The family code identifies persons who have standing to file a SAPCR, and the party seeking relief must plead and establish standing within the parameters of the code's language. In re E.C., No. 02-13-00413-CV, 2014 WL 3891641, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 7, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). As a question of law, we review standing de novo.

Therefore, it is not an affirmative defense. See Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 446 (standing component of court's subject-matter jurisdiction); 6200 GP L.L.C. v. Multi Serv. Corp., No. 05-16-01491-CV, 2018 WL 3154594, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28, 2018, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (noting that "while standing is a jurisdictional issue, lack of capacity is an affirmative defense"); In re E.C., No. 02-13-00413-CV, 2014 WL 3891641, *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 7, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (standing cannot be conferred by consent or waiver). A. Standard of Review

We have previously determined that a "grandparent" under this section includes only someone who has a consanguineous relationship with the child. In re E.C., No. 02-13-00413-CV, 2014 WL 3891641, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 7, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("W.F., E.C.'s step-grandfather, lacks standing under section 102.004(a) because he is not related to E.C. by consanguinity."); In re Russell, 321 S.W.3d 846, 859 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, orig. proceeding [mand.

Standing, a component of a court's subject-matter jurisdiction, cannot be conceded or waived and therefore, it is not an affirmative defense. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993) (standing component of court's subject-matter jurisdiction); In re E.C., No. 02-13-00413-CV, 2014 WL 3891641, *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 7, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (standing cannot be conferred by consent or waiver); see also Compass Bank v. MFP Fin. Servs., Inc., 152 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (affirmative defenses not pleaded or tried by consent are waived). But see, e.g., Rentfro v. Cavazos, No. 04-10-00617-CV, 2012 WL 566364, *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 21, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Fallis v. River Mountain Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., No. 04-09-00256-CV, 2010 WL 2679997, *11 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 1, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding appellee "failed to establish affirmative defense of lack of standing . . . therefore the trial court erred in granting [appellee's] motion for partial summary judgment."); Faulkner v. Bost, 137 S.W.3d 254, 259 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, no pet.) ("Lack of standing is an affirmative defense.").

Standing, a component of a court's subject-matter jurisdiction, cannot be conceded or waived and therefore, it is not an affirmative defense. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993) (standing component of court's subject-matter jurisdiction); In re E.C., No. 02-13-00413-CV, 2014 WL 3891641, *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 7, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (standing cannot be conferred by consent or waiver); see also Compass Bank v. MFP Fin. Servs., Inc., 152 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (affirmative defenses not pleaded or tried by consent are waived). But see, e.g., Rentfro v. Cavazos, No. 04-10-00617-CV, 2012 WL 566364, *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 21, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Fallis v. River Mountain Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., No. 04-09-00256-CV, 2010 WL 2679997, *11 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 1, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding appellee "failed to establish affirmative defense of lack of standing . . . therefore the trial court erred in granting [appellee's] motion for partial summary judgment."); Faulkner v. Bost, 137 S.W.3d 254, 259 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, no pet.) ("Lack of standing is an affirmative defense.").

Despite the grandparents' having performed day-to-day caretaking duties for the children, there was no evidence that the mother did not also care for the children or that she had abdicated her parental duties and responsibilities to the grandparents; therefore, we concluded that the grandparents did not have "actual care, custody, and control" under section 102.003(a)(9). Id. at 758-59; see also In re E.C., No. 02-13-00413-CV, 2014 WL 3891641, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 7, 2014, no pet.)(mem. op.) (holding that grandparents lacked standing under section 102.003(a)(9) because they only had exclusive possession of the child for five and a half months before filing suit).