Opinion
04-22-00273-CV
12-14-2022
IN THE INTEREST OF E.M.E. and E.D.E., Children
From the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020PA02152 Honorable Tina Torres, Judge Presiding.
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice, Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Isabel appeals the trial court's order, based on a jury verdict, terminating her parental rights to E.M.E. and E.D.E. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's best-interest finding. We affirm.
To protect the identity of the minor children, we refer to appellant by a fictitious name and to the children by their initials. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex.R.App.P. 9.8.
Background
The Department of Family and Protective Services filed an original petition on October 22, 2020. In the petition, the Department sought appointment as E.M.E. and E.D.E.'s temporary managing conservator and termination of Jerry and Isabel's parental rights.
To protect the identity of the minor children, we refer to the children's father by the fictitious name "Jerry." See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex.R.App.P. 9.8. Before trial, Jerry voluntarily relinquished his parental rights by affidavit, and the trial court terminated his rights. He does not appeal the trial court's termination order.
The case proceeded to a jury trial taking place March 24, 28, and 29, 2022 and consisting of testimony from ten witnesses along with twenty-eight exhibits admitted into evidence. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury to answer yes or no, as to each child E.M.E. and E.D.E., with respect to each of the following questions:
Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that [Isabel] has knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the children?
Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that [Isabel] engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children?
Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that [Isabel] has failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the mother to obtain the return of the children who have been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the children's removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the children?
Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship between [Isabel] and the children is in the best interest of the children?
The jury answered "yes" to each of the foregoing questions-corresponding to sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O) and 161.001(b)(2) of the Texas Family Code-as to each child.The trial court incorporated the jury's answers into its order terminating Isabel's parental rights to E.M.E. and E.D.E. and appointed the Department permanent managing conservator of the children.
The trial court submitted one additional ground to the jury, but the jury's findings on that ground were excluded from the trial court's order of termination, and no party raises that issue before this court. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
Isabel timely appealed, challenging the trial court's best-interest finding.
Analysis
Isabel argues the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's best-interesting finding. "After a jury trial, a legal-sufficiency challenge may be preserved in the trial court in one of the following ways: (1) a motion for instructed verdict, (2) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, (3) an objection to the submission of the issue to the jury, (4) a motion to disregard the jury's answer to a vital fact issue, or (5) a motion for new trial." In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d 62, 75 n.8 (Tex. 2021); see, e.g., In re A.R.S., No. 05-21-00655-CV, 2022 WL 224812, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding appellant did not preserve legal and factual sufficiency challenges because appellant did not move for instructed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, did not object to any issue submitted to jury, did not ask court to disregard jury's answer, and did not move for new trial); In re A.P., No. 05-19-01536-CV, 2020 WL 3071708, at *5-6 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 10, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding appellant failed to preserve error on legal and factual sufficiency because no motion for new trial); In re M.X.R., No. 04-20-00042-CV, 2020 WL 2736465, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio May 27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding appellant did not preserve her challenges to legal sufficiency of evidence because she did not make motion for new trial or any other motion or objection in trial court that would preserve those challenges).
"Preservation of a factual-sufficiency challenge requires a motion for new trial." D.T., 625 S.W.3d at 75 n.8; E.N. v. Tex. Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-21-00014-CV, 2021 WL 2460625, at *6 (Tex. App.-Austin June 17, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding appellant failed to preserve challenge to factual sufficiency); M.X.R., 2020 WL 2736465, at *3 (concluding appellant did not preserve her challenges to factual sufficiency of evidence because she did not make motion for new trial); A.W. v. Tex. Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-17-00048-CV, 2017 WL 3044243, at *2 (Tex. App.-Austin July 14, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding appellant failed to preserve error on factual sufficiency, among other things, because no motion for new trial).
Our review of the record shows Isabel did not move for an instructed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial. Nor did she object to the submission of the issue of best interest of the children to the jury or move to disregard the jury's answer to the issue. See D.T., 625 S.W.3d at 75 n.8; A.R.S., 2022 WL 224812, at *1-2; E.N., 2021 WL 2460625, at *6; A.P., 2020 WL 3071708, at *5-6; A.W., 2017 WL 3044243, at *2.
Accordingly, we overrule Isabel's challenge to the sufficiency of the best-interest finding.
Isabel includes a statement in the "issues presented" section of her brief that purports to challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the grounds for termination under subsections (D), (E), and (O) of section 161.001(b)(1). She does not provide any citations to the record or authority, and she does not otherwise present any substantive legal analysis in support of her complaint. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Isabel has therefore presented nothing for our review regarding the legal and factual sufficiency of the grounds for termination. See, e.g., In re B.W., No. 12-17-00306-CV, 2018 WL 1180738, at *8 (Tex. App.-Tyler Mar. 7, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re N.M.A., No. 04-21-00256-CV, 2021 WL 5812291, at *2 (Tex. App. Dec. 8, 2021) (mem. op). Even if Isabel had presented the issue for our review by arguing error as to the grounds for termination, like best interest, the issue is not preserved for appeal. See D.T., 625 S.W.3d at 75 n.8; A.R.S., 2022 WL 224812, at *1-2 ("[W]e cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting [findings on grounds (D) and (E)] when the issue has not been preserved."); A.P., 2020 WL 3071708, at *5-6 (same); see also E.N., 2021 WL 2460625, at *6; M.X.R., 2020 WL 2736465, at *3; A.W., 2017 WL 3044243, at *2.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's order.