Opinion
2011-12-13
In the Matter of GABRIEL C. (Anonymous), appellant.
Robert M. Rametta, Goshen, N.Y., for appellant. David L. Darwin, County Attorney, Goshen, N.Y. (Sandra P. Williams of counsel), for respondent.
Robert M. Rametta, Goshen, N.Y., for appellant. David L. Darwin, County Attorney, Goshen, N.Y. (Sandra P. Williams of counsel), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Gabriel C. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Orange County (Currier–Woods, J.), dated March 29, 2011, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated January 25, 2011, made after a hearing, finding that she committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of resisting arrest and attempted assault in the third degree, adjudged her to be a juvenile delinquent and placed her on probation for a period not to exceed two years. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated January 25, 2011.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The appellant challenges the Family Court's finding that she committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted assault in the third degree. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621; cf. People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted assault in the third degree ( see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.00). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see Matter of Steven L., 86 A.D.3d 613, 614, 926 N.Y.S.2d 911, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 714, 2011 WL 4977276; cf. CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see Matter of Daniel R., 51 A.D.3d 933, 934, 856 N.Y.S.2d 876; cf. People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053, cert. denied 542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determination as to that charge was not against the weight of the evidence ( cf. People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
“The Family Court has broad discretion in fashioning orders of disposition” ( Matter of Ashanti B., 62 A.D.3d 790, 791, 878 N.Y.S.2d 447; see Matter of Karen M., 58 A.D.3d 734, 735, 872 N.Y.S.2d 472; Matter of Ashley H., 53 A.D.3d 578, 578, 861 N.Y.S.2d 418). Here, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in adjudicating the appellant a juvenile delinquent and placing her on probation ( see Family Ct. Act § 352.2), rather than directing an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal ( see Family Ct. Act § 315.3). The disposition was appropriate in light of, inter alia, the appellant's poor school attendance, her persistent disciplinary problems, and the recommendation made in the probation report ( see Matter of Leonard J., 67 A.D.3d 911, 912, 888 N.Y.S.2d 424; Matter of Ashanti B., 62 A.D.3d at 791, 878 N.Y.S.2d 447; Matter of Ashley H., 53 A.D.3d at 578, 861 N.Y.S.2d 418; Matter of Gerald W., 12 A.D.3d 522, 523, 784 N.Y.S.2d 626). Contrary to the appellant's contention, she was not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal “merely because this was her first contact with the court system” ( Matter of Ashley H., 53 A.D.3d at 578, 861 N.Y.S.2d 418; see Matter of Gerald W., 12 A.D.3d at 523, 784 N.Y.S.2d 626).
The appellant's remaining contention is without merit.