Opinion
J-A10036-16 No. 898 WDA 2015
08-09-2016
IN RE: ESTATE OF REGINA R. LLOYD APPEAL OF: J.G. WENTWORTH ORIGINATIONS, L.L.C.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order May 13, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 02-11-1612 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PANELLA, J. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:
Appellant, J.G. Wentworth Originations, L.L.C., appeals from the order entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans' court Division, in favor of Arthur Constable, III, executor of the estate of Regina Lloyd ("Regina Lloyd") and Todd T. Jordan, Esquire, guardian of the estate for Anthony Lloyd, a minor ("Anthony Lloyd"), which denied Appellant's exceptions and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's ("MetLife") cross-exceptions and relieving MetLife of liability for any periodic payments made to the estate of Michael Lloyd ("Michael Lloyd") and to Appellant. We affirm.
Michael Lloyd, MetLife, and Metropolitan Insurance and Annuity Company ("MIAC") did not participate in this appeal.
The Orphans' court opinion sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows.
Regina Lloyd and her son, Anthony Lloyd, were involved in an automobile accident in Florida on November 11, 2002. At the time of the accident Regina Lloyd, who suffered a severe and permanent injury, was married to Michael Lloyd, who was not involved in the accident. Regina Lloyd, and Michael Lloyd, individually and as parents and natural guardians of their minor child Anthony Lloyd, filed a complaint on June 3, 2003, against the municipality, the city of Fernandina Beach. This lawsuit was settled by the city of Fernandina Beach and its insurers, Ranger Insurance Company and Preferred Governmental Issuance Trust. A Settlement Agreement was executed in November of 2003 and stated [that] specific amounts of money...would be paid in consideration of the settlement including payments to Regina Lloyd of $6,469.00 monthly for thirty years. The obligation to make the monthly payment was assigned to [MetLife] and its subsidiary [MIAC]. MetLife began to make the required monthly payments of $6,469.00 to Regina Lloyd on December 1, 2003.
In September of 2004, Regina, Michael, and Anthony moved to Pennsylvania. Thereafter, Regina Lloyd filed for a divorce and a divorce decree was granted for Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd on September 12, 2007, in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd did not enter into a property settlement agreement in connection with the divorce.
Regina Lloyd died in Pennsylvania on March 11, 2011. Her will was probated in Pennsylvania. On March 15, 2011, a letter was sent to MetLife stating that Arthur Constable III is the executor of the estate, and informing MetLife of the death of Regina Lloyd, and the 2007 divorce. MetLife requested a copy of the divorce decree with property settlement, especially [requesting] any reference to the Annuity. In response to this request, MetLife was sent a copy of the divorce decree and the Will of Regina Lloyd. MetLife responded with a letter requesting the entire divorce decree with the property settlement, showing the reference to the annuity and how it is to be disbursed, and stating that it must have the signature of the judge and the date. The letter warned that if this document was not provided, MetLife would proceed with the beneficiary
designation on file. MetLife sent four requests for this information and the last request was marked "Final Request." The last letter stated that it would make the funds payable to the beneficiary on file unless MetLife heard back from the addressee within [thirty] days. The final letter was dated July 26, 2011. The letters from MetLife were addressed to Arthur R. Constable, Jr., at an address that was not the correct address for Arthur R. Constable, Jr., but was the address given for correspondence in the initial letter sent to MetLife after Regina Lloyd's death. MetLife's letters of April 22, 2011, June 10, 2011, and July 26, 2011, received no response. This [c]ourt is troubled by the failure of the Executor to respond to the letters from MetLife. Since MetLife is excused from liability under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.2, [its] payments to a former husband-beneficiary make the Executor's failure to respond irrelevant.
MetLife contacted Michael Lloyd on November 1, 2011. On September 28, 2012, in response to prior correspondence with MetLife, Michael Lloyd sent MetLife a notarized handwritten letter providing personal identity information and stating that he was the rightful beneficiary of Regina Lloyd's Annuity and that there was never any kind of property settlement in their divorce. Thereafter, MetLife remitted to Michael Lloyd past payments from the date of Regina Lloyd's death and began paying Michael Lloyd the amount of $6,469.00 monthly.
