argument despite being directed to do so.
ISSUES
Mother presents the following questions for review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in terminating [Mother's] parental rights?
2. Whether the trial court erred in not allowing Father's counsel the latitude to question Mother while taking her testimony?
3. Whether the trial court erred in not giving the appropriate weight to the fact that the [Agency] did not offer the appropriate services necessary for reunification (domestic violence counseling)?
4. Whether the trial court erred in its analysis of the bond between the [Mother] and [C]hildren pursuant to §2511(b)?Mother's Brief at 4.
Although Mother and Father have appealed separately with separate counsel, they raise identical issues.
DISCUSSION
In considering Mother's issues, our
appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must accept the orphans' court's findings of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the orphans' court's factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb the orphans' court's ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.
An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings.
In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans' court must balance the parent's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with the child's essential needs for a parent's care, protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed the Adoption Act, which provides for a bifurcated analysis. First, the orphans' court "must focus on the parent's conduct" relative to the "eleven enumerated grounds" for termination set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d at 830. If the court finds grounds for termination under Section 2511(a), it must assess the evidence relative to the child's needs and welfare under Section 2511(b), "giving primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). This Court need only agree with the orphans' court as to "any one subsection of [Section] 2511(a), in addition to [Section] 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental rights." Id.
Mother's Argument
Preliminary, we note that Mother's argument is disorganized. Mother states that her first three issues "pertain generally to § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8) and [her fourth issue] pertains to § 2511(b)." Mother's Brief at 15. However, her argument does not comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119, which requires that "[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part ... the particular point to be treated therein[.]" Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Mother argues the first three issues presented in her statement of questions, generally and in separate sections from her arguments regarding the Section 2511(a) grounds for termination relied upon by the orphans' court. See Mother's Brief at 21-27; 28-33. We address Mother's issues as presented in her statement of questions. Id. at 4.
Mother raises the same four issues in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925 statement. See Mother's Concise Statement of Errors, 7/3/23.
1. Whether the trial court erred in terminating [Mother's] parental rights?
This issue pertains to the family's caseworker, Jennifer Mengle. Ms. Mengle testified at the first day of hearing on December 8, 2022, but did not complete her testimony. Mother faults the orphans' court for "improperly shifting the burden to parents to subpoena Caseworker Jennifer Mengle as a witness at subsequent hearing dates." Mother's Brief at 15.
Ms. Mengle testified that M.T. was four years old and G.M. was two years old. N.T., 12/8/22, at 63. She stated that Children did not have "special medical conditions," although G.M. "received occupational and physical therapy services … because he was walking on his toes." Id. Ms. Mengle confirmed that Children were adjudicated dependent on July 2, 2021, and placed in their current foster home in November 2021. Id. at 64-65. Shortly thereafter, the orphans' court stopped Ms. Mengle's testimony because the court learned Ms. Mengle was not feeling well. Id. at 65.
The orphans' court stated, "I'm sorry. Unfortunately, a lot of people are feeling really ill today. [Ms. Mengle is] not the only one." N.T., 12/8/22, at 66.
Several weeks later, Ms. Mengle was no longer working at the Agency. The orphans' court later explained, "Inasmuch as Caseworker Jennifer Mengle was no longer employed with [the Agency], her Casework Manager[, Kristin Young,] provided testimony for the Agency." Orphans' Court Opinion, 8/4/23, at 17.
Mother claims the Agency should have subpoenaed Ms. Mengle to complete her testimony. Mother's Brief at 22. Mother implies the orphans' court erred by permitting Ms. Young to testify instead; Mother asserts "it was inappropriate for the Agency to be permitted not to subpoena its own caseworker or supervisor possessing first-hand knowledge, and to shift the burden to the parents." Id. at 25 (underline in original). According to Mother:
Without Caseworker Mengle's testimony, the trial court was not able to give appropriate consideration and weight to Ms. Mengle's alleged bias against Mother and any implications for reasonable efforts made (or not made) by the Agency to facilitate reunification.Mother's Brief at 25-26 (footnotes and citation to reproduced record omitted).
Mother's argument is undeveloped and devoid of relevant legal authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing appellate argument shall include "such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent."); see also Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 781 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating, "When an appellant cites no authority supporting an argument, this Court is inclined to believe there is none.").
Moreover, Mother's argument lacks meaningful evidentiary support. Mother references the testimony of family resource specialist, Melinda Kolesar. Mother's Brief at 25. Mother cites comments by Ms. Kolesar and the orphans' court during cross-examination of Ms. Kolesar by Mother's counsel:
Q. So did you have any conversations with the previous caseworker, Jen Mengle?
A. Yes.
Q. And did the caseworker make accusations that [Mother] was a drug dealer to you?
[Agency's Counsel]: Objection, hearsay.
