Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD228735, JD228736
ROBIE , J.
Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained the allegations of petitions that minors E.H. (case No. JD228735, born in mid-1998) and C.C. (case No. JD228736, born in early 1995) were at substantial risk of serious physical harm because their mother, Heather B. (born 1977) was unable to supervise or protect them adequately as the result of mental illness. At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered the removal of the minors from their mother’s custody, and the provision of reunification services to the mother.
We do not use an initial for the given name of the mother. This impairs readability and leads to confusion for legal researchers and recordkeeping, and her name is among the 1,000 most popular birth names during the last 10 years (unlike the minors). (Keith R. v. Superior Court (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1051, fn. 2; In re Branden O. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 637, 639, fn. 2; In re Edward S. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 387, 392, fn. 1.)
Mother appeals from the judgment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395.) She argues the evidence was insufficient to support jurisdiction because an expert did not specifically tie her mental illness to a risk of serious physical harm to either minor, the evidence otherwise did not make this connection, and E.H.’s truancy of itself is not a proper basis for jurisdiction over him (nor does it support jurisdiction over C.C.). She also contends the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of either a substantial danger that would warrant the removal of the minors from her custody or the lack of a reasonable alternative to removal. We shall affirm the judgment.
Undesignated section references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
Initial Hearing Report (§ 319, subd. (b)): Based on a confidential October 2008 report, the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) conducted an investigation of the family. The mother admitted having a diagnosis of schizophrenia, for which she refused to take medication because of side effects. She denied using any controlled substances, engaging in acts of prostitution, or failing to meet E.H.’s educational needs, but agreed to attend a conference with his school regarding his chronic truancy. However, the mother later refused to attend the meeting (and kept the minor at home with her).
C.C. confirmed that her brother refused to go to school and instead insisted on accompanying their mother wherever she went. C.C. did not know where mother went, but did not believe her mother was using controlled substances. She viewed her maternal grandmother, with whom the minors presently lived (and with whom the mother stayed), as her primary caretaker. E.H. said he went with his mother to movies or the mall, or for meals out. He stated he did not go to school because he was “tired,” but also said he did not want to leave his mother. The maternal grandmother disclosed that the mother had mental health issues and feared the mother because of her tendency to become violent. She was not sure whether the mother was involved in drugs or prostitution (but asserted that the mother was promiscuous); however, the mother was allowing E.H. to avoid school and took him everywhere with her, sometimes staying out overnight with him. The maternal great-grandmother (who also lived in the home) confirmed most of the previous information, adding that the mother wielded her status as a parent to interfere with any efforts to compel E.H. to attend school.
When the Department interviewed the mother in connection with a half sibling’s dependency proceeding, the mother alternated among outbursts of inappropriate laughter and giggles, weeping, and periods of silence. A mental health clinician thought the mother’s behavior was consistent with schizophrenia.
In February 2008, mother had given birth to a half sister of the minors. The Department took the half sibling into protective custody in May 2008. In September 2008, the juvenile court (with the same referee presiding as in the present proceedings) sustained the allegations of a petition in case No. JD227535 that mother’s mental illness impaired her ability to protect the half sibling and thus created a substantial risk of serious physical injury.
Mother had misdemeanor convictions in 2007 for child endangerment and battery of a peace officer.
In alleging a substantial risk of physical harm to the minors as a result of the mother’s mental illness (§ 300, subd. (b)), the November 2008 petitions cited the mother’s behavior in her February 2008 interviews regarding the half sibling, her failure to take her psychotropic medication, E.H.’s more than 20 unexcused absences from school, the mother’s refusal to meet with school officials on the issue, and the fact of dependency proceedings for the half sister based on the same jurisdictional factor. The report recommended maintaining the minors in the home with the provision of services pending the jurisdictional hearing.
At the initial hearing (§ 319) in December 2008, the court found that continuation in the mother’s custody would not be contrary to the welfare of the minors (id., subd. (b)). At a follow-up hearing later that month, the court maintained the status quo because E.H. had been regularly attending school for the two weeks before Christmas vacation and the minors were receiving adequate care from their grandmother. However, the court also found it necessary to order the mother to reside in the home with the grandmother and the minors.
