Opinion
04-22-00264-CV
10-26-2022
IN THE INTEREST OF E.J.D.L.G., a Child
From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020PA01970 Honorable Monique Diaz, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART
This appeal arises from the trial court's order terminating the parental rights of appellant J.A.M., the biological father of E.J.D.L.G. By two issues, J.A.M. argues - and the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (hereinafter the "Department") concurs - that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings that: (1) J.A.M. engaged in conduct or knowingly placed E.J.D.L.G. with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of E.J.D.L.G.; and (2) termination of J.A.M.'s parental rights is in the best interest of E.J.D.L.G. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (b)(2). We affirm in part, reverse and render in part, and reverse and remand in part.
We refer to the child and the child's family members by their initials in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
I. Background
A. J.A.M.'s Conduct Before E.J.D.L.G.'s Birth
J.A.M. was thirty years old when E.J.D.L.G. was born in September 2020. J.A.M. does not contest that, before E.J.D.L.G.'s birth, he had a history of narcotics use, criminal convictions, and parental termination proceedings.
Sue Jurecko, a licensed professional counselor who provided J.A.M. with mental health counseling, recounted that when J.A.M. was eighteen years old, he joined a gang and began using marijuana. By age twenty, he began using cocaine and, approximately two years later, he began using methamphetamine. According to Jurecko, J.A.M. stopped using marijuana and cocaine approximately seven-to-nine years before trial. J.A.M. admitted to using methamphetamine up until 2020, including with L.D.L.G., the biological mother of E.J.D.L.G., while he knew she was pregnant with E.J.D.L.G.
In 2013, J.A.M. was convicted on two felony counts of burglary and one felony count of evading arrest. Later, J.A.M. entered a plea of no contest in exchange for community supervision for a felony count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver that allegedly occurred in 2019. Shortly before E.J.D.L.G. was born, L.D.L.G. accused J.A.M. of assault, and he was arrested and charged. This charge was later dismissed.
Before E.J.D.L.G.'s birth, J.A.M. had fathered three children. J.A.M.'s parental rights to his second- and third-born children were terminated due to what he termed "drug use."
B. E.J.D.L.G.'s Birth and Placement
Shortly after E.J.D.L.G.'s birth, she tested positive for syphilis and was diagnosed with an ante-aortic arch anomaly. According to David Bush, M.D., a pediatric cardiologist, the ante-aortic arch anomaly necessitated surgery. Both L.D.L.G. and E.J.D.L.G. were found to have illegal substances in their systems, according to Rachel Kotowski, a Department caseworker. This development prompted the Department to initiate the underlying proceeding in September 2020, by filing a petition to terminate the parental rights of L.D.L.G. and J.A.M. Having previously adopted two children that L.D.L.G. had birthed, E.B. and J.B. began serving as E.J.D.L.G.'s foster mother and father, respectively. J.A.M. was granted - supervised and then unsupervised - visitation, including a couple of weekend visits.
C. Custody Dispute
A custody dispute unfolded almost a year after the Department initiated termination proceedings. E.B. and J.B. intervened in the Department's suit and sought to have themselves appointed as E.J.D.L.G.'s managing conservators. The Department, aligned with J.A.M., moved to have E.J.D.L.G. placed with J.A.M. The Department pleaded that J.A.M. "has eliminated all the concerns the Department had, has engaged in services, has cooperated with the Department and has been visiting with the child," and that the "permanency goal for the case is reunification with" J.A.M. E.B. and J.B. opposed the Department's request. Ultimately, the trial court denied the Department's request.
D. Jury Trial
Three months after the hearing on the Department's motion to place E.J.D.L.G. with J.A.M., a jury trial commenced. At trial, the Department and J.A.M. advocated against terminating J.A.M.'s parental rights, but E.B. and J.B., represented by counsel, advocated otherwise. Crystal Jones, a Department caseworker, and Kotowski testified that J.A.M. was credited with following his family service plan. Laura Torres, J.A.M.'s probation officer, testified that, during J.A.M.'s community supervision, he remained employed and that she had no concerns regarding the results of drug tests administered to him.