THE COURT: Well, this is where we run into a problem when we don't have a witness that's available. Bias is something [Mother's] attorney certainly can bring up, and that's why I was concerned, but I'm going to allow the question.
[Ms. Kolesar]: I'm permitted to answer the question []?
THE COURT: You are.
A. I wouldn't say -- [Ms. Mengle] didn't say drug dealer. She mentioned a sugar daddy.
Q. And was that the entire conversation?
A. What was that question?
Q. Was that the entire conversation regarding that issue?
A. Yes ….N.T., 1/25/23, at 119-20.
Mother's counsel continued:
Q. Was there only one conversation like this that occurred between you and Ms. Mengle?
A. Yes.Id. at 122.
Our review reveals no error with respect to the testimony of the two caseworkers and Ms. Kolesar, particularly in the context of the entire record. The orphans' court held four days of hearing and heard testimony from many witnesses. In explaining its decision to terminate Mother's parental rights, the orphans' court summarized each witness's testimony and found that Mother "failed to engage, let alone successfully complete services first ordered at the initial adjudication in July of 2021." Orphans' Court Opinion, 8/4/23, at 30; see also id. at 9-28 (detailing witness testimony). The court relied partially on Mother's testimony in concluding:
The record … establishes that [Mother] took negligible steps in the care of the Children. [Mother] allowed others to provide for the Children's basic needs while [she] struggled with sobriety, mental health and domestic violence. Testimony and evidence supports a record that paints a picture of [Mother] failing to attend medical appointments and failing to attend [c]ourt-ordered services with commitment and regularity until after the Agency filed a petition requesting the termination of [her] parental rights. Facing the potential loss of [her] Children, the concerns of the Agency and the mandates of this [c]ourt should have been of paramount interest. Until the proverbial eleventh hour, [Mother] failed to … take actions to support and preserve the parent/child relationship and prioritize the parenting of [Children].Id. at 31 (finding "the Agency has established, by clear and convincing evidence, grounds for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1).").
We reiterate that this Court need only agree with the orphans' court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a). In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.
Contrary to Mother's claim, the orphans' court did not shift the Agency's evidentiary burden. The orphans' court accurately referenced the record in concluding that the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination. We thus discern no error or abuse of discretion related to Agency witness Jennifer Mengle.
2. Whether the trial court erred in not allowing Father's counsel the latitude to question Mother while taking her testimony?
In a single paragraph, Mother argues:
Disallowing Father's counsel the latitude to question Mother was without justification and stunted development of the record to the detriment of Mother. During cross-examination of Mother, Father's counsel successfully brought out that both the August 5, 2022, Crossroads letter regarding Mother's Suboxone treatment compliance, and the September 7, 2022, SPHS letter, reflect Mother's engagement with services as prior to the September 8, 2022, TPR filing date. (R5, pp. 74-75). Specifically, these facts (and potentially other facts) were fair to be considered as part of Mother's progress at the TPR hearings. Additional information in this same vein was not permitted to be elicited by Father's counsel without justification. (R5, pp. 75, 80-81).Mother's Brief at 26.
Again, Mother cites no legal authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). In addition, her references to the reproduced record are unavailing. Father's counsel cross-examined Mother at the January 25, 2023, hearing. See N.T., 1/25/23, at 219-26. Father's counsel initially questioned Mother about Father. Id. at 219-22. The questioning continued:
Q. And you stated coping with addiction is a long-term process?
A. Yeah. It is. It is a long-term process. I mean if you want it -
[Agency's Counsel]: Your Honor, I'm going to object again to the line of questioning. Again, [Father's counsel] is not representing Mother. I mean, he's directing virtually all of his questions about Mother's services rather than his client.
[Father's Counsel]: Can I ask what Rule of Evidence says that I cannot ask Mother questions? Cite what Rule of Evidence that is.
THE COURT: Okay. So we are going over areas that we've gone over before -
[Father's Counsel]: It's a foundation -
THE COURT: Pardon me?
[Father's Counsel]: I didn't mean to interrupt you, Your Honor. I'm sorry. I'm trying to lay a foundation for further questions as well.
THE COURT: Okay. So let's move on at this point.
BY [Father's Counsel]:
Q. So since [Father] has been incarcerated, has he been sober?
A. Yes.
Q. And has a caseworker ever met with you or [Father] to discuss the services that were ordered at the adjudication?
A. No.
Q. Do you know what a child permanency plan is?
A. No.
Q. And so the caseworker never set up a meeting to discuss that with you?
A. No.
Q. And you heard testimony in regard to the domestic violence, correct?
A . Yes.
