Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a disposition order of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles No. MJ19351, Benny C. Osorio, Judge.
Stephen Borgo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, David C. Cook, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MOSK, J.
INTRODUCTION
Minor and appellant (D.S.) was found by the juvenile court to have committed felony vandalism. As a condition of probation, the juvenile court ordered him to pay $1,175 in restitution, the estimated cost of the five light fixtures that were vandalized during the incident in question.
On appeal, D.S. argues that the amount of restitution awarded exceeds the damage caused by D.S.’s conduct and that the trial court failed to provide a proper theory to justify imposing a restitution award for the damage to all five light fixtures.
We hold that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in making the restitution award. We therefore affirm the disposition order awarding restitution in the amount of $1,175.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 30, 2010, Keith Snell was at his home in Palmdale. At approximately 4:30 p.m., he heard the sound of glass breaking. At first he thought the sound had come from inside his house, but when he heard the same sound a second time, he realized it was coming from outside the house. He went to a second floor window of his house and saw broken glass in the pathway that was adjacent to his house. When he heard glass break a third time, he went to another window and saw D.S. in the process of kicking a light fixture on a cinderblock wall. Snell then saw D.S. “turn and run at an angle to the next fixture and jump on it” as glass fell to the ground.
Snell also observed a younger boy and two girls with D.S. He saw the boy swing a skateboard “like a bat” at one of the light fixtures. Snell watched the two boys and two girls cross the street and congregate on the corner. After some time had passed, sheriffs’ deputies arrived and Snell was “able to point [D.S.] out to the sheriffs.”
Dori Petersen was the president of the homeowner’s association for the community where the light fixtures were vandalized. As of the date of trial, the association had fixed two of the five damaged light fixtures for a total cost of $470.
Z.S., D.S.’s 11-year old sister, was with D.S. on the day the police came and spoke to D.S. In addition to D.S., Z.S.’s other brother and sister were with Z.S. that day. They were walking from the park along a path when Z.S. saw D.S. break a light fixture with a skateboard. According to Z.S., the light was already broken or cracked at the time D.S. hit it with the skateboard.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that D.S. had committed vandalism causing over $400 in damage in violation of Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a), a felony. The juvenile court found the allegation true and sustained the petition. The juvenile court also found D.S. to be a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and placed D.S. on probation for a period of six months. As a condition of probation, the juvenile court entered a restitution order, explaining the basis for the order as follows: “Here is the situation. [¶] The Court has taken the $470 amount, divided by two, and multiplied by five. [D.S.] was there close in time when [the damage to] all five [fixtures] had occurred. [¶] Also he’s fortunate that on the... [vandalism that occurred] two months before, he’s not getting billed for that. [¶] So at this time the Court will set restitution at $1,175.”
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
DISCUSSION
D.S. contends that the evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that D.S. damaged all five light fixtures. According to D.S., the evidence showed only that he personally damaged two fixtures. D.S. also contends that the juvenile court failed to provide its reasoning or theory in support of the amount of the award.
“[W]e review the trial court’s restitution order for abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., People v. Maheshwari (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1409 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 903]; People v. Hove (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1275 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 128]; People v. Draut (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 577, 581-582 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 469].) (Footnote omitted.) The abuse of discretion standard is ‘deferential, ’ but it ‘is not empty.’ (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 948 P.2d 429].) ‘[I]t asks in substance whether the ruling in question “falls outside the bounds of reason” under the applicable law and the relevant facts [citations].’ (Ibid.) Under this standard, while a trial court has broad discretion to choose a method for calculating the amount of restitution, it must employ a method that is rationally designed to determine the surviving victim’s economic loss. To facilitate appellate review of the trial court’s restitution order, the trial court must take care to make a record of the restitution hearing, analyze the evidence presented, and make a clear statement of the calculation method used and how that method justifies the amount ordered.” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663-664.)
Here, restitution was imposed as a condition of D.S.’s probation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6. Thus, the trial court had broader discretion in making the award. It is undisputed that five light fixtures were damaged during the vandalism incident in question. Snell heard three distinct sounds of breaking glass just prior to witnessing D.S. kick and damage two light fixtures. Moreover, D.S. was with his younger brother who Snell observed striking a fixture with a skateboard. That evidence supported a reasonable inference that D.S. directly damaged two light fixtures, as well as a reasonable inference that he was involved in damaging the other three, either as a direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor. Because a trier of fact could have inferred from the evidence that D.S. was involved either directly or indirectly—as an aider and abettor—in the damage to all five light fixtures, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in basing the amount of the restitution award on the estimated repair cost for those five fixtures.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, subdivision. (a)(1) provides: “It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of conduct for which a minor is found to be a person described in Section 602 who incurs any economic loss as a result of the minor’s conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor.”
“While we review all restitution orders for abuse of discretion, we note that the scope of a trial court’s discretion is broader when restitution is imposed as a condition of probation.” (People v. Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p.663, fn. 7.)
We also disagree that the juvenile court failed to explain adequately the reasoning behind the award. The trial court expressly found that D.S. “was there close in time when [the damage to] all five [fixtures] occurred.” Because the juvenile court found D.S. responsible for damage to five fixtures, it calculated restitution based on the actual $470 cost for the repair of two of the fixtures, i.e. $235 per fixture multiplied by five fixtures. That explanation was both reasonable and a clear statement of the calculation method used, so as to support the $1,175 amount.
DISPOSITION
The restitution order is affirmed.
We concur: TURNER, P. J. KRIEGLER, J.