Opinion
23-C-25
05-31-2023
SUCCESSION OF LLOYD ST. GERMAIN, SR AND BEATRICE ST. GERMAIN
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RELATOR, LARRY ST. GERMAIN MARC L. FRISCHHERTZ DOMINICK F. IMPASTATO, III OLIVER SMITH, III COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT, LLOYD ST. GERMAIN, JR. IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATES OF LLOYD ST. GERMAIN, SR. AND BEATRICE ST. GERMAIN BENJAMIN T. SANDERS DAVID L. COLVIN
ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 818-626, DIVISION "F" HONORABLE MICHAEL P. MENTZ, JUDGE PRESIDING
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RELATOR, LARRY ST. GERMAIN MARC L. FRISCHHERTZ DOMINICK F. IMPASTATO, III OLIVER SMITH, III
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT, LLOYD ST. GERMAIN, JR. IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATES OF LLOYD ST. GERMAIN, SR. AND BEATRICE ST. GERMAIN BENJAMIN T. SANDERS DAVID L. COLVIN
Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker, Jude G. Gravois, and Robert A. Chaisson
FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER JUDGE
Relator, Larry St. Germain, Jr., seeks review of the trial court's January 13, 2022 judgment denying his motion for summary judgment, seeking to be recognized as a forced heir of the Successions of Lloyd St. Germain, Sr. and Beatrice St. Germain. The sole issue presented in this writ application is whether La. C.C. art. 1493(C) provides for the forced heirship of a grandchild, whose parent predeceases the decedent-grandparent, and who is permanently physically or mentally disabled rendering him incapable of caring for himself or administering his estate.
Upon consideration of the plain statutory language and the legislative history of the article, we find that La. C.C. art. 1493(C) provides that a disabled grandchild who can prove the requirements under the statute-that he or she, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, is permanently incapable of taking care of his or her person or administering his or her estate-qualifies as a forced heir when the disabled grandchild's parent, regardless of age at the time of the parent's death, predeceases the grandparent-decedent.
Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we grant relator's writ application, reverse the trial court's denial of the motion for summary judgment, and render summary judgment in favor of relator in this case, determining that relator qualifies as a forced heir pursuant to La. C.C. art. 1493(C). We further remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Factual and Procedural Background
The underlying facts in this case are undisputed. Lloyd St. Germain, Sr. and Beatrice St. Germain ("the Decedents") were married but once and then to each other, and of their marriage four children were born: Lloyd St. Germain, Jr., Floyd St. Germain, Larry St. Germain, Sr., and Rose St. Germain Sumner. Lloyd St. Germain, Sr., by notarial testament, left his estate to his wife Beatrice, who also executed a notarial testament which left her estate to her surviving children, Lloyd St. Germain, Jr. and Rose St. Germain Sumner. Floyd St. Germain and Larry St. Germain, Sr. both predeceased their parents. Relator is the surviving child of Larry St. Germain, Sr. and the grandson of the Decedents.
On June 17, 2021, relator filed a "Petition for Notice of Application for Appointment as Administrator/Executor of the Unopened Succession," seeking to open the Succession of Lloyd St. Germain, Sr. Thereafter, both relator and his mother, Melissa W. Lore, filed a petition to open the successions of Lloyd, Sr. and his wife, Beatrice St. Germain; to be recognized as a forced heir of the successions of Lloyd, Sr. and Beatrice; seeking an order that the Last Wills and Testaments be submitted for probate; and seeking an accounting of the assets of the successions.
Respondent, Lloyd, Jr., intervened in the action on July 20, 2021, and answered the petition. He asserted that both decedents, Lloyd St. Germain, Sr. and Beatrice St. Germain, had notarial testaments, which precluded the legal operation of forced heirship by representation. He sought to have the notarial testaments of Beatrice and Lloyd, Sr. be upheld and the denial of Larry, Jr.'s recognition as a forced heir. Lloyd, Jr. also petitioned the trial court to be appointed the independent executor of the successions of Lloyd, Sr. and Beatrice, which was granted on July 22, 2021. In response, as an alleged creditor and forced heir, Larry, Jr. requested an accounting of the successions and the furnishing of security from Lloyd, Jr.