Jurisdictional social study (§ 355, subd. (b)): In a January 2009 report, the social worker reported contacts with the mother in 2008 regarding the half sibling, during which mother did not always appear coherent. The mother insisted then that her mental diagnosis was not accurate, and she did not find that medications were helpful. Among other things, she insisted that she had had sexual relations with only one individual throughout her lifetime who had disguised himself as different men when she conceived each of the minors. During the Department’s investigation for the present dependency proceedings, the mother still did not believe her schizophrenia diagnosis. In interviews, she did not maintain eye contact, had difficulty focusing, and had trouble answering questions. The mother denied the present allegation involving the half sibling being the subject of dependency proceedings. Mother had been born to the unmarried grandmother, and claimed to have been a victim of ongoing physical and mental abuse from the grandmother, a maternal uncle, and the great-grandmother. Mother left school in the eighth grade as a result of being a chronic truant; at 15, she entered into a relationship with C.C.’s father (then 28, presently a resident of San Diego) and gave birth to C.C. at 18. Three years later, E.H. was the result of her liaison with his father (then 18, presently a transient in the Sacramento area). She did not want to pursue the option of voluntary adoption of the minors.
The name she gave for the father of the half sibling does not match the name of the presumed father in the order after the half sibling’s six-month review hearing.
The study noted that in addition to her 2007 convictions, the mother had a 1996 conviction for residential burglary and arrests for trespassing in 2007 and for failure to appear or to complete parenting classes in 2007 and 2008.
E.H. did not provide any additional information, other than to state that he had resumed attending school and wanted to remain in his present home. C.C. also did not provide any new information, other than to confirm that her brother had resumed attending school and to express her desire to remain in her current home. The minors had had limited contact with their half sibling because of the mother’s lack of visitation. The great-grandmother believed that neither the grandmother nor the mother had any control over the minors, and asserted that the mother behaved erratically (for which reason she did not want the mother in the home). The grandmother reported to school officials that the mother physically assaulted her more than once in the presence of the minors and had misappropriated the grandmother’s money. School officials reported that the mother was not cooperative regarding E.H.’s attendance, and she was blaming E.H. for his absences.
The study noted that the mother claimed Cherokee heritage, based on which the Department sent notices to the various Cherokee entities. (Ultimately, all three responded that the minors were not members nor were they eligible for membership.)
Mother had a history of “inconclusive” reports on referrals to the Department. (See Pen. Code, § 11165.12.) There were allegations of general neglect after the birth of each minor in 1995 and 1998, and allegations of emotional abuse of the minors at the hands of a boyfriend of the mother in 2003. In 2007, there were two referrals for general neglect. The first involved both minors being absent from school and bizarre behavior on the mother’s part; it was noted that C.C. appeared to be acting as her brother’s caretaker. The second related to the mother’s 2007 misdemeanor convictions: the police followed a car for two miles; E.H. (then eight years old) was driving and did not yield for officers. After parking in front of his home, E.H. claimed the mother had allowed him to drive the car. The mother came out of the residence and attacked the officers. At that time, C.C. said that the mother had been talking to herself and had not cooked food for four months; again, C.C. was described as the one providing care for her brother. In 2008, there was a referral for general neglect just before the birth of the half sibling, in which it was reported that the minors were not attending school, the mother had taken E.H. for a walk in the rain and returned with both soaking wet, and E.H. had poor hygiene habits. In addition to the referrals involving the half sibling and the present proceedings, other referrals noted that the grandmother was “very erratic and appeared overwhelmed and frazzled,” and had failed to provide the minors with adequate food.
Mother did not introduce anything to controvert this or any other hearsay evidence in the social studies and addenda. She also did not object, for which reason the hearsay evidence is independently competent to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. (§ 355, subds. (b) & (c).) Hearsay evidence is also competent to support the court’s dispositional findings. (In re Corey A. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 339, 346-347; § 358, subd. (b).)
It does not appear that the minors were living in their grandmother’s home in Meadowview at this time. The study noted that the police report was out of Elk Grove; an uncle transported the grandmother to the location to pick up the minors; and the family was being evicted.
