In re Euell

4 Citing cases

  1. IN RE GOVE

    Case No. 09-22405-JNF, Adv. P. No. 10-1048 (Bankr. D. Mass. Jan. 13, 2011)   Cited 6 times
    Finding debt to guardian ad litem to be nondischargeable because debt: was incurred for support of the child; was incurred in connection with an order of a court of record, and had not been assigned to a non-governmental entity

    Some courts have adhered strictly to the literal text of 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) by holding that nondischargeable domestic support obligations cannot be owed to a third party. See, e.g.,In re Euell, 271 B.R. 388, 390-93 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2002); In re Townsend, 177 B.R. 902, 904 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1995).

  2. In re Franklin

    Case No.: 05-01310-BGC-7, AP No.: 05-00158-BGC-7 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2006)

    The majority of courts which have addressed similar issues has determined that only the parties to the divorce action have standing to prosecute a proceeding to declare the nondischargeability of a debt pursuant to section 523(a)(15).Baroway Dawson, P.C. v. Euell (In re Euell), 271 B.R. 388, 392 (Bankr. D. Col. 2002); Bryant v. Bryant (In re Bryant), 260 B.R. 839, 848 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2001); Savage, Herndon Turner v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 236 B.R. 107, 110 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1999); Brian M. Urban Co. v. Wenneman (In re Wenneman), 210 B.R. 115, 119 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997); Woodruff, O'Hair Posner, Inc. v. Smith (In re Smith), 205 B.R. 612, 617 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997); Abate v. Beach (In re Beach), 203 B.R. 676, 680 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997); Woloshin, Tenenbaum, Natalie, P.A. v. Harris (In re Harris), 203 B.R. 558, 562 (Bankr. D. Del. 1996); Douglas v. Douglas (In re Douglas), 202 B.R. 961, 963 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1996); Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressler), 194 B.R. 290, 304 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996); Barstow v. Finaly (In re Finaly), 190 B.R. 312, 315 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995). This Court agrees.

  3. In re Beggs

    314 B.R. 401 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2004)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that a debtor's step-daughter could not assert non-dischargeability under section 523

    Nicole was not named a defendant in this action, and did not appear. Nevertheless, her absence is immaterial because third parties, such as Nicole, do not have standing under § 523(a)(15) in any case. See In re Dollaga, 260 B.R. 493 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001); In re Euell, 271 B.R. 388 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2002); In re Beach, 203 B.R. 676 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). Debtor may raise the affirmative defense found in § 523(a)(15)(B), which is discussed in more detail below, and as a matter of law, he will prevail where the debt is owed to a third party and his former spouse is not jointly liable for the debt, and will not suffer any detrimental consequences if the debt is not paid. Id. This is because Debtor will receive a benefit by not having to pay the debt, but his former spouse will suffer no detriment because she was not liable for the debt in any case, and will not suffer any consequences if it is not paid. Accordingly, the Debtor has met his burden under § 523(a)(15)(B) with respect to the life insurance obligation which is dischargeable, and there is no need to further analyze that debt.

  4. In re Industrial, Commercial Electrical, Inc.

    Case No. 02-45451-JBR, Adversary Proceeding No. 02-4591-JBR (Bankr. D. Mass. Apr. 7, 2004)

    (citation omitted)); In re Euell, 271 B.R. 388, 390 (Bankr. D. Co. 2002) (finding sua sponte examination of party's standing to pursue an exception to discharge proper because "[s]tanding to sue is an essential element to a justiciable cause. It is a jurisdictional prerequisite that is not subject to waiver.