Opinion
23-2021
03-06-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF G.G., Minor Child, A.F., Mother, Appellant, W.G., Father, Appellant.
Deborah L. Johnson of Deborah L. Johnson Law Office, P.C., Altoona, for appellant mother. Donna M. Schauer of Schauer Law Office, Adel, for appellant father. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State. Jeremy M. Evans of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lynn Poschner, District Associate Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal termination of parental rights to their child.
Deborah L. Johnson of Deborah L. Johnson Law Office, P.C., Altoona, for appellant mother.
Donna M. Schauer of Schauer Law Office, Adel, for appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.
Jeremy M. Evans of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
CHICCHELLY, JUDGE.
A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental rights to their child, G.G., born in 2011. The father contests that the statutory grounds for termination have been met. Both parents contend termination is not in the best interests of the child, ask us to consider a permissive exception to termination, and request more time to work toward reunification. Upon our review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) became involved with G.G. in January 2022 after the mother was the victim of domestic violence by her then-partner. Though G.G. was not present during the assault, citing concerns that the mother had not cut ties with her abuser, the court removed G.G. from the mother's custody and placed her in the father's custody with the Department's supervision. In April, the court adjudicated G.G. to be a child in need of assistance.
Two other children were removed and adjudicated children in need of assistance with G.G. Neither are part of this appeal because one child turned eighteen during the proceedings and his case was dismissed and the other child's whereabouts are currently unknown.
While its initial services targeted domestic violence in the mother's home, the Department soon developed additional concerns about substance use by both the mother and the father. In recorded jail calls between the mother and her partner, the mother stated she was "detoxing hard" and referenced the withdrawal-related symptoms she was experiencing. The two also discussed where Narcan was located and that other unnamed items in the home needed to be cleaned up or removed. The partner also expressed concern that certain items the mother was using in the basement of the home would cause her to die. When the Department requested the mother provide drug tests, she refused. When she did agree to testing, she instructed the father and children to remove their sweat patches and did the same herself. Despite wearing the patches for a short length of time, the mother and father both tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.
Citing these concerns, in May 2022, the Department removed G.G. from the father's custody and placed her in the care of her paternal grandparents in their home, although the father still resided with them. Over the next few months, both parents refused some drug screenings, provided other positive screenings, and declined services. In October, the mother was found with methamphetamine and glass pipes in Michigan. She later testified that she was unsure if she had any pending criminal charges from the incident.
During the winter of 2022, the paternal grandparents traveled to Florida for the season. G.G. was placed with a family friend, and the father lived with them. The Department developed concerns about the placement and that the family friend was allowing unsupervised contact with the parents. On November 1, the mother notified the Department "that she is no longer in Iowa and is 'never coming back.'" Meanwhile, the father continued to test positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.
In February 2023, the father's drug test was presumed positive because he never returned to the testing facility to remove and analyze the sweat patch.
By April 2023, the Department's concerns that the family friend was allowing unsupervised contact with the parents were confirmed after the friend "could not remember" if the father was ever left alone with G.G. The Department had also reviewed a photo of the mother and G.G. interacting without supervision. Additionally, the family friend abruptly took G.G. out of school one day. When the Department came to check on G.G., the father did not allow G.G. to answer the door and became "hostile and aggressive" in his communications. The father's visits were halted due to safety concerns because he told providers that "he has guns" and "will leave the state with [G.G.] if she is removed." Subsequently the court removed G.G. from the family friend's custody and placed her with a foster family.
By this time, the mother had returned to Iowa. The day after G.G. was placed in foster care, the mother attempted to pick up G.G. from school. Because she was not allowed unsupervised contact, the school did not allow her to remove G.G. and notified the Department. Two weeks later, G.G. packed overnight items into her backpack when she went to school. After the school day finished, she disappeared and was eventually found at the father's house. The Department took her to a foster family, but because of mental-health concerns, she was hospitalized for self-harm behaviors.
Even after G.G. was released from the hospital, the parents' issues continued. They tested positive again and again for methamphetamine and amphetamine. The mother was arrested in July 2023 for second-degree burglary and fifth-degree theft. Officers found a methamphetamine pipe when they searched her jail cell. After she was released, she lived with a new boyfriend. The mother reported to the Department that he was "treating her poorly." On one occasion, a worker observed him "driving erratically through [the mother's] yard." The Department was concerned about the boyfriend because of his volatile behavior and criminal history of domestic violence.