On May 7, 2013, Michael Lloyd agreed to sell/transfer part of the future payments to [Appellant]. Michael Lloyd transferred $2,200.00 of the monthly annuity payments for [twenty] years to [Appellant] for $200,000.00. This [sale]/transfer was approved by [a] Florida state court on June 25, 2013. The Petition For Court Approval of a Transfer of Structure Settlement Payment Rights filed with the Florida [c]ourt in May of 2013, ...makes no mention that Michael Lloyd was not the injured party. It further makes no mention of his divorce from and subsequent death of Regina Lloyd. The Florida [c]ourt [o]rder dated June 25, 2013, ...set forth in finding number [one], that the transfer sought does not contravene "Any Federal or State Statute." Had the Florida [c]ourt been made aware of Regina's Pennsylvania divorce from Michael Lloyd as
well as her death in 2011, that court may not have approved the transfer. Notice of the Florida court proceeding had not been given to the estate of Regina Lloyd, or to the guardians of Anthony Lloyd prior to this transfer.(Orphans' Court Opinion, filed January 16, 2015, at 1-4). After conducting a bench trial, the Orphans' court entered an opinion and order on January 16, 2015, finding 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.2 applied under these circumstances and all subsequent periodic payments made pursuant to the annuity contract were to be paid to the estate of Regina Lloyd as the contingent beneficiary, and ordering MetLife to distribute all accumulated and future annuity payments to Regina Lloyd's estate as well as ordering Appellant to return to Regina Lloyd's estate any funds received. MetLife and MIAC filed a motion for post-trial relief on January 23, 2015, seeking modifications to the Orphans' court order regarding their liability to the parties in the action. On January 29, 2015, Appellant filed exceptions to the Orphans' court order. MetLife and MIAC filed cross exceptions to Appellant's exceptions on February 5, 2015. Appellant filed amended exceptions on February 11, 2015. On April 21, 2015, counsel for Anthony Lloyd and Regina Lloyd filed motions to strike MetLife and MIAC's motion for post-trial relief and Appellant's exceptions. The Orphans' court entered an order on May 15, 2015, (a) denying Appellant's exceptions and MetLife and MIAC's cross-exceptions, (b) relieving MetLife and MIAC of liability for any periodic payments made to Michael Lloyd and to Appellant, and (c) stating its January 16, 2015 decision/opinion remains in effect. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on June 9, 2015. Appellant filed a motion for stay of orders pending appeal on June 10, 2015, which the Orphans' court granted on June 17, 2015. The Orphans' court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant did not file one.
On October 31, 2013, Michael Lloyd attempted to sell/transfer another portion of the annuity to [Appellant]. This time [Appellant] notified Arthur and Angela Constable (the guardians of the person of Anthony Lloyd) of the impending [sale]/transfer and it was objected to by the attorney for [Anthony Lloyd], as well as the attorney for [Regina Lloyd]. Based on the objections, this second [sale]/transfer was withdrawn by [Appellant]. Michael Lloyd died in Florida on December 13, 2013.
The instant matter was commenced in this [c]ourt on November 26, 2013, when the Estate of Regina Lloyd filed a Petition for Citation to Show Cause Why Annuity Payments Should Not Be Paid to Estate. MetLife and Michael Lloyd were the named Respondents. On February 24, 2014, [Appellant] filed an Emergency Petition to Intervene, which was granted on March 21, 2014. On June 10, 2014, MetLife filed a Petition for Rule to Interplead by Notice to Plaintiff Estate of Regina R. Lloyd and [Appellant] and by Citation to Claimant Estate of Michael R. Lloyd, which interpleader, on July 23, 2014, this [c]ourt granted. On July 17, 2014, Anthony Lloyd filed a Petition to Intervene, which this [c]ourt granted. On August 21, 2014, this [c]ourt [o]rdered that Petitioner, Estate of Regina Lloyd, [Appellant], Intervenor Guardian of Estate of Anthony Lloyd and Claimant, Estate of Michael Lloyd [were] enjoined from commencing or further prosecution of any action in any court against MetLife for periodic payments under the subject Annuity, except as a party to the above entitled action. Currently all monthly annuity funds have been interpleaded into this [c]ourt and fall under the jurisdiction of this [c]ourt.