Q. Has a caseworker ever presented that in a child permanency plan or any court order or recommended that service to you or [Father] during the pendency of this case?
[Children's Counsel]: Objection. Asked and answered many times throughout the course of this proceeding.
THE COURT: I don't know that this witness was asked that question. So I'm going to overrule the objection and let her respond.
[MOTHER]: No.
Q. But you and [Father] took it upon yourselves to engage in domestic violence counseling[,] correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you believe [Father] should also be given a chance to parent the [C]hildren?
A. Yes.
Q. And can you discuss how [C]hildren would be impacted if parental rights were terminated for G.M. and if M.T. is unable to see [Father] as well?
A. I think it would be a severe issue, not only just with [M.T.] growing and being confused and just, you know, getting older and just being so confused. Like, she loves [Father] so much and G.M. loves his dad I mean he's watching the visits. When we were having them together, I
mean, it was just so precious and memorable that, you know, I think it would affect [M.T.]'s ability to -- you know, she can have issues -
[Agency's Counsel]: I'm going to object, Your Honor. This is outside the scope of this witness's ability to speculate as to what kind of conditions this may cause or issues this may cause a child.
THE COURT: Objection sustained.
[Father's Counsel]: Thank you, [Mother], that's all the questions I have.Id. at 223-26 (footnote added).
The Agency's counsel withdrew a prior objection. See N.T., 1/25/23, at 221.
As indicated above, the orphans' court did not "disallow[] Father's counsel the latitude to question Mother [] without justification." Mother's Brief at 26. Likewise, the record does not indicate that the court "stunt[ed] development of the record to the detriment of Mother." Id.
As the Agency's counsel observed, Mother had her own counsel to advocate against termination.
The orphans' court recounted Mother's overall testimony. See Orphans' Court Opinion, 8/4/23, at 23-26. The orphans' court recognized:
[Mother] testified that although [the Agency] didn't recommend domestic violence [counseling], she individually enrolled on her own.
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[Mother] testified that she felt that her former caseworker, Jennifer Mengle, had a personal vendetta against her.Id. at 23-24.
Notably, the orphans' court observed:
[Mother] was asked why she waited so long to begin services. The question posed was, M.T. has continually said she wanted to come home, since the beginning, but [Mother] waited over a year to begin services, knowing your child wanted to come home. In response, [Mother] said she was so disgusted with herself that she changed her life and there is no time limit to overcome addiction. However, [Mother] later acknowledged that it was unfair for her Children to have to wait while she got herself together.Id. at 25.
Although the orphans' court does not cite the record, our review confirms Mother's testimony. See N.T., 1/25/23, at 215 (Mother testifying on cross-examination by Agency's counsel that she has known M.T. wanted to "come home since [M.T.] was removed from [Mother's] care," but Mother waited over a year to participate in court-ordered services due to "other obstacles in [Mother's] life that [Mother] was grieving over ….").
In sum, there is no merit to Mother's claim that the orphans' court improperly limited her testimony during cross-examination by Father's counsel.
3. Whether the trial court erred in not giving the appropriate weight to the fact that the [Agency] did not offer the appropriate services necessary for reunification (domestic violence counseling)?
Mother correctly avers that the dependency court did not order her to participate in domestic violence counseling. Mother states:
The Agency was aware of domestic violence concerns at least as early as at the January 11, 2022, Permanency Review Hearing. (R5, pp. 62-62; R1, p. 6). Yet, during the remaining eight (8) months of the underlying dependency proceedings, the
Agency did not recommend or offer Mother domestic violence counseling, the Agency's forensic psychologist did not recommend same, nor was Mother ever court-ordered to engage in same. (R3, pp. 17-19, 25-26, 39-40; R5, pp. 73, 224-225, 235, 239-240).
This lapse in providing domestic violence counseling raises the issue of whether the Agency provided services necessary for reunification and the reasonableness of its efforts. The trial court may consider Agency reasonable efforts [sic] at termination of parental right parental rights hearing. Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook, TPR Chapter, page 16-11 (Rev. 2014) ("Also relevant is to what extent services offered were truly 'available' to the parent, financially and geographically."). Here, the circumstances of alleged bias and an unavailable witness require such consideration.Mother's Brief at 27.
In response, the Agency argues "it is disingenuous for [M]other to allege that the [A]gency failed to recommend the [domestic violence] program, when she acknowledges that she supposedly obtained her own program and according to her, learned much from it." Agency's Brief at 22-24 (citing N.T., 1/25/23, at 154-55).