On October 4, 2021, relator filed a motion for summary judgment, wherein he sought to be recognized as a forced heir of the successions of his grandparents, Lloyd, Sr. and Beatrice. In the motion, he asserted that he was permanently mentally incapable of taking care of his person or administering his estate as of the dates of Lloyd, Sr., Beatrice, and Larry, Sr.'s deaths. In support of his motion, relator attached medical records and the expert affidavit of a treating physician, Dr. Brian Monette, who attested to the fact that relator has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, in addition to other diagnoses, and that relator is permanently incapable of taking care of his person or administering his estate because of his mental disorders. Relator argued that such inability to take care of his person or administer his estate under the facts of this case qualifies him as a forced heir pursuant to La. C.C. art. 1493(C).
Relator also attached his mother's, Melissa Lore's, affidavit. Ms. Lore attested that she has served as relator's personal caregiver for his entire adult life and that she has personal knowledge of relator's medical conditions; that relator is not capable of managing his own personal affairs; that relator is the grandchild to Decedents; and that relator's father, Larry St. Germain, Sr., predeceased both relator and Decedents.
In opposition, Lloyd, Jr.-as the independent executor of the successions of Lloyd, Sr. and Beatrice-argued that, when a legatee predeceases the decedent in testate successions, the legacy is deemed to have lapsed; and, relator's intestate representation of his father Larry, Sr. is inapplicable to the testate successions of Lloyd, Sr. and Beatrice. He further argued that relator, as a grandchild, is not a forced heir in his own right. Moreover, Lloyd, Jr, as independent executor, argued that because relator's father, Larry, Sr., would not have been a forced heir at the time of his parents', the decedents', death, representation does not occur and relator does not qualify as a forced heir under Louisiana law.
On January 13, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion for summary judgment. The court orally reasoned that Subpart C of La. C.C. art. 1493 did not contain the language "for forced heirship purposes" and, thus, relator could not be recognized as a forced heir in the successions through representation of his father. The trial court rendered a written judgment denying the motion for summary judgment and the motion to compel accounting on that same date. Relator's timely writ application for supervisory review followed. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 966(H), this Court provided the parties the opportunity for oral argument. The matter was subsequently docketed and oral argument took place on April 5, 2023.
The trial court certified the judgment final pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915. Relator filed a notice of appeal, which this Court subsequently dismissed, finding an appeal does not lie from the denial of a motion for summary judgment. This Court, however, granted relator 30 days to file an application for supervisory review. Succession of St. Germain, 22-148 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/21/22), 355 So.3d 674, 676.
Discussion
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, "using the same criteria governing the [trial court's] consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate: whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Salathe v. Par. of Jefferson Through Dep't of Sewerage, 18-447 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/19/18), 262 So.3d 429, 433 (citing Breaux v. Fresh Start Properties, L.L.C., 11-262 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/29/11), 78 So.3d 849, 852).
Further, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law and is reviewed by this Court under a de novo standard of review. Gloria's Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tauren Expl., Inc., 17-1518 (La. 6/27/18), 252 So.3d 431, 444-45. The Louisiana Supreme Court explained:
The function of statutory interpretation and the construction given to legislative acts rests with the judicial branch of the government. The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the Legislature. Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will and, thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent. We have often noted the paramount consideration in statutory interpretation is ascertainment of the legislative intent and the reason or reasons which prompted the Legislature to enact the law.
The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.Gloria's Ranch, 252 So.3d 431, 445, quoting M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 27 (internal quotations omitted).
The Louisiana Constitution was amended in 1995 to abolish forced heirship in the State of Louisiana, except under certain circumstances. In re Succession of Boyter, 99-0761 (La. 1/7/00), 756 So.2d 1122, 1126. La. Const. Art. XII § 5 provides:
(A) The legislature shall provide by law for uniform procedures of successions and for the rights of heirs or legatees and for testate and intestate succession. Except as provided in Paragraph (B) of this Section, forced heirship is abolished in this state.
(B) The legislature shall provide for the classification of descendants, of the first degree, twenty-three years of age or younger as forced heirs. The legislature may also classify as forced heirs descendants of any age who, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates. The amount of the forced portion reserved to heirs and the grounds for disinherison shall also be provided by law. Trusts may be authorized by law and the forced portion may be placed in trust.
