In re Estate of Venturelli

11 Citing cases

  1. In re Estate of Pirie

    141 Ill. App. 3d 750 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 18 times
    Reversing because the instruction implied that an executor's failure to diversify could, by itself, constitute a breach of his fiduciary duty

    Although courts have differentiated between corporate and individual executors, the distinction more accurately is described as that between professional and nonprofessional executors. While the rule holding professional and nonprofessional executors to the same standard of care has been recited recently as the law in Illinois (see, e.g., Hamilton v. Nielsen (N.D. Ill. 1981), 513 F. Supp. 204, 207; In re Estate of Lindberg (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 714, 721, 388 N.E.2d 148, 154), the only authority cited by these courts for this rule is In re Estate of Venturelli (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 997, 370 N.E.2d 290. (See also In re Estate of Vanderwater (1945), 326 Ill. App. 81, 61 N.E.2d 392 (abstract of opinion) (without citation to authority, court stated that executor which qualified as a trust company and advertised for business was subject to the same standard of care applicable to all other executors).) However, the Venturelli court cites no authority from the supreme court, appellate court, or from any Illinois statute in support of its conclusion.

  2. Hamilton v. Nielsen

    513 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Ill. 1981)   Cited 4 times

    As co-executors of the Hamilton estate, the Bank and Nielsen owed fiduciary duties of care to the plaintiff. Estate of Venturelli v. Granville National Bank, 54 Ill. App.3d 997, 12 Ill.Dec. 667, 370 N.E.2d 290, 293 (3d Dist. 1977); Estate of MacLeish v. MacLeish, 35 Ill. App.3d 835, 842, 342 N.E.2d 740, 746 (1st Dist. 1976). 3.

  3. In re Lieberman

    391 Ill. App. 3d 882 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 12 times
    Analyzing the facts under both the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 and Illinois law, and stating unless a Restatement section has been adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court, it is not the law, and merely provides guidance

    While the acts of an executor must be judged in the context in which he acted [citation], in Illinois a corporate executor is held to no higher standard than an individual executor. ( In re Estate of Venturelli (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1002 * * *.)" In re Estate of Lindberg, 69 Ill. App. 3d at 721.

  4. In re Estate of Wallen

    262 Ill. App. 3d 61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 61 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding a veil piercing claim was not barred by claim preclusion, as it did "not appear from the record that decedent was ever sued individually or was ever called upon to defend against the issue of piercing the corporate veil"

    Like the executor, the administrator is the representative of the decedent and all those interested in the estate, such as creditors, heirs, legatees, and devisees; he is a fiduciary to those interested in the estate and, as such, is held to a high standard of fair dealing and diligence. In re Estate of Garbalinski (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 767, 772; In re Estate of Venturelli (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 997, 1002; see Wilmere v. Stibolt (1987), 152 Ill. App.3d 642, 645 (when administrator acquires possession of the assets of the decedent, title vests in the administrator as a quasi-trustee or trustee for the benefit of creditors, distributees, and legatees). In representing decedent in his capacity as controlling shareholder, the administrator also has a separate fiduciary duty to the corporation itself and cannot misappropriate corporate assets (see Graham v. Mimms (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 751).

  5. Jewish Hospital of St. Louis, Missouri v. Boatmen's National Bank

    261 Ill. App. 3d 750 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 69 times
    Holding an attorney who drafted a will owed a duty in contract or tort to the remainder beneficiaries of a testamentary trust; under either theory, the non-client beneficiary must demonstrate that they are in the nature of a third-party intended beneficiary of the relationship between the attorney and the client, and evidence of intention is derived from a consideration of all of the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of the execution of the will

    Furthermore, the corporate executor is held to no higher standard than is the individual executor. ( In re Estate of Venturelli (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 997, 370 N.E.2d 290.) The Bank had a right to hire an attorney to handle the legal affairs of the estate, and the Bank had a right to rely on the attorney's advice, unless the Bank knowingly chose incompetent counsel or had some reason to know that the advice given was not sound.

  6. In re Estate of Mulvaney

    470 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 7 times

    The standard for determining whether a representative has mismanaged a decedent's estate is whether the representative acted as an ordinarily prudent and cautious person who is the trustee of property of another. ( In re Estate of Busby (1937), 288 Ill. App. 500, 6 N.E.2d 451; In re Estate of Venturelli (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 997, 370 N.E.2d 290.) The petitioners argue that the executors violated this standard by failing to submit the real estate lease to the court, as required in section 20-2 of the Probate Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110 1/2, par. 20-2).

  7. In re Estate of Lindberg

    424 N.E.2d 1161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 6 times

    • 1, 2 The standard of care required of the administrator of an estate was set forth in Christy v. Christy (1907), 225 Ill. 547, 80 N.E. 242. An administrator must possess the highest degree of fidelity, and utmost good faith, and the skill that an ordinarily prudent man bestows on his own affairs. 225 Ill. 547, 552-53; see also In re Estate of Venturelli (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 997, 1002, 370 N.E.2d 290 (applying the Christy standard to executors).) The issue is not whether an ordinarily skillful executor would have succeeded in selling the estate's shares at a better price; the issue is whether the Bank made a reasonable attempt in the instant case.

  8. In re Estate of Dembufsky

    411 N.E.2d 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)

    • 2 It is true the court may make an award without hearing evidence ( cf. In re Estate of Venturelli (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 997, 1000, 1004, 370 N.E.2d 290). However, in the instant case the court did specifically order that a hearing take place on the widow's petition.

  9. Gregory v. First Nat'l Bk. Trust Co.

    406 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 8 times

    ) There is no clear-cut rule to aid the probate court in ascertaining what a reasonable fee should be; it is a determination which must be based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case being considered. ( In re Estate of Brown (1978), 58 Ill. App.3d 697, 706, 374 N.E.2d 699, 706-07.) The factors to be weighed by the probate court in making this determination include the size of the estate, the complexity of its administration, the skills used, the opinion testimony of those familiar with that particular type of work ( In re Estate of Venturelli (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 997, 1004, 370 N.E.2d 290, 295), the time required and the diligence, good faith and reasonable prudence of the one requesting the fee ( In re Estate of Brown (1978), 58 Ill. App.3d 697, 706-07, 374 N.E.2d 699, 707). In order to reverse the allowance of an executor's fee a reviewing court is required to find that the trial court's determination is manifestly or palpably erroneous.

  10. In re Estate of Lindberg

    388 N.E.2d 148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 6 times

    While the acts of an executor must be judged by the context in which he acted ( In re Estate of Busby (1937), 288 Ill. App. 500, 519-22, 6 N.E.2d 451), in Illinois a corporate executor is held to no higher standard than an individual executor. ( In re Estate of Venturelli (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 997, 1002, 370 N.E.2d 290.) In either case, the fiduciary must act with the highest degree of fidelity, with the utmost good faith, and with that degree of skill and diligence which an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his own similar affairs.