Mother's claim does not warrant relief. It is the responsibility of the orphans' court, as fact-finder, to "assign the evidence the appropriate weight to which it is entitled in reaching its factual and legal conclusions." Int. of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1124 (Pa. 2021). Here, the orphans' court observed that "concerns about domestic violence were discussed" at the January 11, 2022, review hearing. Orphans' Court Opinion, 8/4/23, at 6 (noting a "JWYC supervisor's report indicating that Mother had shown her bruises reportedly caused by Father."). The dependency court did not order Mother (or Father) to engage in domestic violence counseling. Id. (citing Permanency Review Order, 1/11/22).
A permanency review hearing was held on January 11, 2022, and a termination hearing was held on January 11, 2023.
Approximately three months later, in April 2022, police responded to a "domestic disturbance involving" Mother and Father. Orphans' Court Opinion, 8/4/23, at 14. Police Sergeant Anthony Cancilla testified at the termination hearing. The orphans' court summarized Sergeant Cancilla's testimony:
Mother suffered a skull fracture and brain injury. [Sergeant] Cancilla filed charges against Father … including: Felony Aggravated Assault, Misdemeanor Recklessly Endangering Another Person, Simple Assault and Summary Harassment.
[Father] pleaded to the charges of Recklessly Endangering Another Person and Simple Assault, as to victim, [Mother's mother]. However, [c]harges specific to Mother were dropped because [Mother] refused to testify. [Sergeant] Cancilla testified that Mother was initially cooperative, but "not in the end."
***
[Sergeant] Cancilla testified that Mother did not articulate why she wouldn't prosecute ….Id. at 14-15.
As a result of the incident, Father was incarcerated at the time of the May 2022 review hearing, when the dependency court found "Mother achieved no progress and [showed] only minimal compliance" with her parenting objectives unrelated to domestic violence. Id. at 29. The orphans' court stated:
Of significance, Mother failed to attend intake for both drug and alcohol treatment and had a positive test for cocaine. At the time, Mother was inconsistent with visitation and unable to complete nurturing parenting [programming] as a result of her inability to show the requisite period of sobriety. See Permanency Review Hearing Order of August 17, 2021. To add further complexity, Father [] was incarcerated due to a domestic [incident] with Mother, where [Mother] suffered [a] significant injury.
With [] Children in placement over fourteen (14) months, Mother … failed to engage, let alone successfully complete services first ordered at the initial adjudication in July of 2021.Id. at 29-30.
The dependency court did not order Mother to participate in domestic violence counseling after the May 2022 review hearing. Although Mother testified at the termination hearing that she sought domestic violence counseling independent of the court and the Agency, she failed to otherwise demonstrate successful completion or progress with the services first ordered when Children were adjudicated dependent on July 2, 2021. See id. at 30. Thus, we cannot conclude that the orphans' court erred by "not giving appropriate weight to the fact" that Agency service providers did not recommend or offer domestic violence counseling. See Int. of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1124.
4. Whether the trial court erred in its analysis of the bond between [Mother] and [C]hildren pursuant to §2511(b)?
Finally, Mother challenges termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). When the court finds grounds for termination under Section 2511(a), it must separately consider Child's needs and welfare:
The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. ...23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
"Notably, courts should consider the matter from the child's perspective, placing [their] developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent." In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023). Courts must also "discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond." Id. (citation omitted). However,
the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
Importantly, the question is not merely whether a bond exists, but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.In re A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 444-45 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted, emphasis added).
Our Supreme Court recently affirmed that "the parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection (b) analysis." K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. Courts must also consider factors such as: (1) the child's need for permanency and length of time in foster care; (2) whether the child is in a pre-adoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and (3) whether the foster home meets the child's needs. Id. It bears repeating that "intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability" are relevant to a child's needs and welfare. See id. at 1096, 1098, 1106, 1109, 1111 (citations omitted).
Mother argues the orphans' court "erred in its bond analysis required by subsection 2511(b) by not undertaking an evaluation of the nature of the parental bond (i.e., whether it was "necessary and beneficial"). Mother's Brief at 38. We disagree.
In finding that termination was in Children's best interests, the orphans' court provided comprehensive reasoning:
With regard to [] G.M., who was only five (5) months old at the time he came into care, this [c]ourt's evaluation under § 2511 (b) is clear. G.M. has lived with his Foster Parents nearly his entire life. All of G.M.'s physical, medical, mental, educational and emotional needs are cared for by the Foster Parents. … [W]hile Mother engages in visits and provides educational activities and clearly loves G.M., the record [lacks] evidence of Mother providing any other benefit for the developmental, physical and emotional needs of G.M. Accordingly, this [c]ourt finds [G.M.'s] best interest and welfare are served by achieving permanency through adoption and consequentially finds clear and convincing evidence to terminate the parental rights of [Mother] as to [] G.M.