Therefore, by the plain language of the Louisiana Constitution, the legislature is mandated to qualify descendants of the first degree who are twenty-three years of age or younger as forced heirs. However, the Louisiana Constitution further provides that the legislature may qualify as forced heirs "descendants of any age who, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates." Paragraph B does not restrict "descendants of any age" to be only descendants of the first degree.
Subsequent to the adoption of the amendment to the Louisiana Constitution, the Louisiana legislature amended the forced heirship code article, La. C.C. Art. 1493, titled "Forced heirs; representation of forced heirs" to provide:
A. Forced heirs are descendants of the first degree who, at the time of the death of the decedent, are twenty-three years of age or younger or descendants of the first degree of any age who, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are permanently incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates at the time of the death of the decedent.
B. When a descendant of the first degree predeceases the decedent, representation takes place for purposes of forced heirship only if the descendant of the first degree would have been twenty-three years of age or younger at the time of the decedent's death.
C. However, when a descendant of the first degree predeceases the decedent, representation takes place in favor of any child of the descendant of the first degree, if the child of the descendant of the first
degree, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, is permanently incapable of taking care of his or her person or administering his or her estate at the time of the decedent's death, regardless of the age of the descendant of the first degree at the time of the decedent's death.
D. For purposes of this Article, a person is twenty-three years of age or younger until he attains the age of twenty-four years.
E. For purposes of this Article "permanently incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates at the time of the death of the decedent" shall include descendants who, at the time of death of the decedent, have, according to medical documentation, an inherited, incurable disease or condition that may render them incapable of caring for their persons or administering their estates in the future.
Therefore, although Paragraph B states that "representation takes place for purposes of forced heirship only if the descendant of the first degree would have been twenty-three years of age or younger at the time of the decedent's death," Paragraph C provides that representation takes place "in favor of any child of the descendant of the first degree, if the child of the descendant of the first degree, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, is permanently incapable of taking care of his or her person or administering his or her estate.. .regardless of the age of the descendant of the first degree at the time of the decedent's death." For guidance to interpret these provisions, we look to the Official Revision Comments to La. C.C. art. 1493.
The fundamental question in all cases involving statutory interpretation is legislative intent. Tracie F. v. Francisco D., 15-1812 (La. 3/15/16), 188 So.3d 231, 238, quoting Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 10-2605 (La. 3/13/12), 89 So.3d 307, 312. While the Official Revision Comments are not the law, they may be helpful in determining legislative intent. Id. Official Revision Comment (e) to La. C.C. art. 1493 explains:
(e) Paragraph C of this Article is new. It expands the narrow rule regarding the ability of a grandchild to represent a predeceased parent that is set forth in Paragraph B by extending the right of representation to disabled grandchildren of any age. Paragraph B requires that a
predeceased parent not have attained the age of twenty-four by the time of the decedent's death for the grandchild to be able to represent him. Paragraph C, on the other hand, permits representation irrespective of the age of the predeceased parent, if the grandchild is disabled at the time of the death of the decedent. The nature of the disability of the grandchild that is required for him to qualify as a forced heir under Paragraph C is the identical kind of disability that is required for a child to qualify as a forced heir, namely, the grandchild must be severely disabled.
(Emphasis added).
Upon review of the statutory language in addition to the guidance provided by the Official Revision Comments to La. C.C. art. 1493, we find that Paragraph C of Article 1493 provides for representation of "any child of a descendent of the first degree" if that child can prove that he or she "because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, is permanently incapable of taking care of his or her person or administering his or her estate at the time of the decedent's death, regardless of the age of the descendant of the first degree at the time of the decedent's death." In other words, we find that a disabled grandchild who can prove the requirements under the statute-that he or she, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, is permanently incapable of taking care of his or her person or administering his or her estate-qualifies as a forced heir when the disabled grandchild's parent, regardless of age at the time of the parent's death, predeceases the decedent.
Decree
Accordingly, upon de novo review of the writ application and attachments thereto, we find that the trial court erred in denying relator's motion for summary judgment as to his status as a forced heir. We find that relator met his burden to prove that he qualifies as a forced heir under the facts of this case pursuant to the application of La. C.C. art. 1493(C). Accordingly, we grant the writ, reverse the trial court judgment, and render judgment granting relator's motion for summary judgment, finding relator to be a forced heir to the Successions of Lloyd St. Germain, Sr. and Beatrice St. Germain. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED; SUMMARY JUDGMENT RENDERED; MATTER REMANDED