The Department, however, did not seek court approval to amend its parental termination petition or non-suit its claims against J.A.M. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.203 (providing that a "suit to terminate may not be dismissed nor may a nonsuit be taken unless the dismissal or nonsuit is approved by the court" and that the "dismissal or nonsuit approved by the court is without prejudice").
Although submitted for the jury's consideration in the charge of the court, the jury rejected terminating J.A.M.'s parental rights on the basis of Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (O), and (P) of the Texas Family Code. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (O), (P). Nevertheless, the jury found that J.A.M.'s parental rights should be terminated under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) (hereinafter "Subsection E"). Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). The jury's answer regarding Subsection E allowed it to answer that appointing E.B. and J.B. as E.J.D.L.G.'s managing conservators would be in the child's best interest. The trial court rendered a termination and conservatorship appointment in accordance with the jury's verdict.
Generally, these provisions allow a trial court to terminate the parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that, among other things, the parent allowed the child to remain in a physically or emotionally dangerous condition or surrounding, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), failed to comply with specific provisions of a court order, id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O), or used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the child. Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(P).
J.A.M. timely appealed from the termination and conservatorship order. Consistent with its posture in the trial court, the Department urges us to reverse the termination of J.A.M.'s parental rights to E.J.D.L.G.
The termination order also terminated the parental rights of L.D.L.G. She, however, did not appeal the termination of her parental rights and is not a party to this appeal.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
A parent-child relationship may be terminated, pursuant to section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code, only if the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence one of the predicate grounds enumerated in subsection (b)(1) and that termination is in a child's best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1), (2). Clear and convincing evidence requires "proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Id. § 101.007.
We review the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence under the standards of review established by the Texas Supreme Court in In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266-67 (Tex. 2002). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we must "look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true." Id. at 266. "[A] reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so." Id. In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we "must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing." Id. "If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient." Id.
B. Applicable Law: Endangerment Under Subsection E
Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) allows a trial court to terminate a parent's rights if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Under Subsection (E), the trial court must determine whether there is evidence that a parent's acts, omissions, or failures to act endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being. See In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
Our analysis under Subsection (E) is guided by, among other things, three basic rules. First, "endanger" means to expose a child to loss or injury or to jeopardize a child's emotional or mental health. In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125; In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam). Second, our analysis may not rest on a single act or omission; it must be "a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct." Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 723 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). Third, we may consider parental conduct that did not occur in the child's presence, including conduct before the child's birth or after the child was removed from a parent's care. In re I.I.T., 648 S.W.3d 467, 475 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2021, no pet).
C. Analysis: Endangerment Under Subsection E
In J.A.M.'s first issue, he argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he engaged in conduct or knowingly placed E.J.D.L.G. with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of E.J.D.L.G. The thrust of J.A.M.'s sufficiency argument is that there is insufficient evidence of endangerment after E.J.D.L.G. was born.
The recent Texas Supreme Court opinion in In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 749-50 (Tex. 2022) militates against J.A.M.'s sufficiency challenge. In that case, the court articulated a rule that "a parent's knowledge of the other parent's drug use during pregnancy and corresponding failure to attempt to protect the unborn child from the effects of that drug use can contribute to an endangering environment and thus support an endangerment finding." Id. at 749. Holding otherwise would, according to the court, "effectively endorse a parent's willful ignorance of the significant risk that a pregnant mother's drug use poses." Id. at 750. The court found an exception to this rule in a situation involving a father who knew about his pregnant wife's drug addiction and, according to him, "did everything he could to assist pregnant Mother in her quest [to] overcome addiction." Id. The court sustained the father's legal sufficiency challenge. Id.
The instant case is farther removed from the facts in J.W. Unlike the father in J.W., there is no evidence that J.A.M. took any action to help L.D.L.G. overcome her drug addiction. To the contrary, J.A.M. admitted to using methamphetamine with L.D.L.G. knowing that she was pregnant with E.J.D.L.G. There is also the issue of J.A.M.'s allegedly assaultive conduct during L.D.L.G.'s pregnancy. While the charge was later dismissed, J.A.M. acknowledged that he was arrested on a charge of allegedly assaulting L.D.L.G. shortly before E.J.D.L.G. was born. In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 110 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2017, no pet.) ("'Domestic violence, want of self-control, and propensity for violence may be considered as evidence of endangerment." (quoting In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)).
Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction J.A.M. "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Thus, the evidence is legally sufficient to support these findings. Further, after considering the entire record, including any disputed or contrary evidence, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court's termination under Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(E) of the Texas Family Code. J.A.M.'s first issue is overruled.
D. Applicable Law: Best Interest
It is the burden of the party seeking termination to establish that termination is in the child's best interest. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. In a best interest analysis, we apply the non-exhaustive Holley factors. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). The set of factors is not exhaustive, and no single factor is necessarily dispositive of the issue. Id. at 372; In re A.B., 269 S.W.3d 120, 126 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, no pet.).
We recognize there is a strong presumption that keeping a child with a parent is in the child's best interest. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). However, promptly and permanently placing a child in a safe environment is also presumed to be in the child's best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a). Thus, we also consider the factors set forth in section 263.307(b) of the Family Code. Id. § 263.307(b). Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may be probative of a child's best interest, but it does not relieve the State of its burden to prove best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002).
In conducting a best interest analysis, we consider direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence. In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). Additionally, a factfinder may measure a parent's future conduct by her past conduct in determining whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest. Id. In analyzing the evidence within the Holley framework, evidence of each Holley factor is not required before a court may find that termination is in a child's best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Moreover, in conducting our review of a trial court's best interest determination, we focus on whether termination is in the best interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent. In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 470 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2014, no pet.).
E. Analysis: Best Interest
1. Desires of the Child
Being eighteen months old at the time of trial, E.J.D.L.G. did not testify. E.B. testified that E.J.D.L.G. is bonded with her and two of her half siblings, whom E.B. and J.B. have adopted. J.B. testified that E.J.D.L.G. always cries when she is transferred to J.A.M.'s family for their visits. Jones, a Department caseworker, admitted that E.J.D.L.G. has bonded with her foster family. However, Jones also testified that it would be in E.J.D.L.G.'s best interest to be placed with J.A.M. Congruently, Kotowski, another Department caseworker, testified that E.J.D.L.G. seemed appropriately bonded to J.A.M. and that J.A.M. "would tell me all the time how much he loved his daughter and how much she meant to him." J.A.M. testified that he is bonded with E.J.D.L.G. He further testified that E.J.D.L.G. seems happy while in his care and comes to him for comfort when, for example, strangers like a new caseworker visit their home.
J.B.'s testimony of E.J.D.L.G. crying during visit transfers must be viewed in light of E.J.D.L.G. being younger than eighteen months at the time. See In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d 633, 643 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) ("The young age of the child render[s] consideration of the child's desires neutral."). Given the competing testimony from deeply vested parties (E.B., J.B., and J.A.M.), Jones's testimony that E.J.D.J.G. is bonded with her foster family, and Kotowski's belief that E.J.D.L.G. is appropriately bonded to J.A.M., the desires-of-the-child factor is neutral. See In re J.M.G., 608 S.W.3d 51, 57 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2020, pet. denied) (when child is too young to express a desire, factfinder may consider whether child is bonded with caregiver and well-cared for).
2. The Present and Future Physical and Emotional Needs of the Child
Jurecko testified that she "absolutely believe[s] [J.A.M.] can appropriately take care of his child and be a protective parent." Kotowski recounted J.A.M.'s affection for E.J.D.L.G., testifying that:
During my observations with those visits, I could tell that [J.A.M.] really loved [E.J.D.L.G.]. He tried to care for her every need. Whenever she was upset, he would check all the basics. Check her diaper, check to see if she was hungry, walk her around, do everything he could to soothe her. Once we informed him that he could bring his own items to feed [E.J.D.L.G.], he did attempt to bring a bottle or other food for her. He also brought her gifts and toys to play with.Jones testified that J.A.M. demonstrated to her that he is able to take care of E.J.D.L.G.'s needs and that he seems committed to E.J.D.L.G.