Appellant raises one issue for our review:
WHETHER THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION, ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN RULING THAT 20 [PA.C.S.A] § 6111.2 APPLIED IN THIS CASE TO RENDER INEFFECTIVE THE DESIGNATION OF MICHAEL LLOYD AS THE BENEFICIARY OF THE ANNUITY CONTRACT AT ISSUE.(Appellant's Brief at 2).
Appellant argues Section 6111.2 does not apply under these circumstances because MIAC owned the annuity contract pursuant to a structured tort settlement agreement, and Regina Lloyd was unable to revoke the beneficiary designation of the annuity contract without MIAC's approval because she did not personally own the annuity contract. Appellant claims the only instance in which Section 6111.2 applies is when an individual owns an insurance policy, annuity contract, or other contract and that individual has the unilateral legal right and power to revoke the designation of the individual's ex-spouse as a beneficiary at the time of the individual's death. Appellant insists the language of the tort settlement agreement controls to whom the periodic payments must be made. Under that agreement, Appellant emphasizes the "claimants," which included both Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd, possessed the joint power to revoke or make any beneficiary designations, so the designation of Michael Lloyd as a beneficiary was not unilaterally revocable by Regina Lloyd upon her death. Appellant further contends the tort settlement agreement remains in effect because it contains the continuing obligation to make periodic payments to Michael Lloyd, and the assignment agreement simply carries forward those obligations found in the tort settlement agreement, with MIAC as the assignee and Ranger Insurance Company as the assignor. Appellant argues Michael Lloyd released his loss of consortium claim when he signed the tort settlement agreement in 2003 and the Orphans' court incorrectly relied on its equitable powers in interpreting the contracts and the statute at issue, upon deciding that it would be unjust to allow Michael Lloyd to block Regina Lloyd's beneficiary designations beyond their marriage because the application and interpretation of Section 6111.2 is purely a question of law. Appellant alternatively argues that if Section 6111.2 applies and renders Michael Lloyd's initial designation as beneficiary of the annuity contract ineffective, his estate would still be entitled to the periodic payments because the right to the payments arose out of the tort settlement agreement and he was named the default beneficiary under that agreement. Appellant concludes the Orphans' court decision should be reversed. We disagree.
Regarding estate matters, our standard of review of an order of the Orphans' court is deferential:
[W]e will not reverse unless there is a clear error of law or an abuse of discretion. Our scope of review is also limited: we determine only whether the court's findings are based on competent and credible evidence of record.In re Estate of Karschner , 919 A.2d 252, 255-56 (Pa.Super. 2007) (quoting In re Estate of Westin , 874 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa.Super. 2005)). "An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, discretion has been abused." Silver v. Pinskey , 981 A.2d 284, 291 (Pa.Super. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Mencer v. Ruch , 928 A.2d 294, 297 (Pa.Super. 2007)).
As a general rule, the law of the chosen forum governs all procedural matters. Commonwealth v. Sanchez , 552 Pa. 570, 716 A.2d 1221 (1998). A dispute concerning the applicable substantive law, however, compels a choice of law analysis. Wilson v. Transport Ins. Co., 889 A.2d 563, 571 (Pa.Super. 2005). "Substantive law is the portion of the law which creates the rights and duties of the parties to a judicial proceeding, whereas procedural law is the set of rules which prescribe the steps by which the parties may have their respective rights and duties judicially enforced." Id. A court conducts the choice of law analysis under the choice of law rules of the forum state. See Griffith v. United Air Lines , Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 21, 203 A.2d 796, 805 (1964).
In Pennsylvania, a choice of law analysis includes a preliminary test: "the first step in a choice of law analysis under Pennsylvania law is to determine whether a conflict exists between the laws of the competing states." Budtel Associates , LP v. Continental Cas. Co., 915 A.2d 640, 643 (Pa.Super. 2006).
§ 5327. Determination of foreign law42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5327. To ascertain the law of a sister state, a tribunal may judicially notice the foreign law, and may inform itself of such law by considering any relevant material or source, regardless of whether it was submitted under the rules of evidence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5327(b). The operation of foreign law presents a question of law, rather than fact. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5327(c).
(a) Notice.-A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of any jurisdiction or governmental unit thereof outside this Commonwealth shall give notice in his pleadings or other reasonable written notice.
