Opinion
G032132.
11-18-2003
In re FAITH B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES B., Defendant and Appellant.
Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, and Paula A. Whaley, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Jennifer Mack, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for the Minor.
Clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile courts denial of reunification services to petitioner. We affirm.
I
FACTS
On April 1, 2003, the juvenile court denied reunification services to petitioner James B., the presumed father under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (e)(1) after declaring Faith B., a minor then two years old, a dependent of the court. Petitioner contends the court erred in denying services to him.
There were approximately 14 child abuse reports for the family between 1994 and 2003. A prior petition sustained on behalf of Faiths siblings states that in 1994 petitioner exposed one sibling, a sister, to sexually explicit materials, including a video of both the siblings parents, and that petitioner and a friend masturbated in the siblings presence. A prior sustained petition also states petitioner picked up another of the minors siblings, pushed him, punched him and struck him in the face. That sibling told his therapist in 1996 petitioner fondled his penis, and threatened to cut it off while holding scissors in his hand. Petitioners parental rights to two other children were previously terminated after petitioner failed to complete the case plan, and those children have been adopted.
Both petitioner and the mother have histories of substance abuse, and the children have been subjected to domestic violence between petitioner and the mother. Tara B., the mother, knew of the 1994 incidents, failed to protect and reconciled with petitioner. In 1996, petitioner struck the minors sister in the back with a metal rod and burned her with matches, battered the mother and threatened to kill the mother and the children. On at least one occasion, petitioner reunited with the mother in violation of a restraining order. On January 10, 2003, the mother and petitioner were arguing in the car. When she exited the vehicle, he ran over her leg, which was still swollen two months later. Petitioner has a long history of drug abuse, and no history of successful completion of a drug rehabilitation program. He was convicted of domestic violence in 1994, 1996, 1997 and 2003. On January 30, 2003, petitioner was arrested for domestic violence involving the mother in the presence of the child in a public place. At the time of the incident, he was under the influence of drugs.
A disposition hearing was conducted on March 25, 2003. At that time, petitioner was in custody in the Orange County jail, soon to be transferred to Wasco State Prison to serve four years for spousal abuse, possession of drugs and parole violations. During the hearing, the judge stated to petitioners attorney, "[Y]ou might mention to your client it doesnt do him any good to be staring down at mom during these proceedings." During his testimony, petitioner denied he and the mother had an argument during the January 30, 2003 incident. He explained they were not having a pleasant day when he asked the mother for some money. After she refused, he admits he was rough and abusive with the mother. He grabbed her purse and "she fell down." He dragged the mother with the purse for about 10 or 15 feet, and she then ran away to escape from petitioner. The mother "screamed bloody murder and half of K-Mart came outside." A security officer tackled petitioner to the ground. Petitioner was restrained, handcuffed to a bike rack and arrested. The mother was bruised on her arm, elbow and cheek. When asked what effect the altercation might have had on Faith, who was in a shopping cart near her parents at the time, petitioner said, "I had absolutely no effect on her."
The mother told the court she was called vile names by petitioner in front of Faith. The social worker opined petitioners prognosis for reunification was poor, ". . . due to his current sentence, criminal history, and dependency history." The judge considered the age of the minor, noting petitioner had been out of Faiths life for at least a year and bonding had not occurred between the two. He would not be released from prison any sooner than 20 months, and services should be completed within 18 months. The court recognized there were claims petitioner received treatment, but no documentary evidence of completion of any treatment programs was offered. The judge stated it would be detrimental for a two-year-old to undergo five hour drives for "behind glass" visits to state prison.
II
DISCUSSION
The duty of a court reviewing a denial of reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b) is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court. (Curtis F. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.) When an appellant challenges an order on the ground of insufficient evidence, an appellate court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile courts order, drawing every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547.) The party claiming lack of substantial evidence bears the burden to show there is no evidence of a substantial nature to support the trial courts finding or order. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.) When reviewing for substantial evidence, an appellate court must determine whether there is reasonable, credible evidence of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could make the finding being challenged. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924.) In addition, where the standard of proof in the trial court is by clear and convincing evidence, appellate courts review the evidence through the prism of the clear and convincing evidence standard. (In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 169-170.)
Petitioner further contends the trial judge abused his discretion in denying services to appellant. While he provides authority for when a court abuses its discretion, he cites none for his proposition that this standard of review applies in this case, nor any explanation why there is no authority for this point. A brief should support each point by argument, and if possible, by citation of authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 14(a)(1)(B).) Because this argument lacks support, it is deemed waived.
Petitioner argues the trial court erred when it denied reunification. Reunification services are offered whenever the goal of preservation of family is furthered. But sometimes it is fruitless to offer reunification services. (Raymond C. v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 159, 163.) Section 361.5, subdivision (b) provides that services need not be provided when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent falls into one or more specified circumstances. Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) provides that services need not be provided when the parental rights of the parent have been terminated as to any sibling or half sibling of the child, and the parent has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the previous dependency. Two of his other children had been removed, declared dependents of the juvenile court and adopted.
Petitioner claims section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) does not apply to him because he made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal of the two older children. He testified he completed programs, but could not state which specific programs he completed or produce documentary evidence he did complete them. During the hearing, he said he gave his certificates of completion to both his parole officer and the mother. Regardless of whether he completed programs, there was substantial evidence he did not make a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of the older children. His drug use and spousal abuse continued afterward. Petitioners completion of any programs does not in any way provide sufficient evidence it would be in Faiths best interest to provide him reunification services. That he ran over Faiths mother with a car, and then beat her up and dragged her on the ground in Faiths presence 20 days later, while under the influence of drugs, indicates he did not learn much. At the hearing, he demonstrated no insight regarding the effect of his actions on Faith. The court had more than enough evidence to conclude there was clear and convincing evidence he failed to address his propensity for violence and use of drugs.
The next thrust of petitioners claim is that the mother received reunification services, so he should receive them, too. For this proposition, he cites no authority, so we deem it to be waived. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 14(a)(1)(B).) Section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) provides that when a parent is incarcerated, the court shall order reasonable services "unless the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, those services would be detrimental to the child." In determining detriment, the court shall consider the age of the child, the degree of parent-child bonding, the length of the sentence, the nature of the crime, the degree of detriment to the child if services are not offered and any other appropriate factors. (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1).) The juvenile court considered Faiths age, the lack of bonding between Faith and petitioner, the length of petitioners prison term, the reason for his incarceration, the degree of detriment if Faith were taken for prison visits and the detriment to her if no reunification services were provided, and concluded there was clear and convincing evidence to deny services.
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts finding by clear and convincing evidence that reunificiation services should be denied.
III
DISPOSITION
The juvenile courts orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: OLEARY, ACTING P. J., IKOLA, J. --------------- Notes: All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.