The study based its assessment of the substantial risk to the minors on mother’s failure to treat her own diagnosed mental disorder; her volatile behavior in the presence of the children; her failure to inform the Department of her whereabouts, maintain contact, or participate in services with respect to the half sibling; and her uneasy relationship with the other adults in the household.
At the February 2009 jurisdictional hearing (§ 355), the social worker additionally testified about a recent incident. The mother was at a video store with E.H. during school hours. She lay down on the floor with her hat pulled down over her eyes for 20 minutes, at which point the police responded. The social worker noted that C.C. was doing well. In sustaining jurisdiction and continuing the minors in their mother’s custody, the juvenile court stated that the evidence of the recent incident, occurring during school hours with E.H. present, demonstrated the risk that the mother’s mental illness presented to the well-being of the minors, and that “it’s likely... it’s the results of [C.C.]’s efforts that they are able to stay [in the] home. It appears to me [that C.C] is the true parent in this family..., and if she w[ere]n’t there..., the likelihood would be that these children would be detained at this point.”
The social worker filed a total of six addenda to the original social study in support of the dispositional hearing (§ 358, subds. (a) & (b), § 358.1), which was subject to a number of continuances until July 2009.
As of March 2009, there continued to be truancy issues, a concern that C.C. was possibly abusing illegal substances, and a lack of cooperation with the Department on the part of the adults.
As of early April 2009, the mother had not submitted to counseling and did not think E.H. needed any. However, at her interviews she appeared to be collected and able to discuss the issues coherently; she had been taking her latest medications. Her four drug/alcohol tests were negative. This addendum had attached the March 2, 2009, attendance record for E.H. but did not otherwise discuss the issue (nor did subsequent addenda).
Addenda prepared in June 2009 stated that as of June 2009, the mother had completed a passing number of her parenting courses. She had seven negative drug/alcohol tests and two tests showing the presence of Vicodin. There was still irregular compliance with counseling requirements. When she appeared at one appointment in April 2009, she dressed inappropriately (in pajamas) and acted disorganized and erratically (which was an indication to the therapist that the medication was not helping or she was not taking it). She was not cooperating with the grandmother in establishing rules for the children, and the grandmother was not making sure that the minors were not alone with the mother. She had not followed through on counseling for the minors. At a June 15, 2009, appointment, E.H. expressed his concern that his mother would stop taking her medication, that she acted “strange” when she did not take her medication, and that she brought “a lot of strange men to the house.” E.H. was also present at a June 22, 2009, appointment. He had a strong unwashed smell. He stated that he was concerned that his mother “would disappear if he went to sleep.” The mother admitted to the therapist that E.H. tried to accompany her at all times to prevent her from meeting men. C.C. was insisting on setting her own rules in defiance of the adults. Finally, the addenda noted that the juvenile court had terminated the mother’s parental rights to the half sibling at a May hearing. (§ 366.26.)
In January 2009, the juvenile court had held a six-month review in the half sibling’s dependency. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) It had then found that the mother had failed to participate or progress in services (the mother having stated previously that she was in favor of the paternal relatives adopting the half sibling), and thus the juvenile court had set the May hearing on a permanent plan of adoption of the half sibling by a paternal aunt. (Ibid.)
As of July 2009, the mother’s mental health had continued to decompensate; she had missed her most recent counseling date, and was refusing medication. Antagonism continued between the mother and the grandmother, which interfered with the proper care of the minors. E.H. had expressed his fears that his mother would return to prostitution, and that the family would lose its present housing.
At the dispositional hearing (§ 358), the Department submitted on its reports and its recommendation for the removal of the minors from the mother’s custody with a grant of services; counsel for the minors concurred. The mother objected to out-of-home placement, asserting the evidence was insufficient to support that disposition, and requested that the court order reunification services. She pointed out the absence of any evidence that the minors previously suffered physical harm or any deprivation of safety.
The juvenile court adopted the proposed findings in the social study and addenda. These asserted a substantial danger to the minors (incorporating the allegations of the petition) that required their removal from the home and placement in a confidential foster home, the absence of other reasonable means to protect them despite reasonable efforts on the part of the Department (§ 361, subds. (c)(1) & (d)), and minimal progress to date on the part of the mother. However, despite the mother’s failure to reunify with the half sibling, the juvenile court ordered provision of reunification services as being in the best interests of the minors. (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(10), (b)(11) & (c).)
