Fuller's relevance to the present case is limited because, unlike here, there was no police presence on the premises during the questioning.          We have found only two cases in Illinois addressing the relevance of Miranda to questioning by school authorities: People v. Shipp, 96 Ill.App.2d 364, 239 N.E.2d 296 (1968), decided by the Third District Appellate Court, and In re E.M., 262 Ill.App.3d 302, 199 Ill.Dec. 556, 634 N.E.2d 395 (1994), decided by this district. In Shipp, the defendant, a high school student, was summoned to the principal's office and interrogated by the principal about a false fire alarm.

" (Emphasis added.) See also In re E.M. (1994), 262 Ill. App.3d 302, where our appellate court noted that a school principal's interrogation of a student at school was for school disciplinary purposes while a police liaison officer's subsequent interrogation of that student at school regarding the same incident was for law enforcement purposes. Cf. People v. Bowers (1974), 77 Misc.2d 697, 356 N.Y.S.2d 432, where a school security officer, unlike a faculty member, was required to have probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion in searching a student because: (1) the security guard was under the control of the police commissioner and had to abide by the police department's guidelines; and (2) the security guard was placed on school grounds solely for security purposes and served no educational function at the school.

Thus, applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis in this case, we hold that the phrase "other public official or employee" as used in section 5-401.5(a-5) is intended to refer to an elected or appointed government official or an employee who works for a government agency and who has as his or her primary duties the protection of the public interest and the enforcement of the law. While Deans Reagan and Aiello and Assistant Principal Pikul are undoubtedly responsible for administration and discipline within Lake Zurich High School (see 105 ILCS 5/24-24 (West 2016) (granting educators in loco parentis status, which extends to both disciplinary and nondisciplinary matters); In re E.M. , 262 Ill. App. 3d 302, 307, 199 Ill.Dec. 556, 634 N.E.2d 395 (1994) ), they do not have as their primary mission the same duties as the individuals specifically listed in section 5-401.5(a-5). See People v. Dilworth , 169 Ill. 2d 195, 221-22, 214 Ill.Dec. 456, 661 N.E.2d 310 (1996) (Nickels, J., dissenting) (recognizing that school districts and law enforcement authorities have different missions); Pankhurst , 365 Ill. App. 3d at 255, 302 Ill.Dec. 329, 848 N.E.2d 628 (emphasizing that, although school officials are charged with maintaining order and discipline in their schools, the fact that these duties occasionally entail the investigation of criminal conduct does not alone make the school officials agents of the police); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al. , Criminal Procedure § 6.10(c) (4th ed. 2017) (noting that courts have generally held that government agents not primarily charged with enforcement of the criminal law are under no obligation to comply with Miranda ); Commonwealth v. Ira I. , 439 Mass. 805, 791 N.E.2d 894, 900-01 (2003) (holding th

"Hearsay evidence is in-court testimony of an out-of-court statement, which is offered to establish the truth of the matter contained in the statement, and the value of which rests on the credibility of someone other than the witness." In re E.M., 262 Ill. App.3d 302, 309, 634 N.E.2d 395, 400 (1994). Neither party has cited, and we have not found, an Illinois case addressing the issue of whether testimony about conduct observed on a missing videotape is hearsay.

Hearsay evidence is in-court testimony of an out-of-court statement, which is offered to establish the truth of the matter contained in the statement, and the value of which rests on the credibility of someone other than the witness. In re E.M., 262 Ill. App.3d 302, 309 (1994). Here, defendant assumes that the video camera that telecast the incident was the source of an out-of-court statement.