In re Fenner's Estate

4 Citing cases

  1. In re Clark's Estate

    354 P.2d 112 (Utah 1960)   Cited 4 times

    But exemption from execution for payment of debts does not exempt from payment of estate taxes. Counsel for respondent contend that the payment received by the beneficiary herein was in the nature of proceeds of life insurance and "passed to her by the terms of the policy and not by the laws of intestacy or wills" and are therefore not subject to the tax sought to be imposed. Counsel assert that the ruling of this court in In re Fenner's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 134, 270 P.2d 449, establishes that proceeds of life insurance are not taxable under the inheritance tax law. They rely upon the following statement from the opinion in that case: 2 Utah 2d at page 136, 270 P.2d at page 450.

  2. Norris v. Oklahoma Tax Commission

    350 P.2d 246 (Okla. 1960)   Cited 2 times

    "Trusts created subject to general power of appointment held within rule that property passing by appointment belongs to donor, not donee; hence, not liable for inheritance taxes as donee's property." In the case of In re Fenner's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 134, 270 P.2d 449, the Supreme Court of Utah construed their gross estate statute, which is practically identical to the Oklahoma statute, and at page 452 of 270 P.2d we find the following language: "The historical concept that property passes from the donor of the power to the appointee, the donee of the power acting as a conduit lacking ownership of the appointive property, is responsible for the exclusion of the donee's spouse and creditors in the appointive property they would normally have in property owned outright by the donee.

  3. In re Estate of Wylie

    342 So. 2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 4 times

    The issue before this court is whether the property which was the subject of the power of appointment Gertrude M. Wylie exercised was part of her estate. If it was, then the fees the court awarded to the appellees were proper; if it was not, the fees were improper. The following authorities support a holding that the property subject to the power of appointment in the present case was not part of the estate of Gertrude M. Wylie: United States v. Field, 255 U.S. 257, 41 S.Ct. 256, 65 L.Ed. 617 (1921); In re Baird's Estate, 135 Cal.App.2d 333, 287 P.2d 365 (1955); In re Breault's Estate, 29 Ill.2d 165, 193 N.E.2d 824 (1963); Boston Safe Deposit Trust Co. v. Johnson, 151 Me. 152, 116 A.2d 656 (1955); Fiske v. Warner, 99 N.H. 236, 109 A.2d 37 (1954); Norris v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 350 P.2d 246 (Okla. 1960); In re Fenner's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 134, 270 P.2d 449 (1954); 33 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators ยง 121, pp. 1074-1075. On the strength of these authorities I concur in the decision to reverse the order under review.

  4. Brown v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia

    249 So. 2d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 3 times

    Lake v. New York Life Insurance Co., Sup., 194 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (1959). Re Fenner's Estate, 2 Utah 134, 270 P.2d 449 (1954). Re Fenner's Estate involved a factual circumstance where the primary beneficiary died prior to exercising the power of appointment over the insurance proceeds.