The State petitioned to terminate the parents' parental rights in July 2023. The termination hearing was originally scheduled for August, but the father was receiving "detox" services, so it was continued. In preparation for inpatient substance-use treatment, the father testified he used methamphetamine because "[t]hey wouldn't let me in clean." But the father voluntarily left after three days because the facility would not allow him to smoke cigarettes.
Before the termination hearing, G.G. began attending therapy regularly. Her therapist requested that the father write an "accountability letter" for use in their sessions and for the Department to resume visits, but he refused despite G.G. begging him. Before trial, G.G.'s therapist stated G.G. "has identified feeling ready to 'move on' from this and reports having found stability within [her] current foster placement." But G.G. also expressed a desire to preserve her parents' parental rights.
After a two-day termination hearing in December, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both the mother and the father. Both separately appeal.
II. Review.
Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. In re B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d 227, 233 (Iowa 2020). "We are not bound by the juvenile court's findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility of witnesses." In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted).
III. Discussion.
Iowa courts use a three-step analysis to review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings. Id. We consider whether: (1) statutory grounds for termination have been established, (2) termination is in the best interests of the child, and (3) we should exercise permissive exceptions to decline termination. Id. at 47273. In conducting this analysis, our primary concern is always the best interests of the child. In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 529 (Iowa 2019).
A. Statutory Grounds for Termination.
The juvenile court terminated both parents' parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2023), which allows the court to terminate if it finds all of the following:
1. The child is four years of age or older.
2. The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
3. The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for a period of at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.
4. There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in section 232.102.
The mother does not contest the grounds for termination, and the father only challenges the fourth element: whether the child could be returned to the parent's care at the time of termination. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4).
Clear and convincing evidence shows G.G. could not be returned to her father's custody at the time of the termination hearing. While the father claims the juvenile court "terminated solely on the basis of the amount of time the child has been out of the father's care," this is untrue. The father has not addressed the substance-use and mental-health concerns that were the catalysts for removal. At the hearing, he testified he did not know why G.G. was removed from his care. He has not been accountable for his methamphetamine use, claiming over a decade of sobriety while also admitting to using prior to entering treatment because "[t]hey wouldn't let me in clean." Despite numerous positive drug tests, the father testified that every test has been "false." In his communications with the Department, he was aggressive and combative regarding the positive test results, claiming the Department was lying. When G.G.'s therapist requested he write an "accountability letter" to contribute to her services, he refused. The juvenile court noted, "Of course, because [the father] does not take any accountability for using methamphetamine or needing substance use treatment or that he had any role in her removal, he is not able to write an accountability letter." The social work case manager testified that G.G. begged her father to write the letter so the two could resume visits, but he said, "I don't think I can do that." By the time of the termination hearing, he had not had a visit with G.G. in eight months.
The father also alleges he was reengaged with services by the time of the termination hearing, but this is also incorrect. The father discontinued his mentalhealth therapy months before termination and had not reached out to reengage or start with another provider. While he was attending twelve-step programs, he had not completed substance-use treatment services. During previous attempts at inpatient treatment, he started "detox" services but left after three days because he wanted a cigarette. At the hearing, G.G. expressed frustration with this, stating his actions showed the cigarettes were more important to him than her. The juvenile court described their situation best: "[G.G] can recognize what her parents cannot: that they have addictions to methamphetamine, that they continue to use methamphetamine, and that they need treatment services." The juvenile court further found the father's testimony "deserves very little weight and is not generally credible." He has not engaged in services for either himself or G.G. Because the father has not addressed his methamphetamine addiction, G.G. cannot return to his custody at this time. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012) ("We have long recognized that an unresolved, severe, and chronic drug addiction can render a parent unfit to raise children."). We therefore find the statutory grounds for termination have been met for both the mother and the father.
B. Best Interests of the Child.
Both parents argue that termination is not in the best interests of the child. In considering this issue, we "give primary consideration to the child's safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child." Iowa Code § 232.116(2). The "defining elements" of our analysis are the child's safety and "need for a permanent home." In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011). We consider the parent's past performance because it "may be indicative of the quality of the future care that parent is capable of providing." A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 778 (citation omitted).
The juvenile court concluded that termination is in G.G.'s best interests, explaining that "[G.G.'s] mental health has of course taken a high toll due to her parents' unaddressed mental health and substance use issues, and [her] subsequent removal and changes in placement." We agree. G.G. is in a stable, healthy foster placement. See In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 225 (Iowa 2016) (concluding the child's integration into the foster placement supports termination). Neither parent has addressed the Department's concerns regarding substance use and mental health. For the reasons stated previously, the father's ongoing methamphetamine use and refusal to comply with services have negatively impacted his parenting. We therefore find that it is likely this will prevent him from exercising proper parenting to G.G. in the future. See A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 778.
