Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J07-00689, J07-00690 J07-00691
Richman, J.
B.G. and E.G. are the parents of minor E.G.-I and two siblings. They each appealed from the order of the Contra Costa County Juvenile Court declaring all three minors to be dependent children.
Respondent Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau has moved to dismiss the parents’ appeals on the ground that the matter is moot. In support of its motion, respondent asks this court to take judicial notice of a subsequent order of the juvenile court terminating the dependency. B.G. and E.G. have each filed opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss. B.G. asks this court to take judicial notice of her notice of appeal from the termination order.
“ ‘ “[T]he duty of this court, as of every judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” [Citation.]’ . . . ‘It necessarily follows that when, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the defendant, an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal. [Citations.]’ ” (Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541.) This standard applies to appeals from orders of the juvenile court in dependency proceedings. (E.g., In re Dani R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 402, 404-405; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 769; In re Audrey D. (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 34, 39, fn. 4.)
The circumstances in which respondent moves to dismiss this appeal as moot are as follows: On January 16, 2008, the juvenile court, having already sustained jurisdictional allegations of the petitions on file, ordered that dependent minor E.G. be removed from his mother’s custody and that he be placed with his father. The other dependent minors were left in the mother’s custody. On August 14, 2008, after mother and father had commenced their respective appeals, the juvenile court dismissed all three of the dependencies.
This is a compelling case for finding mootness. The reasons for state intervention have been resolved to the satisfaction of the juvenile court. Although the parents concede they are in the midst of an acrimonious dissolution of their marriage, they present no reasons for believing that another intervention by respondent is either imminent or even likely. Reversal of the original dispositional would achieve nothing more than the juvenile court has already done by terminating its jurisdiction.
The parents both assert that their appeals are not moot because the dismissed dependencies nevertheless have the potential to adversely affect in the future. They argue that, having been given reunification services, the amount of those services might be deducted from the services they could get if new dependencies are initiated. They also argue that they might be assessed the costs of the dismissed dependencies pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 903 and 903.1. The likelihood of these consequences is entirely speculative. We decline to ignore the mootness doctrine based on hypothetical possibilities about what might happen if there are additional dependencies in the future.
Moreover, we can advise the parents that we have seen numerous instances where a resumption of dependency jurisdiction is treated as starting the clock anew on the provision of reunification services. The pertinent statutory language pegs the provision of services to “the date the child entered foster care” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subds. (a)(1)-(a)(2)), and the juvenile courts in our experience do not treat this language as cumulative.
We note that the circumstances presented here are virtually identical to those in In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, where Division Five of this District dismissed a parent’s appeal from a dispositional order as moot in light of the juvenile court’s termination of its jurisdiction. Although both parents ask us to exercise our discretion to decide what might otherwise qualify as a moot appeal because an important issue of public interest is presented, nothing in the record before us suggests that this case has ramifications beyond the single family and individuals involved.
The requests for judicial notice are granted. The motion to dismiss is granted, and the appeals are ordered dismissed.
We concur: Haerle, Acting P.J., Lambden, J.