Kotowski acknowledged that E.J.D.L.G. had "developmental concerns" during the period that she was the assigned caseworker. Specifically, E.J.D.L.G. was participating in various forms of therapy - speech, occupational, physical, and feeding. Some of E.J.D.L.G.'s therapies are conducted while she is at daycare. Additionally, E.J.D.L.G. is, according to E.B. and J.B., under the care of a gastroenterologist, has been referred to a pulmonologist, and is awaiting testing for cystic fibrosis.
E.B. and J.B. posited that terminating J.A.M.'s parental rights was in E.J.D.L.G.'s best interest. They pointed to two specific instances or areas of concern. First, E.B. faulted J.A.M. for missing many of E.J.D.L.G.'s doctors' appointments. However, E.B. admitted that she schedules E.J.D.L.G.'s doctor appointments and never consults with J.A.M. regarding his availability in light of his work schedule. Second, E.B. claimed that, when she returned from a visit with J.A.M., E.J.D.L.G. suffered from diarrhea, diaper rash, and weight loss.
J.A.M. relies on his mother, sister, and brother-in-law as his support system. When J.A.M. is unable to care for E.J.D.L.G., his mother and sister do so. E.B. acknowledged that she had no evidence that J.A.M.'s mother or sister could not care for E.J.D.L.G. J.A.M. testified that he had no concerns about caring for E.J.D.L.G. during her overnight visits. If E.J.D.L.G. were placed with J.A.M., he would keep her in the Medicaid program and ensure that she continued receiving the same medical care.
There is evidence showing that E.J.D.L.G. has medical needs. But there is no evidence that J.A.M. cannot meet those needs. To the contrary, Jurecko, Kotowski, and Jones believe that J.A.M. can care for E.J.D.L.G. Accordingly, the present and future physical and emotional needs factor weighs against termination.
3. The Present and Future Emotional and Physical Danger to the Child
J.B. expressed concern that J.A.M.'s past gang membership may place E.J.D.L.G. in danger, worrying that "[i]f somebody from an opposing gang sees him in the street, they won't try to deal with him. If he's got [E.J.D.L.G.] with him, I don't think they would take the time to ask him to put the child down." J.B.'s concern, couched in multiple "ifs," is speculative, and therefore, legally insufficient. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998) (holding that speculative evidence is legally insufficient).
J.A.M.'s arrest for allegedly assaulting L.D.L.G. shortly before E.J.D.L.G. was born is something to consider under the third Holley factor. See In re T.L.B. Jr., No. 01-16-00806-CV, 2017 WL 1019520, at *11 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 16, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that evidence of domestic violence is supportive of a trial court's best-interest finding). J.A.M. asserts that, since the assault arrest, Jurecko, Kotowski, and Jones have had an opportunity to get to know him. J.A.M. further highlights that these individuals - his counselor and two Department caseworkers - testified against terminating his parental rights. Additionally, Torres, J.A.M.'s probation officer, testified that J.A.M. is a compliant and responsive probationer.
Given all of the evidence, the present and future emotional and physical danger to the child factor is neutral.
4. The Parental Abilities of the Persons Seeking Custody
E.B. and J.B. are parents to several children, including two of E.J.D.L.G.'s half siblings. E.B. has coordinated E.J.D.L.G.'s medical care. Neither Kotowski nor Jones testified as to E.B. and J.B.'s parenting abilities. On the other hand, Kotowski testified that, based on her personal observations, J.A.M. was able to care for E.J.D.L.G. Given all of the evidence that was presented, the factor concerning parental abilities of the persons seeking custody weighs against termination.
5. Programs
The fifth Holley factor relates to the programs available to assist those persons seeking custody in promoting the best interest of the child. Torres testified that J.A.M. has made progress in a gang diversion program. The program includes parenting classes, which J.A.M. completed. J.A.M. has also participated in a community service program called Bexar Gives Back. J.A.M. had, according to the Kotowski, completed all the services within the Department's service plan. No controverting evidence was admitted. This factor weighs against termination.
6. Plans
The sixth Holley factor relates to the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody. J.A.M. testified that he planned to place E.J.D.L.G. in daycare during his working hours. Additionally, J.A.M.'s mother was, according to him, willing to look after E.J.D.L.G. while he was working. When E.J.D.L.G. became old enough, J.A.M. planned on enrolling her in pre-kindergarten. This factor weighs slightly against termination.
