Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Nicholas, 258 Iowa 115, 121, 137 N.W.2d 900, 904 (1965) ; see also Luttenegger v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 671 N.W.2d 425, 433–34 (Iowa 2003) (noting that when a statute describes “all charges ... including” four examples, the word “including” cannot create an exclusive list because that “would conflict with the word ‘all’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Barron v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 540 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Iowa 1995) ; Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 252 Iowa 205, 211, 106 N.W.2d 655, 659 (1960) (“The word ‘all’ is commonly understood, and when so used does not admit of an exception or exclusion not specified.”); In re Peers' Estate, 234 Iowa 403, 411, 12 N.W.2d 894, 898 (1944) (“[W]e cannot by judicial interpretation nullify the definite pronouncements of the legislature which has particularly declared that the statute in question applies to ‘all claims.’ ”).

Alternatively stated, non-claim statutes extinguish the right to sue and not merely the remedy. In re Estate of Peers, 234 Iowa 403, 409, 12 N.W.2d 894, 897. See also Donnally v. Montgomery County Welfare Bd., 200 Md. App. 534, 540-542, 92 A.2d 354, 357, 34 A.L.R.2d 996, and citations; State ex rel. State Bd. of Charities Reform v. Bower, Wyo., 362 P.2d 814, 823, and citations.

In a rather extensive discussion of this question, we have previously reviewed both the logic and the holdings of various authorities of other jurisdictions. See In re Estate of Peers, 234 Iowa 403, 12 N.W.2d 894, and cases cited therein; St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Nyce, 241 Iowa 550, 41 N.W.2d 682. In the Peers case at page 411 of 234 Iowa, page 898 of 12 N.W.2d, we said: "The statute here in question is a statute of limitations.

The purpose of non-claim statutes, in most instances, is to promote the prompt and orderly administration of estates for all parties, including creditors and distributees. See e.g., Jones v. Arkansas Farmers Ass'n, 232 Ark. 186, 334 S.W.2d 887 (1960); Hurlimann v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust Sav. Ass'n, 141 Cal.App.2d 801, 297 P.2d 682, 685 (1956); In re Peers' Estate, 234 Iowa 403, 12 N.W.2d 894 (1944); Minor v. Lillard, 306 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. 1957). So the basic policy underlying the non-claim statute will not be disturbed by allowing plaintiff's action, since plaintiff admittedly is not and cannot pursue assets in the estate once he obtains a judgment.

However, as held by the Iowa Supreme Court in a recent case that statute is a statute of non-claim. In re Peers' Estate, 1944, 234 Iowa 403, 12 N.W.2d 894. Rules of law which are applicable to cases arising under ordinary statutes of limitations may not be applicable to cases arising under the Iowa statute prescribing the time for filing claims against estates. In re Peers' Estate, supra.

); City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium, Inc., 96 Ill.2d 457, 71 Ill.Dec. 720, 451 N.E.2d 874, 875-76 (1983) ("While sovereign immunity from liability and governmental immunity from statutes of limitation shared a philosophical origin and have the similar effect of creating a preference for the sovereign over the ordinary citizen, we do not believe that the abolition of the first of these doctrines requires abandonment of the second."); Dep't of Transp. v. Sullivan, 38 Ohio St.3d 137, 527 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1988) ("[T]he abolition of sovereign immunity by R.C. Chapter 2743 and recent decisions of this court did not serve to strip the state of all the privileges of sovereignty and place it in absolute parity with all other litigants."); Dep't of Transp. v. J.W. Bishop Co., 497 Pa. 58, 439 A.2d 101, 104 (1981) (holding the abrogation of sovereign immunity did not require abrogation of nullum tempus). re Peers' Estate, 234 Iowa 403, 411, 12 N.W.2d 894, 898 (1944) ("[A] general statute of limitations does not apply to the State of Iowa." (citing Des Moines County, 34 Iowa 84; Kellogg v. Decatur County, 38 Iowa 524 (1874); Manatt v. Starr, 72 Iowa 677, 34 N.W. 784 (1887))); State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 231 Iowa 784, 838, 2 N.W.2d 372, 400 (1942) ("It is well established that neither the plea of laches, nor that of the statute of limitation is of any avail against the general government."