DISCUSSION
An appeal from the dispositional order, which constitutes the judgment in dependency proceedings, incorporates any issues involving the jurisdictional order. (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150; In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393, fn. 8.) We review the findings in support of these orders for substantial evidence. (Savannah M., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1393-1394.)
We note that in a review of the evidence, a parent’s mental illness of itself cannot support a finding of a risk of physical harm to a minor. (In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 540 (Jamie M.).) Evidence of past incidents can be a supporting prelude to a present finding of substantial risk only if there is a reasonable basis for believing these will recur under the present circumstances. (In re S.O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 461; In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 388.) The commission of acts of domestic violence in a minor’s presence demonstrates a failure to protect from a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm from it. (S.O., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 460-461.) A minor’s truancy of itself is not a basis for exercising jurisdiction on the ground of a risk of physical harm. (Janet T., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 389.) A parent’s conduct with another child is relevant on the issue of the risk of physical harm to the subjects of the dependency proceedings. (In re Y.G. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 109, 115-116; § 355.1.)
The mother contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain a jurisdictional finding that the minors were in substantial risk of physical harm. She also argues there was insufficient evidence at the dispositional hearing of a risk justifying their removal from her custody.
While the mother is correct that the burden of proof is greater at the dispositional hearing to remove a child from parental custody (In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694), this does not affect our assessment of substantial evidence (In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154) any more than where proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required (In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214). Thus, what is substantial evidence for the jurisdictional findings can also be substantial evidence for the dispositional finding of risk of harm.
The mother does not (and indeed could not) dispute the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that she suffers from some form of schizophrenia, which is uncontrolled either because it is not responsive to medication or she refuses to cooperate in a prescribed regimen of medication, and consequently she manifests aberrant behaviors. Contrary to her thesis on appeal, the jurisdictional findings and the dispositional decision to remove the children from her custody do not rest on her status in vacuo. Rather, there is more than sufficient evidence that her condition posed a substantial risk to the physical well-being of the minors at the time the court assumed jurisdiction over them, and nothing had changed for the better by the time of the disposition that removed them from her custody.
We noted in Jamie M. that “schizophrenia” is not a distinct condition but a broad grouping of disorders. (134 Cal.App.3d at p. 537.)
The record shows that the mother was not able on her own to provide housing, food, or full-time care for the minors. After her eviction from her previous residence, she has delegated full-time care of the minors to the grandmother. However, the mother’s condition puts her at odds with the grandmother both generally (to the point of having only a transitory presence in the residence until the court ordered her to maintain a permanent residence there while these proceedings were pending) and in connection with her interference with any efforts on the part of the grandmother to impose rules on the minors, resulting in anarchic deadlock (according to the great-grandmother). This has also resulted in incidents of domestic violence between the mother and grandmother in the presence of the minors. In addition, her need to rely on the grandmother as a result of her condition puts the minors in the care of someone who has had shortcomings in controlling or feeding them in the past, and who might not be able to continue to provide shelter for them (if E.H.’s concerns are credited). Furthermore, E.H. and the grandmother both noted the mother’s disproportionate need to search for male companionship (the former also stating that unfamiliar men were coming to the home). Coupled with her habit of taking E.H. with her overnight, and given her recent episode of entirely withdrawing into herself in public and stranding E.H. while he was in her care during school hours, this is all evidence of a substantial risk of exposing E.H. to the risk of harm from strangers at home or in public. Finally, while the Department and juvenile court may not have tied the termination of the mother’s parental rights as to the half sibling to the present case in more than conclusory fashion, this fact nonetheless is some evidence that her mental condition is sufficient to pose a substantial risk to the physical well-being of a minor; in any event, the remaining evidence is more than adequate to sustain the findings.
