Opinion
J-A32033-16 No. 1579 EDA 2016
01-17-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.C., A MINOR APPEAL OF: K.C., FATHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order April 7, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Domestic Relations at No.: CP-09-DP-0000019-2014 BEFORE: DUBOW, J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT, J. MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
K.C. (Father) appeals from the trial court's order changing the permanency goal of K.C. (Child) from reunification to adoption. We affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
Father filed a timely notice of appeal and statement of errors complained of on appeal on May 3, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(1), (b). The trial court filed an opinion on June 2, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(ii).
In its June 2, 2016 opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. ( See Trial Court Opinion, 6/02/16, at 1-4). Therefore, we have no reason to restate them here.
We have redacted the copy of the trial court's June 2, 2016 opinion attached to this decision to remove the name of the Child involved in this case and any other identifying information. See Superior Court I.O.P. 424A (providing that Superior Court decisions related to custody proceedings shall not contain the names of minors or identifying information of any other individuals involved).
As a preliminary matter, we observe that, in the argument section of his brief, Father maintains for the first time that, because "[t]he statutory construction of 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6351(e)(1) only permits that there be a permanency goal as to the child and not to the parents or guardian[,]" "[t]he [trial] court abused its discretion by bifurcating the Child's goal between the Child's parents instead of maintaining a singular goal as to the Child[.]" (Father's Brief, at 9, 10). Because he did not raise this allegation in his statement of questions involved or statement of errors complained of on appeal, this claim is waived.
It is well established that any issues not raised in the Rule 1925(b) Statement are waived for purposes of appeal. See , e.g., Commonwealth v. Castillo , [] 888 A.2d 775, 780 ([Pa.] 2005) (reaffirming the bright-line rule of waiver and stating that "in order to preserve their claims for appellate review, [a]ppellants must comply whenever the trial court orders them to file a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.1925. Any issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.") (citation omitted); Giles v. Douglass , 747 A.2d 1236, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2000) (finding that Father waived appeal in custody case when he failed to file a Rule 1925(b) Statement).Ramer v. Ramer , 914 A.2d 894, 902 (Pa. Super. 2006) (finding one of mother's issues waived for failing to include it in Rule 1925(b) statement); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). Also, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2116(a), "[n]o question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby." Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a).
In this case, Father raises one issue in both his Rule 1925(b) statement and statement of questions involved: "[t]he [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion and/or erred as a matter of law and fact by granting the request to change the permanency goal from reunification to adoption." (Father's Rule 1925(b) Statement, 5/03/16; see also Father's Brief, at 4). Therefore, Father's issue, that the court abused its discretion because it was statutorily precluded from ordering a different goal for each parent with respect to Child, is waived. See Ramer , supra at 902; see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii), 2116(a).
Moreover, even if this issue were not waived, it would not merit relief. We review a trial court's goal change decision for an abuse of discretion. See In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d 339, 345 (Pa. Super. 2010). Pertinent to our review of this issue, the court commits an abuse of discretion if it misapplies the law. See id.
In this case, Father relies on the language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(e)(1) and Rule of Juvenile Procedure 1608(A) in support of his argument that "[t]he [trial] court abused its discretion by changing the goal to adoption for Father only [because] there is only a permanency goal for the subject [C]hild and not for the parents or guardian." (Father's Brief, at 10; see id. at 10-14). Father's claim would lack merit.
[I]n evaluating a trial court's application of a statute, our standard of review is plenary and is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law. Further, [w]hen interpreting a statute, we must abide by the rules of statutory construction. It is a basic tenet of statutory interpretation that, when the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.Faust v. Walker , 945 A.2d 212, 213 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Section 6351(e)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
The court shall conduct a permanency hearing for the purpose of determining or reviewing the permanency plan of the child, the date by which the goal of permanency for the child might be achieved and whether placement continues to be best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child. In any permanency hearing held with respect to the child, the court shall consult with the child regarding the child's permanency plan, including the child's desired permanency goal, in a manner appropriate to the child's age and maturity. . . .42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(e)(1).
Rule 1608(A) states:
A. Purpose and timing of hearing. For every case, the court shall conduct a permanency hearing at least every six months for purposes of determining or reviewing:
(1) the permanency plan of the child;
(2) the date by which the goal of permanency for the child might be achieved; andPa.Juv.Ct.R. 1608(A)(l)-(3).
(3) whether the placement continues to be best suited to the safety, protection, and physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child.
We discern nothing in the above language that precludes a trial court from finding that a permanency plan containing different goals for each parent is "best suited to the safety, protection, and physical, mental, and moral welfare of the [C]hild." Id. at (A)(3). Indeed, Father fails to identify any precedent that supports his position, ( see Father's Brief, at 10-14), and we are not aware of any. Further, we will not "disregard[ the clear and unambiguous language of the statutes] under the pretext of pursuing [Father's interpretation of their] spirit." Faust , supra at 213 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Hence, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in applying the law and in finding it was in Child's best interest to designate different permanency plans for each parent. See R.M.G., supra at 345. Father's claim, even if not waived, would not merit relief.
We now turn to the only issue properly before us: "Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion and/or erred as a matter of law and fact by changing the permanency goal from reunification to adoption for Father?" (Father's Brief, at 4). In support of this claim, Father maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in changing Child's permanent placement goal as to him, to adoption. ( See Father's Brief, at 4, 14-19). After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court, we conclude that there is no merit to Father's claim. The trial court opinion properly disposes of the question presented. ( See Trial Ct. Op., at 5-12 (finding that: (1) it is necessary for Child to remain in care of Bucks County Children & Youth Agency (Agency) because both parents have been incarcerated since her birth; (2) the Child cannot wait indefinitely, without any sense of permanency, while Father tries to become fit for reentry into society at some unknown future date; (3) the court will be able to approve adoption providing a stable and nurturing environment for Child well before an unidentified future date when Father might be released from confinement and he acquires necessary skills to care for her; (4) Agency has made reasonable efforts for reunification of Father and Child; (5) although Father has made some progress under parenting plan, he will remain incarcerated indefinitely and unable to care for Child; (6) Child has been under care and supervision of Agency longer than proscribed fifteen out of last twenty-two months)). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 1/17/2017
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