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In re Enron Corp.

United States District Court, S.D. New York
Dec 10, 2004
04 Civ. 7693 (RJH) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2004)

Opinion

04 Civ. 7693 (RJH).

December 10, 2004


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER


By motion dated September 27, 2004, defendant Telplexus, Inc. ("Telplexus") seeks to withdraw the reference to a matter pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, captioned as Enron Corp., et al. v. Telplexus, Inc., Case No. 01-16034 (AJG). Telplexus argues that withdrawal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) because it has demanded a jury trial and has not otherwise subjected itself to the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court, but has not consented to have the jury trial conducted by the bankruptcy court, as is required by 28 U.S.C. § 157(e). Alternatively, and independent of its right to a jury trial, Telplexus argues that it is entitled to have its case heard before an Article III court. In either event, Telplexus maintains that withdrawal is inevitable, and urges the Court to act now.

For the reasons that follow, Telplexus' motion to withdraw the reference to the bankruptcy court [1-1] is DENIED without prejudice to renew the application.

ANALYSIS

With the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 157, Congress conferred upon district courts the authority to refer cases to bankruptcy courts where the underlying action arises under Title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, or is related to a case that arises thereunder. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). At the same time, with the inclusion of Section 157(d), Congress provided a mechanism for district courts to withdraw a reference made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). Section § 157(d) provides:

Telplexus does not argue that the reference was improper in this case.

The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred under this section, on its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for cause shown. The district court shall, on timely motion of a party, so withdraw a proceeding if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce.
28 U.S.C. § 157(d).

The procedure for withdrawing a reference is provided for by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 5011(a), which states that "[a] motion for withdrawal of a case or proceeding shall be heard by a district judge." Fed.R.Bankr.P. 5011(a). Where, as here, an application for withdrawal has been submitted by a party to an action that has been referred to bankruptcy court, Section 157(d) does not require withdrawal; as indicated by the first sentence, "the district court may withdraw . . . any case of proceeding referred under this section", withdrawal is at the discretion of the court " for cause shown." 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (emphasis added).

"Although § 157(d) does not define `cause,'" a district court's analysis of a motion to withdraw a bankruptcy reference is guided by Second Circuit law, which "set[s] forth the following factors for consideration: `whether the claim or proceeding is core or non-core, whether it is legal or equitable, and considerations of efficiency, prevention of forum shopping, and uniformity in the administration of bankruptcy law.'" McCord v. Papantoniou, 316 B.R. 113, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ( citing In re Orion Pictures Corp., 4 F.3d 1095, 1101 (2d Cir. 1993)).

28 U.S.C § 157(e), enacted subsequent to the Second Circuit's decision in In re Orion Pictures Corp., has supplanted the core/non-core distinction where a jury trial is demanded because, whether a proceeding is labeled "core" or "non-core", bankruptcy courts cannot preside over jury trials without the consent of all parties. In particular, Section 157(e) states: "If the right to a jury trial applies in a proceeding that may be heard under this section by a bankruptcy judge, the bankruptcy judge may conduct the jury trial if specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court and with the express consent of all the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 157(e). See, e.g., In re Enron Power Mrktg., 2003 WL 68036, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2003) ("my decision [to deny the motion to withdraw] in this case need not and does not rest on the core/non-core distinction"); In re Rickel Assoc., Inc., 2003 WL 23021972, at *3 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 2003) ("the absence of consent dooms a jury trial . . . even if the case were viewed as a core proceeding. . . . Prior to the adoption of section 157(e), the core/non-core distinction was necessarily a threshold issue.")

As suggested by the Second Circuit's holding in In re Orion Pictures Corp., district courts are generally unreceptive to motions to withdraw references where the underlying action is in its preliminary stages and is closely related to proceedings already pending before the bankruptcy court. Here, Telplexus argues that withdrawal is inevitable because it has a right to a jury trial, but has not consented to have the trial heard in bankruptcy court, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 157(e). Even if that is true, "a district court is not compelled to withdraw a reference simply because a party is entitled to a jury trial," especially where doing so would be inefficient. Enron Power Mktg. v. City of Santa Clara (In re Enron Power Mktg.), 2003 WL 68036 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). For the same reason, neither should a court be compelled to withdraw a reference where, as here, the movant asserts that it is entitled to be heard before an Article III judge. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989) ("[T]he question whether the Seventh Amendment permits Congress to assign . . . adjudication [of a legal cause of action] to a tribunal that does not employ juries as factfinders requires the same answer as the question whether Article III allows Congress to assign adjudication of that cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal.")

As the court noted in In re Kenai Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 826 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1992):

A rule that would require a district court to withdraw a reference simply because a party is entitled to a jury trial, regardless of how far along toward trial a case may be, runs counter to the policy favoring judicial economy that underlies the statutory scheme governing the relationship between the district courts and bankruptcy courts. Although withdrawal is an important component of this scheme, the court must employ it judiciously in order to prevent it from becoming just another litigation tactic for parties eager to find a way out of bankruptcy court.
In re Kenai Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 826 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The point is simple: a motion for withdrawal should be denied where refusal serves the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, such as where significant pre-trial or managerial matters remain, even if the action will ultimately be transferred to a district court because the movant is entitled to a jury trial or to an Article III judge. Without reaching a conclusion on either of those issues, the Court finds that efficiency and economy will best be served in this case by refusing Telplexus' request to withdraw the reference.

Telplexus' entitlement to a jury trial or Article III judge need not be decided at this juncture. Although the Court notes that the jury right will ultimately depend on findings regarding the nature of the dispute — specifically whether the claims asserted are legal or equitable, Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41 (1989) — the Court believes judicial efficiency will best be served by reserving judgment on that issue until the underlying proceedings have matured. Indeed, at the time Telplexus filed the present motion, it had not even answered the complaint. (Def. Mot. to Withdraw Reference, p. 2). See In re Rickel Assoc., Inc., 2003 WL 23021972, at *3 (denying motion to withdraw reference and merely noting that district court "will conduct a jury trial of this adversary proceeding if a jury trial is required after all pretrial proceedings before the bankruptcy court"). For the same reason, the Court declines to rule on Telplexus' right to an Article III tribunal. Granfinancierai at 53.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Telplexus' motion to withdraw the reference to bankruptcy court [1-1] in the case captioned Enron Corp., et al. v. Telplexus, Inc., Case No. 01-16034 (AJG) is DENIED without prejudice to renew.

SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

In re Enron Corp.

United States District Court, S.D. New York
Dec 10, 2004
04 Civ. 7693 (RJH) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2004)
Case details for

In re Enron Corp.

Case Details

Full title:In re: ENRON CORP., et al., Debtors, ENRON CORP. and ENRON BROADBAND…

Court:United States District Court, S.D. New York

Date published: Dec 10, 2004

Citations

04 Civ. 7693 (RJH) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2004)

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