The mother asserts that the absence of expert testimony drawing these obvious conclusions about the connection between her mental illness and the risk of harm to the minors renders all this evidence insufficient to support the findings. As she cites, we have stated in the past that “The proper basis for a ruling [on this issue] is expert testimony giving specific examples of the manner in which the mother’s behavior has and will adversely affect the child or jeopardize the child’s safety.” (Jamie M., supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 540.) However, “It is an axiomatic principle in interpreting judicial rulings that the ratio decidendi of a case must be determined by the facts before the court rendering it. (In re Randy J. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1503.)” (Honey Baked Hams, Inc. v. Dickens (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 421, 427, disapproved on another ground in Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 614, fn. 8.) In Jamie M., there was an entire absence of any evidence on the issue of risk other than the mother’s diagnosis. (134 Cal.App.3d at p. 537.) Jamie M. thus did not (and could not) purport to rule that expert testimony is the sine qua non of evidence tying a mental condition to risk of harm. Rather, in light of the facts of the case, this quote must be understood as a suggestion of the manner in which to determine harm as a hypothetical matter under those circumstances.
Consequently, it is immaterial that the juvenile court may have relied on E.H.’s excessive truancy per se as an additional basis for its findings. In any event, the evidence showed more than mere truancy: the underlying reason for his truancy was his self-imposed role as the mother’s chaperone, both inappropriate for a child of 10 and presenting a substantial risk of harm to him in situations he could not possibly control.
As for the mother’s arguments that nothing indicates her mental illness presents any risk of physical harm to C.C., the above evidence of strangers in the house and public abandonment pose a risk to C.C. as well. In addition, given C.C.’s sense of entitlement to set her own rules (as a result of her mother’s abdication of her parental authority and interference with others attempting to fill the vacuum), it does not require any act of clairvoyance to conclude that there is a substantial risk of a headstrong ungovernable 13-year-old putting herself into inappropriate situations that might result in physical harm.
This leaves the mother’s claim that there is inadequate evidence for the juvenile court to have found that reasonable means to protect the physical health of the minors other than removal from her custody did not exist. She contends the court “could have ordered that [she] participate in services” (citing her expressed willingness at the jurisdictional hearing to do so). This in fact being the order of the court, it is a puzzling assertion. As she makes clear in her reply brief, however, she means to assert that she cannot discern any reason why a variety of in-home services (including counseling between the mother and grandmother), along with close monitoring of the home, could not have worked. She also suggests that the court should have ordered a medical evaluation in order to determine if there was a psychotropic medication that might be effective in remediating her symptoms.
Both these claims overlook a sorry fact. Although for purposes of appellate review the record contains substantial evidence of the mother’s schizophrenia, it also shows that mother herself does not believe in this diagnosis and has refused to continue taking a variety of medications. The juvenile court could order all the in-home and supervisory services in the world, but it cannot compel her to take medication. (See Thor v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 725, 744.) Absent any alleviation of her symptoms, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude as of the dispositional hearing that the risk her condition posed to the minors up to that point would remain the same (and not even she suggests 24-hour supervision of the home and her person to prevent this), as would her minimal progress in services (her earlier declaration of intent notwithstanding). Therefore, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of an absence of any other reasonable means to protect the minors in their mother’s custody.
The mother cites to the facts of other cases in an effort to undermine the judgment of the juvenile court. However, as the Supreme Court has explained, this is a pointless exercise: “Reviewing the sufficiency of [the] evidence... necessarily calls for analysis of the unique facts and inferences present in each case, and therefore comparisons between cases are of little value.” (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 137-138, italics added, disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; accord, State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Brown (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 188, 202.)
In conclusion, mother correctly notes that in the court’s oral ruling, it improperly suggested that removal from the home would be a motivation to induce the mother’s participation in the ordered reunification services and to induce E.H. to attend school. (In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 529-530 [court can base removal from home only on statutory grounds that relate to danger to minor, not on need to induce cooperation of parent]; cf. In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217 [cannot coerce voluntary participation in services through contempt power].) This rationale, however, is not part of the court’s written order. It is the judgment that controls, not a court’s remarks in announcing its ruling. (Smith v. City of Napa (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 194, 199; cf. In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 876 [it is result, not reasoning, that is subject to review].) Therefore, while we agree with mother’s premise, it is not a basis to reverse the judgment here.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON , Acting P. J., BUTZ , J.