Opinion
J-S32044-16 No. 2592 EDA 2015
06-14-2016
IN THE INTEREST OF: T.G.-D. & G.G.-D., MINORS APPEAL OF: E.D., MOTHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Decrees August 5, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at Nos.: CP-51-AP-0000603-2014 CP-51-AP-0000604-2014 BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and PLATT, J. MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
E.D. (Mother) appeals from the decrees, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) on August 5, 2015, that terminated her parental rights to her daughters, T.G.-D., born in March of 2009, and G.G.-D., born in December of 2004 (Children), and changed the Children's goals to adoption. We affirm.
The Children's father, F.G., is deceased.
The trial court relates the history of this case in its opinion entered on November 13, 2015. We refer the reader to that opinion for the facts of this case. ( See Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/15, at 1-12).
The trial court held hearings in this matter on December 2, 2014, and August 5, 2015. At the hearing on December 2, 2014, the trial court heard the testimony of DHS case manager, Esmerelda Oetting. At the hearing on August 5, 2015, the trial court heard the testimony of Ms. Oetting, Delta Community Supports caseworker, Frank Citron, and Mother.
The trial court entered its decrees terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), and changing the Children's goals to adoption on August 5, 2015. Mother filed her notice of appeal and statement of errors complained of on appeal on August 25, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The court filed an opinion on November 13, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(ii).
Mother raises the following questions on appeal:
1) Did the [trial court] err in terminating Mother's parental rights because the Agency social worker indicated that the [C]hildren are bonded to Mother?(Mother's Brief, at 3).
2) Did the [trial court] err in terminating Mother's parental rights because the Agency social worker indicated that the [C]hildren may suffer harm if Mother's parental rights were terminated?
3) Did the [trial court] err in terminating Mother's parental rights because Mother was in compliance with the objectives set for her by the [A]gency and/or DHS?
Our standard of review is as follows:
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence presented as well as the trial court's factual findings and legal conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will reverse the trial court's order only if we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge's decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Further, we have stated:
Where the hearing court's findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court even though the record could support an opposite result.
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Though we are not bound by the trial court's inferences and deductions, we may reject its conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court's sustainable findings.
The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). We will focus on sections 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Requests to have a natural parent's parental rights terminated are governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
* * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
* * *
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (b).
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent's rights bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by "clear and convincing evidence," a standard which requires evidence that is "so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." In re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Further,
A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one's parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional needs. . . .In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
The Adoption Act provides that a trial court "shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The Act does not make specific reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child, but our case law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 484-85 (Pa. 1993). However, this Court has held that the trial court is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation performed by an expert. See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008).
With the above legal standards in mind, we have thoroughly reviewed the record, briefs, and the applicable law, and determined that the evidence presented is sufficient to support the trial court's decrees terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2) and (b). Also, although Mother requests that we change the goal to reunification, ( see Mother's Brief, at 10), she did not raise the question of the change of the Children's goal in her statement of errors complained of on appeal. ( See Mother's Rule 1925(b) Statement, at 1). The issue is, therefore, waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Yates v. Yates , 963 A.2d 535, 542 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Our reading of the trial court's opinion reveals that the trial court carefully and methodically reviewed the evidence and ably addressed Mother's issues presented on appeal. ( See Trial Ct. Op., at 12-22 (finding: (1) Mother did not have a healthy parent-child bond with Children; (2) there was no evidence that there would be any detrimental harm if Mother's rights were terminated; and (3) Mother was not in compliance with her service plan objectives)). Accordingly, we affirm based on the concise, thoughtful, and well-written opinion of the Honorable Vincent L. Johnson, entered on November 13, 2015.
Hence, we affirm the trial court's decrees, entered August 5, 2015, that terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2) and (b), and changed the Children's goals to adoption.
Decrees affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 6/14/2016
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