On this appeal John asserts the lower court erred in each of said adverse rulings. I. A probate court, in its broadest sense, is a court of administration. It is charged with the duty of seeing that estates are properly and promptly administered. It has inherent power to see that its officers act efficiently and effectively and, if because of conflicting interests can not act so that the rights of all parties are protected, the probate court has the inherent power to appoint an officer for or on behalf of the court to see that no rights are lost. Whether the appointee is designated a special or temporary administrator is of no consequence. Jackson v. Jones, 231 Iowa 106, 114, 300 N.W. 668, 672; In re Estate of Peers, 234 Iowa 403, 411, 12 N.W.2d 894, 898. Code section 633.3(32) defines temporary administrator as: "any person appointed by the court to care for an estate pending the probating of a proposed will, or to handle any special matter designated by the court."

See note, 34 A.L.R.2d 1003, 1005, 1011. A number of jurisdictions which have passed upon claims similar to that in issue here have held the nonclaim statute to be applicable to the state. Estate of Randall v. Colorado State Hospital, 166 Colo. 1, 441 P.2d 153; Bahr v. Zahm, 219 Ind. 297, 37 N.E.2d 942; In re Peers' Estate, 234 Iowa 403, 12 N.W.2d 894; In re Dockham Estate, 108 N.H. 80, 227 A.2d 774; State v. Evans, 143 Wash. 449, 255 P. 1035; see also Donnally v. Welfare Board, 200 Md. 534, 92 A.2d 354; State v. Estate of Crocker, 38 Ala. App. 306, 83 So.2d 261. Decisions to the contrary are Territory v. Makaaa, 43 Haw. 237, and In re Will of Bogert, 64 N.M. 438, 329 P.2d 1023. Other contrary decisions, which turn either on tax claims and the provisions of tax statutes, such as In re Estate of Adams, 224 Wis. 237, 272 N.W. 19, Ray v. State, 123 Colo. 144, 226 P.2d 804, and Liebhardt v. Department of Revenue, 123 Colo. 369, 229 P.2d 655, or on the ground that the state's claim did not arise out of contract and, therefore, was not governed by the provisions of the applicable nonclaim statute, such as State ex rel. Conway v. Glenn, 60 Ariz. 22, 131 P.2d 363, and County of Los Angeles v. Security First National Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 191 P.2d 78, are not guides to our present problem.

We do not know of any statute or rule of law that relieves the State of Indiana from the obligation to perform conditions precedent upon which the enforcement of a right of action is made to depend.' To the same effect see State v. Evans, 143 Wn. 449, 255 P. 1035, 53 A.L.R. 564; Rhodes v. State, 196 Wn. 618, 83 P.2d 896; In re Peers' Estate, 234 Iowa 403, 12 N.W.2d 894, and People v. Osgood, 104 Cal.App. 133, 285 P. 753. See also In re Bird's Estate, 410 Ill. 390, 102 N.E.2d 329, recognizing the distinction between a non-claim statute and a statute of limitations as applied to a State.

We do not know of any statute or rule of law that relieves the state of Indiana from the obligation to perform conditions precedent upon which the enforcement of a right of action is made to depend.' To the same effect see State v. Evans, 143 Wn. 449, 255 P. 1035, 53 A.L.R. 564; Rhodes v. State, 196 Wn. 618, 83 P.2d 896; In re Peers' Estate, 234 Iowa 403, 12 N.W.2d 894 and People v. Osgood, 104 Cal.App. 133, 285 P. 753. See also In re Bird's Estate, 410 Ill. 390, 102 N.E.2d 329, recognizing the distinction between a non-claim statute and a statute of limitations, as applied to a state.