7. Home Stability
The seventh Holley factor relates to the stability of the home or proposed placement. J.A.M. testified that he lives with his mother and stays with his sister on the weekends when he has had visitation with E.J.D.L.G. Jones testified that the Department has had no concerns regarding either J.A.M.'s mother or sister. This factor weighs against termination.
8. Acts or Omissions
The eighth Holley factor relates to acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not appropriate. There is no evidence of this factor. Therefore, this factor weighs against termination. See In re E. N.C. , 384 S.W.3d 796, 808 (Tex. 2012) (stating that "[a] lack of evidence does not constitute clear and convincing evidence" in evaluating a lower's court's analysis of the Holley factors).
9. Any Excuse for the Parent's Acts or Omissions
There is no evidence of this factor. Being mitigating in nature, we conclude that it is neutral regarding termination.
10. Disposition
Of the nine Holley factors, six weigh against termination and three are neutral. Kotowski, Jones, and Jurecko testified against termination, and the Department's position at trial and on appeal is against termination. Kotowski recounted in detail the caring relationship J.A.M. has with E.J.D.L.G. The concern J.B. raised regarding J.A.M.'s past gang affiliation is speculative, and it constitutes no evidence. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 968 S.W.2d at 936. J.A.M. has taken advantage of parenting classes, and he plans to enroll E.J.D.L.G. in pre-kindergarten and continue her medical care. The Department, according to Jones, has no concerns with those who have assisted J.A.M. with housing, specifically J.A.M.'s mother and sister.
We conclude that based on the evidence introduced at trial, no reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of J.A.M.'s parental rights was in E.J.D.L.G.'s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2). J.A.M.'s second issue is sustained.
Because we sustain J.A.M.'s legal sufficiency challenge as to the trial court's best interest finding, we need not consider his factual sufficiency challenge to that same finding. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
F. Conservatorship
J.A.M. prays that we appoint him as a conservator of E.J.D.L.G. However, J.A.M. provides no argument in support of his request. Nevertheless, the appointment of E.B. and J.B. as managing conservators is infirm. The jury's answer appointing E.B. and J.B. as managing conservators was predicated on a termination finding regarding both L.D.L.G. and J.A.M. This jury answer is necessarily immaterial because it was predicated on a termination of J.A.M.'s parental rights, for which legally insufficient evidence exists. See Am. Recreational Mkts. Gen. Agency, Inc. v. Hawkins, 846 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) (stating that answers to jury questions are immaterial if the predicate for question is not satisfied).
In this situation, a challenge to the trial court's conservatorship determination is subsumed in J.A.M.'s sufficiency challenge because the conservatorship appointment followed as a consequence of a termination, pursuant to section 161.207. See In re D. N.C. , 252 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (holding that, where the only available statutory mechanism for the Department's conservatorship appointment was as a consequence of the termination, pursuant to section 161.207, a biological parent's challenge to the conservatorship appointment was subsumed in the parent's appeal of the parental-rights termination order).
The effect of our judgment to reverse the termination order as to J.A.M. therefore invokes another section of the Texas Family Code. When an order of termination is denied, the trial court is to "deny the petition" or "render any order in the best interest of the child." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.205. An appellate court reviewing a matter months later is not equipped to know if circumstances of the parents or the children have changed since the trial court entered its order; such a determination requires a factfinder. In re A.L.M., 300 S.W.3d 914, 931 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 2009, no pet.). Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of rendering an order, consistent with Section 161.205 of the Texas Family Code. See id.; In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 93 n.19 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
III. Conclusion
The provisions of the trial court's order terminating the parental rights of J.A.M. to E.J.D.L.G. and appointing E.B. and J.B. as E.J.D.L.G.'s managing conservator are reversed. We render judgment denying the request to terminate J.A.M.'s parental rights and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings pursuant to Section 161.205 of the Texas Family Code. We affirm the remaining portions of the termination order, including those portions terminating L.D.L.G.'s parental rights.