In re Estate of Smatlan

5 Citing cases

  1. Voboril v. Vanosdall (In re Estate of Shell)

    290 Neb. 791 (Neb. 2015)   Cited 8 times

    Any ambiguitiesare resolved in favor of the statutory pattern.In re Estate of Smatlan, 1 Neb.App. 295, 501 N.W.2d 718 (1992).Id.

  2. In re Estate of Mousel

    271 Neb. 628 (Neb. 2006)   Cited 8 times

    Id. A latent ambiguity exists when the testator's words are susceptible of more than one meaning, and the uncertainty arises not upon the words of the will as looked at in themselves, but upon those words when applied to the object or subject which they describe. In re Estate of Smatlan, 1 Neb. App. 295, 501 N.W.2d 718 (1992). Case law distinguishes latent ambiguities from patent ambiguities.

  3. Lovorn v. Brethouwer (In re Estate of Tiedeman)

    25 Neb. App. 722 (Neb. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 2 times

    In summary, a patent ambiguity is a case where the same word in a will has two meanings discernible from the face of the will itself, whereas a latent ambiguity is a case where the word has two meanings, but only when extrinsic evidence is brought to bear. In re Estate of Smatlan , 1 Neb. App. 295, 501 N.W.2d 718 (1992).Clark correctly argues that any question regarding the testamentary intent of the purported holographic will is a patent ambiguity.

  4. In re Estate of Matthews

    702 N.W.2d 821 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 3 times

    This court has also contrasted a patent ambiguity, where the same word in a will has two meanings discernible from the face of the will itself, with a latent ambiguity, where a word has two meanings but only when extrinsic evidence is brought to bear. See In re Estate of Smatlan, 1 Neb. App. 295, 501 N.W.2d 718 (1992). Because the ambiguity in the instant case is patent, we reject Melissa's contention that we may consider extrinsic evidence and we confine our analysis to the four corners of the will.

  5. Opinion No. 00029

    00029 (Ops.Neb.Atty.Gen. Jun. 7, 2000)

    The question as to whether or not a leasehold for a term of ninety-nine years is real estate is discussed at length . . . and while it is true that for purposes of conveyancing a lease of more than one year is termed real estate and may be referred to as real estate in a highly technical sense, still it cannot be said that a lease for more than one year is real estate in the common acceptation of the term . . . . Therefore, the 99-year leasehold is not real estate, but personal property under Nebraska law . . . . In re Estate of Smatlan , 501, N.W.2d 718, 721, 722, 1 Neb. App. 295, 300 (1992) (citations omitted). See also, Ballantyne Co. v. City of Omaha , 113 N.W.2d 486, 494, 173 Neb. 229, 242 (1962) (Stating removal and relocation expenses are not included in condemnation awards for a leasehold); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. City of Omaha , 106 N.W.2d 727, 171 Neb. 457 (1960) (Ruling contract rights in an unexercised option to purchase real estate are not compensable in a condemnation action, since a contract is not an estate in land).