The mother has similarly refused "to take accountability [for her actions] or testify truthfully." The mother cannot admit to her methamphetamine addiction, frequently refusing drug tests or manipulating them by removing sweat patches. At the termination hearing, she refused to acknowledge the role her substance use had in G.G.'s removal. Her priority throughout most of the proceedings has been her romantic relationships, including illicit contact with the paramour whose violence initiated the Department's investigation. Even when their contact impacted G.G.'s adjudication proceedings, the mother maintained their relationship. She now has another relationship with a man who she reported to the Department was "treating her poorly." When the Department came to speak with the mother, a worker observed the new boyfriend "driving erratically through [the mother's] yard." At the termination hearing, the mother's testimony was contradictory, sometimes admitting she was a victim of abuse and alternatively saying "three eyewitness statements" proved the abuse never occurred. Despite the Department's concerns about her relationships, the mother never completed any domestic-violence programming.
Similarly, the mother has also not addressed her mental-health concerns. Despite testifying that she's "been really depressed lately," the mother had not engaged with her psychiatrist in three months and refused to take prescription medications to manage her bipolar disorder. She never consistently engaged in services, denying contact with the Department and providers. While she started a mental-health program the day prior to the termination hearing and contacted a therapist the day of the hearing, this is too late. "A parent cannot wait until the eve of termination . . . to express an interest in parenting." In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000). Instead, we consider her past actions, which establish the mother is not capable of putting G.G. first over romantic relationships or methamphetamine. See A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 778. We therefore find that termination is in the best interests of the child.
Before trial, the mother claimed that the Department had no "authority to kidnap my children who fall under my sovereignty." She refused contact with the Department, accusing them of "a pattern and practices of trafficking children" and performing "Satanic Ritual Abuse schemes." Accordingly, she declined the Department's offered services.
C. Extension of Time.
Both the father and mother request more time to achieve reunification. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b) (allowing the court to continue the child's placement for another six months if doing so will eliminate the need for the child's removal). But once the statutory time period for termination has passed, we view these proceedings with a sense of urgency. C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 495. The termination hearing was already continued from August to December. After eighteen months, G.G. deserves permanency, and we cannot withhold permanency for the unlikely chance her parents will improve. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) ("[W]e cannot deprive a child of permanency . . . by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child."); see also B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d at 233 (determining the parent's past performance reflects the quality of care that parent will provide in the future). In that time, neither parent has addressed the reasons that led to termination. Given their past failures and inability to be accountable for their actions, we decline their requests for more time.
D. Permissive Exceptions.
The mother and father each ask us to consider a permissive exception to termination. The father first argues that we should decline to terminate because of their parent-child bond. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c) (permitting the court to decline to terminate when "[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship"). We have no doubt that the father loves his daughter. But "our consideration must center on whether the child will be disadvantaged by termination." In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010). When establishing a termination exception, "the parent resisting termination bears the burden." A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476. The father did not provide any evidence that G.G. would be particularly disadvantaged by the termination based on their bond. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709. We therefore decline to exercise a permissive exception based on this factor.
Next, both parents argue that we should decline to terminate based on G.G.'s wishes because the juvenile court described her as "mature, thoughtful, and respectful." See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(b) (permitting the court to decline to terminate when the older child "objects to the termination"). While G.G. may be of sufficient age and maturity for her preferences to be considered, we decline to exercise this exception. This is a permissive exception, and the child's best interests are still the primary consideration. See M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 225. "The best interests of a child is not always what the child wants." In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019) (cleaned up) (citation omitted). Neither the father nor mother is capable of caring for G.G. at this time. See In re D.S., No. 11-1194, 2011 WL 5868234, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2011) (affirming termination when unresolved substance use prevented the parent from providing care to the child). Further, G.G. is in the beginning stages of addressing her own mental-health concerns. See In re F.H., No. 23-1686, 2024 WL 260886, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2024) (noting the child's mental health makes reunification "not a realistic prospect"). We find that termination is in the best interests of G.G. and decline to exercise an exception based on her wishes.
IV. Disposition.
We find the statutory grounds for termination are satisfied for each parent and that the best interests of the child support termination. Further, we decline to exercise any exceptions or extensions to termination, and so we affirm.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.