(b) Materials to be considered.-In determining the law of any jurisdiction or governmental unit thereof outside this Commonwealth, the tribunal may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the rules of evidence.
(c) Court decision and review.-The court, not jury, shall determine the law of any governmental unit outside this Commonwealth. The determination of the tribunal is subject to review on appeal as a ruling on a question of law.
"[W]here the laws of the two jurisdictions would produce the same result on the particular issue presented, there is a 'false conflict,' and the [c]ourt should avoid the choice-of-law question." Titeflex Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh , PA , 88 A.3d 970, 979 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 629 Pa. 638, 105 A.3d 737 (2014) (quoting Williams v. Stone , 109 F.3d 890, 893 (3rd Cir. 1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 956, 118 S.Ct. 383, 139 L.Ed.2d 299 (1997)). If the court finds a true conflict exists, the court must then decide which state has the greater interest in the application of its law, including which state had the most significant contacts or relationship to the action. Budtel Associates , LP , supra.
The Decedents, Estates and Fiduciaries Code governing the effect of a divorce on a beneficiary designation provides in pertinent part:
With respect to the designation of beneficiaries in an insurance policy, this section has been held as preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq. See In re Estate of Sauers , 613 Pa. 186, 32 A.3d 1241 (2011). The present case does not involve ERISA. Therefore, the state statute remains applicable.
§ 6111.2. Effect of divorce or pending divorce on designation of beneficiaries
(a) Applicability.—This section is applicable if an individual:
(1) is domiciled in this Commonwealth;
(2) designates the individual's spouse as beneficiary of the individual's life insurance policy, annuity contract, pension or profit-sharing plan or other contractual arrangement providing for payments to the spouse; and
* * *
(i) at the time of the individual's death is divorced from the spouse[.]
* * *
20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.2.
(b) General rule.—Any designation described in subsection (a)(2) in favor of the individual's spouse or former spouse that was revocable by the individual at the individual's death shall become ineffective for all purposes
and shall be construed as if the spouse or former spouse had predeceased the individual....
Under Pennsylvania law, a loss of consortium claim arising from a marital union has been described as:
[A] right growing out of the marriage relationship which the [spouses] have respectively to the society, companionship and affection of each other in their life together. As thus defined and limited, any interference with this right of consortium by the negligent injury to one spouse, should afford the other spouse a legal cause of action to recover damages for that interference.Burns v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 510 A.2d 810, 812 (Pa.Super. 1986) (citation omitted)). This Court has previously limited the application of marital consortium damages to the time between a spouse's injury and her death. See , e.g., Amato v. Bell & Gossett , 116 A.3d 607, 626 (Pa.Super. 2015) (reiterating general rule that loss of consortium damages "are limited to the time between the spouse's injury and his death"); Linebaugh v. Lehr , 505 A.2d 303 (Pa.Super. 1986) (holding decedent's widow had no separate claim for loss of consortium in addition to her right to recover for wrongful death). We observe our sister jurisdictions agree that the right of consortium tracks the existence of the marital relationship and terminates at its dissolution by death or divorce. See , e.g., Sawyer v. Bailey , 413 A.2d 165, 167 (Me. 1980); Archie v. Hampton , 112 N.H. 13, 287 A.2d 622 (1972); Walden v. Coleman , 105 Ga.App. 242, 124 S.E.2d 313 (1962); Burk v. Anderson , 232 Ind. 77, 109 N.E.2d 407 (1952).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Frank J. Lucchino, we conclude Appellant's issue merits no relief. The Orphans' court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the question presented. ( See Orphans' Court Opinion at 5-14) (finding: Pennsylvania has most significant contacts or relationship to this matter and has greater interest in protecting property rights of its citizens, as opposed to Florida's interest in this matter which is more tenuous; therefore, Pennsylvania law should govern; language of tort settlement agreement does not require that Michael Lloyd remain beneficiary of annuity contract; language of tort settlement agreement explains that any payments made after Regina Lloyd's death "shall be made to such person or entity as shall be designated in writing by Claimants to insurer or...Insurer's assignee", and that "[i]f no person or entity is so designated by Claimants...such payments shall be made to Michael R. Lloyd"; tort settlement agreement provided payments to Regina Lloyd only; tort settlement agreement does not prohibit change in beneficiary or require Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd to jointly designate beneficiary after initial beneficiary designation; once claimants under tort settlement agreement chose Michael Lloyd as beneficiary, that provision of tort settlement agreement was fulfilled and it no longer controlled Regina Lloyd's ability to change beneficiary designations; assignment agreement between MIAC and Ranger Insurance Company, which followed tort settlement agreement, names only Regina Lloyd and her son as claimants; thus, there is conflicting language on who is "claimant" between tort settlement agreement (which includes Michael Lloyd as claimant) and MIAC and Ranger Insurance Company's assignment agreement; language of tort settlement agreement was not incorporated by reference into any subsequent agreements; court must consider all relevant agreements to reach fair and just decision; only document from which any party derives present claim to payments is annuity contract; moreover, all of Michael Lloyd's rights to be compensated for loss of consortium ended upon divorce; it would be unjust to give Michael Lloyd any right to block Regina Lloyd's beneficiary designations beyond time of their marriage; further, if court were to agree with Appellant that tort settlement agreement continued to control rights and obligations of Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd after 2003, then court would also consider paragraph of tort settlement agreement which prohibits claimants (Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd) from having power to sell, mortgage, encumber, or anticipate periodic payments, by assignment or otherwise; Florida court made no finding regarding enforceability of this non-assignment provision; thus, court gives little weight to Appellant's argument that tort settlement agreement continued to control rights and obligations concerning annuity payments; more importantly, per 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.2 of Decedents, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, entire annuity payments were due to Regina Lloyd's estate upon her death because her designation of Michael Lloyd as beneficiary became ineffective upon her death; application of statute does not require Regina Lloyd to own annuity contract; statute applies when individual's spouse is designated as beneficiary in individual's annuity contract; annuity contract belonged to Regina Lloyd because she was receiving annuity payments as payee and was "measuring life (annuitant)"; fact that changes in beneficiary designation required approval from MetLife does not mean designation of Michael Lloyd as beneficiary was irrevocable upon Regina Lloyd's death; there was no evidence presented at trial that MetLife would have denied request to change beneficiary following Regina Lloyd's divorce; because beneficiary designation was revocable upon Regina Lloyd's death, per Section 6111.2, designation of Michael Lloyd as beneficiary became ineffective for all purposes after Regina Lloyd's death and should have been construed as though Michael Lloyd predeceased Regina Lloyd; notably, Michael Lloyd was not injured in car accident that left Regina Lloyd paralyzed, and they were married for less than five years after accident; Michael Lloyd's loss of consortium claim terminated upon divorce; when Michael Lloyd purportedly assigned his "interest" in annuity contract to Appellant, Michael Lloyd had no interest in annuity contract to assign; had Appellant read closely Michael Lloyd's structured settlement application, Appellant would have noticed that Michael Lloyd listed date of Regina Lloyd's death and their divorce incorrectly, where Michael Lloyd listed date of divorce as more than three years after Regina Lloyd's death; Appellant was not bona fide purchaser and should have known with reasonable diligence that Michael Lloyd was no longer beneficiary of Regina Lloyd's annuity contract after their divorce and Michael Lloyd had no interest to sell, based on Pennsylvania law, where Section 6111.2 dictates that, upon Regina Lloyd's death, designation of Michael Lloyd as beneficiary became ineffective and was to be construed as if Michael Lloyd had predeceased Regina Lloyd; all subsequent annuity payments were due to be paid to Regina Lloyd's estate as contingent beneficiary). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the Orphans' court opinion.
With respect to Appellant's claim that the tort settlement agreement remains in effect, we observe Michael Lloyd's right to loss of consortium extinguished upon his divorce from Regina Lloyd because his right tracked the existence of their marriage. Therefore, Michael Lloyd's only claim giving rise to any rights under the tort settlement agreement likewise ceased upon the divorce. See Linebaugh , supra. The Orphans' court properly found that Michael Lloyd had no rights at all under the tort settlement agreement to transfer. As the sophisticated party in this matter and possessing the ability to conduct a thorough due diligence for the transaction, Appellant must bear the brunt of the empty contract it purchased, and its claim merits no relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 8/9/2016
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