The [c]ourt's analysis with regard to M.T. is more complex. While many witnesses spoke of Mother's love for the Children and Children's reactions to Mother, the clear focus was on Mother's bond with M.T. In fact, despite Mother's inconsistencies with visitation, abundant testimony was presented to support Mother's bond with M.T. and the [c]ourt finds this testimony credible. In quick review of a portion of such testimony, Dr. Rosenblum testified that Mother loved her Children and showed positive parenting skills. Foster Mother … testified that the Children have a bond with their parents and further testified to the encounter when M.T. cried, screamed and reached for Mother. Visit Supervisor, Ashley Beck, testified that Mother exercised positive habits during visits, plays with the Children and assists with potty training, provides food and feeds [C]hildren. Beck also testified that the Children cry at the end of visits and G.M. cries when
Mother leaves the room. Maternal Grandmother testified that M.T. and Mother are inseparable, stating further, "[Mother] loves her children." Mother testified to her special relationship with M.T. and [Father] testified that the Children love Mother and don't want to leave her. Throughout the hearings, examples were given of Mother's love for Children and their love for Mother. Clearly, the record establishes that there is a bond between Mother and specifically [] M.T. However, as noted by the [Superior] Court in In re [N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011),] "While a parent's emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of [a] subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the best interest of a child." [] It is suspected this analysis becomes necessary because, alone, this criteria could be established, through many loving relationships in a child's life. Following this logic and making [an] emotional bond the sole basis for consideration, children could have an impenetrable bond with a teacher, a favorite aunt, a pastor, friend's mom, neighbor, and even sadly a perpetrator, to name a few. Rather, in evaluating [subsection] 2511(b), [an] emotional bond must be considered along with other factors that evaluate the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. Other factors cited by the Superior Court include evaluating safety needs of the child, intangibles such as, love, comfort and security and stability[,] in addition to the importance of continuity of relationships.
In his evaluation of Mother and subsequent report and testimony, Dr. Rosenblum recognized the bond between Mother and M.T. [Dr.] Rosenblum also testified that Mother's parenting skills have improved. Nevertheless, [Dr.] Rosenblum remained concerned with Mother's poor judgment, drug use and impulse control and Mother's inability to understand the impact of these concerns on her parenting. Ironically, the testimony of Mother and Father support [Dr.] Rosenblum's conclusion. Mother and Father clearly acknowledge domestic violence and substance use issues as a pervasive part of the dependency case, even properly touting that each sought out domestic violence counseling, unrequested by the Agency and/or Dependency Court. Mother also touts her completion of services, albeit initiated and completed following the filling of the TPR petition. The problem here is that Mother has provided no track record of the effectiveness of services, starting late with services and having the additional layer of probation to influence her actions. It is for
this reason that, considering the safety, security, physical, emotional, consistency and reliability needs of the Children, this [c]ourt cannot dismiss Mother's continued relationship with Father [] and modification of services immediately following her release from house arrest. It follows that this [c]ourt must then consider that, while Mother has provided gifts and food and play during visits, Mother is not responsible for the day to day care of the Children and has never progressed to unsupervised visitation throughout the dependency case. Following the Superior Court's guidance, this [c]ourt finds that Mother has been unwilling or unable to satisfy the minimum requirements of parenthood and must ask that, with this consideration, will preserving her parental rights prevent M.T. from attaining permanency.
Dr. Rosenblum provided a guarded prognosis for Mother, stating that [both] parents "have[] a long road ahead of them," later testifying that Mother did not have "significant improvement" between [Dr. Rosenblum's] first [August 2021] and [second August 2022] evaluation. Finding reunification impossible on a short term basis, [Dr.] Rosenblum opined that the needs and welfare of the Children for stability and the opportunity to grow up with their needs consistently met, support the goal of adoption. [Dr.] Rosenblum recommended adoption mediation and suggested a continuing relationship with Mother[;] however[, Dr. Rosenblum] unequivocally found that Mother is incapable of reaching reunification, finding the benefit of adoption outweighs preservation of the relationship with Parents. In consideration of each factor set forth above, this [c]ourt agrees with Dr. Rosenblum's conclusions.Orphans' Court Opinion, 8/4/23, at 38-41 (underline emphasis added, bold emphasis in original, footnotes omitted).
The record supports the above reasoning, which is also supported by case law. See, e.g., In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that dependent children's lives "cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to … assume parenting responsibilities.").
For the above reasons, we affirm the orders terminating Mother's parental rights.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.