In re Gavin, 181 B.R. 814 (Bankr.E.D. PA 1995) (The orders of the Bankruptcy Judge were later "adopted" by a District Judge who also "ordered" judgments as per the bankruptcy judge's decision. 184 B.R. 670 (E.D.Pa. 1995)). This district, the Central District of California, is often referred to as the "bankruptcy capital" of the country.

In re Bonarrigo, 282 B.R. 101 (D.Mass. 2002)(affirming statewide injunction); In re Bodnar, 1998 WL 480856 (E.D.Pa. August 13, 1998)(denying mandamus and affirming a nationwide injunction); In re Gavin, 181 B.R. 814, 825 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1995), adopted 184 B.R. 670 (E.D.Pa. 1995)(nationwide injunction warranted because of preparer's egregious unauthorized practice of law and § 110 violations-"A nationwide injunction appears clearly authorized by §§ 110(j)(1) and (j)(2)(B), since they speak in terms of entry of an injunction preventing a person from acting as a preparer anywhere."); In re Weatherley, 1993 WL 268546 (E.D.Pa. July 15, 1993)(affirming a nationwide injunction); In re Wagner, 241 B.R. 112, 123 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1999)(nationwide injunction prohibiting all of preparer's petition preparer activities pursuant to § 110(J)(2)(B)); In re Bradshaw, 233 B.R. 315, 329 (Bankr.D.N.J.1999)(nationwide injunction prohibiting all of preparer's petition preparer activities pursuant to § 110(J)(2)(B)); In re Gabrielson, 217 B.R. 819, 828 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1998)(enjoining preparer "in the District of Arizona or in any federal district in which he might now or subsequently locate"); In re Willman, 1997 WL 781878 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.

Id. at 385. See also In re Brokenbrough, 197 B.R. 839, 844 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1996) (doing business as Legal Aid Services prohibited); Ross v. Smith (In re Gavin), 181 B.R. 814, 817-818 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1995), adopted by District Court, 184 B.R. 670 (E.D.Pa. 1995) (business card describing employee as "paralegal assistant" led client to believe that preparer was working with or supervised by an attorney). Subsection (f)(2) states that a petition preparer shall be fined not more than $500 for each instance of using the term legal in advertising.

Id. at *10. The scope and form of the 9/23 Order was described in Patton I, id. at *13-*14, as almost identical to these approved by the district court in In re Bodnar, 1998 WL 480856, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 13, 1998); In re White, 1995 WL 612931, at *2, *5 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 11, 1995); In re Skobinsky, 167 B.R. 45, 47, 53 (E.D.Pa. 1994); and In re Gavin, 181 B.R. 814, 826 (Bankr. E.D.Pa.), modified and expanded, 184 B.R. 670 (E.D.Pa. 1995). Patton I, at *13-*14.

Additionally, the defendants are required to disgorge fees because it is well established that courts may order the disgorgement of the fruits of illegal conduct. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 284, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); In re Kaitangian, 218 B.R. 102, 115 (Bankr.S.D.Cal. 1998); In re Gavin, 181 B.R. 814, 820-21, 823 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.), adopted, 184 B.R. 670 (E.D.Pa. 1995). The unauthorized practice of law is illegal in the State of New Jersey.

Furthermore, although § 329 refers specifically to attorneys, F.R.B.P. 2016(a) applies to any "entity seeking interim or final compensation for services, or reimbursement of necessary expenses." As a result, in several recent decisions, this court has pointed out, e.g., In re Gavin, 181 B.R. 814, 820 (Bankr. E.D.Pa.), adopted, 184 B.R. 670 (E.D.Pa. 1995), that 11 U.S.C. § 329 and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure ("F.R.B.P.") 2016 and 2017 applied to all parties charging for services in bankruptcy cases, and was not confined to attorneys.

1994), for a description of the IFP Program.See In re Gavin, 181 B.R. 814, 816 n. 1 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.), adopted, 184 B.R. 670 (E.D.Pa. 1995), for a full description of L.B.R. 2016.1 and the local rule to which it relates, Local Bankruptcy Rule ("L.B.R.") 2016.1(c). This form requires, essentially, that pro se debtors disclose any fees paid to attorneys or non-attorneys who assisted or advised the debtor in filing bankruptcy.

9. Mr. White and LAS are not attorneys licensed to practice law within the State of Ohio, nor are they admitted to practice before any United States District Court in Ohio (Hearing Exh. 5). 10. Prior to the filing of the instant case, LAS, its principals, and any one acting in concert with them were enjoined from preparing bankruptcy petitions and/or acting as bankruptcy petition preparers anywhere in the United States of America for violations of section 110 of the Bankruptcy Code. See Ross v. Smith (In re Gavin), 184 B.R. 670 (E.D.Pa. 1995) and 181 B.R. 814 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1995); In re Hernandez, unreported, Case No. 95-51477-RBK (W.D.Texas, San Antonio Division, June 14, 1995); and In re Lackey, unreported, Case No. 95-10453FM (W.D.Texas, Austin Division, May 19, 1995). 11. On or about April 1995, debtor's daughter telephoned LAS for information as to whether bankruptcy would resolve the debtor's financial problems.

This new statutory provision does not preempt, but instead supplements, prior bankruptcy remedies. See Ross v. Smith (In re Gavin), 181 B.R. 814, 821 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1995) ("It seems clear that 11 U.S.C. § 110 was not enacted to preempt these traditional bankruptcy court remedies, but to reinforce their propriety and add some very specific weapons to the bankruptcy court's arsenal in remedying certain specific inappropriate conduct by lay advocates."), adopted, 184 B.R. 670 (E.D.Pa. 1995). Section 110, however, only covers a "bankruptcy petition preparer.

The statute is violated when the term "legal" or something similar is contained in the name of the business. In re Gavin, 181 B.R. 814, 823 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.), aff'd 184 B.R. 670 (E.D.Pa. 1995). Section 110(f) provides: