In re Fumo

7 Citing cases

  1. In re Kesler

    433 N.E.2d 643 (Ill. 1982)   Cited 6 times

    " This court has consistently condemned commingling, and the conversion which so frequently results has been the occasion for disciplinary action ranging from disbarment ( In re Smith (1979), 75 Ill.2d 134) to censure ( Clayter; see also In re Schlax (1980), 81 Ill.2d 66; In re Brody (1976), 65 Ill.2d 152; In re Smith (1976), 63 Ill.2d 250; In re Sherman (1975), 60 Ill.2d 590; In re Wyatt (1972), 53 Ill.2d 44; In re Fumo (1961), 22 Ill.2d 429; In re Lingle (1963), 27 Ill.2d 459). Without intending to minimize the serious nature of respondent's misconduct, it can fairly be said that the instances in which this court has disbarred lawyers because of commingling and conversion have involved circumstances of a substantially more aggravated character than appear here. (See, e.g., In re Smith (1979), 75 Ill.2d 134; In re Stillo (1977), 68 Ill.2d 49; In re Smith (1976), 63 Ill.2d 250; In re Ahern (1962), 26 Ill.2d 104.) So far as this record indicates, respondent had no intention of permanently retaining the funds; he was always in a position to repay the $27,500 and did so promptly in the amount requested as soon as he became aware that John Smith was objecting.

  2. In re Witte

    458 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. 1983)   Cited 1 times

    ( E.g., In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill.2d 7, 13-14 (disbarment); In re Fumo (1961), 22 Ill.2d 429, 431-32 (two-year suspension).) Given these precedents, along with the persuasive nature of the Missouri sanction, we reject respondent's claim that his conduct warrants substantially less discipline in the nature of censure in this State.

  3. In re Hopper

    423 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. 1981)   Cited 59 times

    This court always reserves the right to administer such discipline as it sees fit. In re Fumo (1961), 22 Ill.2d 429, 431. The available sanctions include disbarment, suspension, and censure. "Where there is intentional fraud, disbarment is warranted.

  4. In re Smith

    387 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. 1979)   Cited 14 times

    In fact this court has even disbarred an attorney for an isolated act of conversion. (See cases cited in In re Fumo (1961), 22 Ill.2d 429, 431.) Considering that respondent has been guilty of three independent acts of conversion and long-continuing false representations to his clients, together with the absence of candor, remorse, or attempts at restitution, a proper sense of concern for the protection of the public requires respondent's disbarment.

  5. In re Turner

    387 N.E.2d 282 (Ill. 1979)   Cited 2 times

    In Stillo the court explicitly stated that the misconduct of the attorney was aggravated by his subsequent dishonesty when appearing before the Hearing Board. Stillo was disbarred. In re Fumo (1961), 22 Ill.2d 429, involved a similar commingling and conversion of funds. In that case the respondent was given checks for payment of taxes.

  6. In re Ahern

    185 N.E.2d 869 (Ill. 1962)   Cited 6 times

    Instead, the conclusion is inescapable that respondent acted in bad faith and converted the monies in question to his own use. The wrongful conversion of a client's funds involves moral turpitude and in itself is such a flagrant violation of an attorney's oath as to warrant disbarment. ( In re Fumo, 22 Ill.2d 429; In re Ashbach, 13 Ill.2d 411.) Here, the conduct of respondent was even more reprehensible, and the unfavorable reflection on the legal profession more acute, due to the fact that one person was held unnecessarily in jail and another has been unable to secure a driver's license as a result of respondent's derelictions of duty. This court, in the proper discharge of its own duties, cannot permit acts of the type here portrayed to be perpetrated on the public, nor can we permit the name of respondent to remain on the rolls of attorneys as one who is worthy of the confidence of his clients and who meets the high standards of conduct the profession demands.

  7. In re Bourgeois

    182 N.E.2d 651 (Ill. 1962)   Cited 6 times

    The wrongful conversion of funds in an attorney's hands for specific purposes involves moral turpitude and subjects him to disciplinary action. ( In re Fumo, 22 Ill.2d 429; In re Abbamonto, 19 Ill.2d 93; In re Ashbach, 13 Ill.2d 411; In re Thomson, 3 Ill.2d 308.) While conceding that his acts were improper, respondent argues that suspension, particularly for a fixed period of time, is not called for under the circumstances. He asserts that in addition to certain other mitigating factors, his actions were the result of severe mental and emotional strain brought on by domestic and business difficulties. He had family troubles which led to a separation from his wife.