Opinion
Nos. 35627-9-II; 36192-2-II; 36790-4-II.
January 15, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 06-1-02464-0, Linda CJ Lee, Katherine M. Stolz, and Stephanie A. Arend, JJ., entered December 1, 2006, together with petitions for relief from personal restraint.
Reversed by unpublished opinion per Bridgewater, J., concurred in by Houghton, C.J., and Hunt, J.
John David Everett appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of hydrocodone. The State concedes that the trial court improperly denied Everett's motion to suppress the evidence officers obtained from a warrantless search of his hotel room. Accepting the State's concession, we reverse Everett's conviction.
Hydrocodone is a Schedule II controlled substance. RCW 69.50.206(a)(1)(x).
I. FACTS
On May 31, 2006, a Fife community corrections officer (CCO) conducted a random search of the guest registry at the Econo Lodge in Fife. When she checked Everett's name against the Department of Corrections' (DOC) database, she discovered that he was on active DOC supervision with drug-related conditions.
The CCO, her partner, and a Fife police officer went to Everett's motel room to conduct a compliance check. The CCO knocked and identified herself. When Everett opened the door, the officers immediately removed him from the room and handcuffed him.
Inside the room, the officers saw a woman and several empty beer cans. The CCO searched Everett's room and found two crack pipes in the bathroom and a backpack containing small pills, later determined to be hydrocodone. Everett told the CCO that the backpack was his. When questioned, Everett admitted to ingesting crack, marijuana, heroin, and hydrocodone that evening.
The State charged Everett with unlawful possession of hydrocodone. After a hearing, the trial court denied Everett's motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his hotel room. The jury convicted Everett as charged. Everett appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
Everett argues, and the State concedes, that the trial court improperly denied his motions to suppress evidence officers obtained after discovering his presence at the Econo Lodge during a random search of the guest registry. The recent Washington Supreme Court's decision, State v. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d 121, 156 P.3d 893 (2007), controls our analysis. Jorden held that "[a]bsent a valid exception to the prohibition against warrantless searches, random viewing of a motel registry violates article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution." Jorden, 160 Wn.2d at 131.
In Jorden, a police officer conducted a random, warrantless search of a Lakewood motel's guest registry and discovered Jorden's presence at the motel. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d at 124. When officers entered Jorden's hotel room to arrest him for outstanding warrants, they discovered crack cocaine. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d at 124-25. The trial court denied Jorden's pretrial motion to suppress evidence of the drugs. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d at 125. Because officers obtained the evidence by an unlawful search, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court improperly denied Jorden's motion to suppress the evidence. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d at 131.
Here, as in Jorden, the officers obtained Everett's name and room number through a random search of the motel's guest registry. The State concedes that in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Jorden, the trial court improperly denied Everett's motions to suppress evidence acquired as a result of that search. We agree.
Reversed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HOUGHTON, C.J. and HUNT, J., concur.