Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. CK 60964, Jan G. Levine, Judge.
M. Elizabeth Handy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FLIER, J.
Maria G. is the mother of D., who was born in June 2005. The court terminated mother’s parental rights and freed D. for adoption by the family that was taking care of him. Mother appeals; we affirm the judgment (order).
FACTS
1. Overview
On the one hand, we have in this case a child who has been repeatedly and severely abused physically while in mother’s custody and who has lived through no less than 11 separate placements. On the other, we have mother who appears to be devoted to D., as is shown by her frequent and successful visits and her diligent completion of parenting classes. The trial court tipped the scales against mother, principally because it concluded that D. requires stability and permanency in his life. As our account of the facts shows, the court’s decision was the right one.
2. The Background Facts
In July 2005, barely a month old, D. was diagnosed with two skull fractures. In September 2005 D. was hospitalized with two fractures to his left arm, a spiral fracture of the left femur and a fracture to the clavicle “of different ages.” The injuries were found to be the result of inflicted trauma. Both parents were drug users.
D. was removed from parental custody. Early in 2007 reunification services were denied but in June 2007, upon mother’s petition, reunification services were reinstated. Mother regained custody of D. in December 2007 and the court terminated its jurisdiction on August 21, 2008.
On October 6, 2008, school authorities reported to the police that D. had bruises on his buttocks and right upper thigh. The police confirmed these injuries and asked D. who had done this. The answer was that an adult male named Anderson, later identified as mother’s roommate’s boyfriend, had done it. When the police called mother, she did not have a clear explanation for these injuries.
D. was detained in foster care and placed with Stacy R., with whom D. had been placed previously. D. was removed from Mrs. R.’s custody when the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services learned that she had permitted unauthorized visits with mother and was scheming to return D. to mother. D. was moved to another foster home.
The jurisdictional issue was tried at the end of February 2009. D. was declared to be a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. Mother’s counsel did not dispute that D. had been physically abused, contending that it was not mother who had done it. Evidence was received that D. had been beaten with a belt. As far as who had done so, the nurse practitioner who examined D. asked him and he replied: “My mommy whipped my ass.” The manager of the apartment building testified that he saw mother’s roommate slap D. on his bottom with her hand.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The court found that D. had been physically abused and that mother had failed to protect the child even though she knew of the abuse. Reunification services were denied. The court set the case for a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent, out-of-home placement. Mother challenged this by way of a petition for an extraordinary writ, which we denied on May 7, 2009.
D. was receiving therapy during 2009. Mr. and Mrs. H. were identified as prospective adoptive parents and D. was placed with them at the end of August 2009. By December 2009, D. was reported to be comfortable, loved and well provided for in the H. household.
Mother was visiting regularly and appropriately during 2009. She also completed a 20-session parenting class, several sessions of individual counseling and attended follow-up parenting classes.
Understandably, D. was becoming confused about who his parents were. He referred to the H.’s as mommy and daddy, but he also referred to mother as mom. He exhibited emotional instability after mother’s visits.
We have already noted that for various reasons that need not be detailed D. had gone through 11 placements the H.’s being the 11th and that this succession of foster homes rendered D.’s life unstable.
3. The Contested Section 366.26 Hearing
Mother testified at this hearing that she visited D. every Monday from 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and that she has a loving, close relationship with D., who calls her “mom.” She stated that she has learned how to talk to D. in the parenting classes that she took. Mother feels that she plays a parental role in the visits.
D.’s counsel called no witnesses. He stated that there was a bond between mother and D. but it “does not rise to the level that is going to be detrimental to [D.] to be adopted. [D.].... is bonding and bonded to his prospective adoptive parents who are very committed to adopting him. He is thriving in their home and doing really well there.” D.’s counsel concluded by saying that parental rights should be terminated and D. should be adopted by the H.’s.
Mother’s counsel contended that parental rights should not be terminated, citing to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), which provides that parental rights should not be terminated if “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” Among other things, mother’s counsel stated that she was in a parental role to the maximum extent possible under the given circumstances and that her relationship with D. was that of a mother and child.
The court noted that D. was in foster care for much of his early life and that D. was returned to mother but that the petition that led to this proceedings was filed shortly after his return to mother. The court found that D. has not had stability, having gone through several placements. The court stated: “One of the cornerstones of the law that I have to apply today is [that] children are entitled to permanency. Parents are given a specific amount of time to step up and provide a safe, stable, permanent home for [D.].” The court found that mother has a good relationship with D. but that the boy could not be left in the limbo in which he found himself. The court concluded: “I know that he’s very confused about who his parents are and I also know that he has found people who love him a great deal and whom he loves and he’s entitled to have some permanency with those people, so I am going to terminate parental rights today.”
DISCUSSION
1. The Trial Court’s Order Is Based on Uncontradicted Evidence
The broadly applicable principles have been stated by our Supreme Court:
“The federal and state Constitutions guarantee that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. [Citation.] A parent’s interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his children is a compelling one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights. [Citation.] Likewise, natural children have a fundamental independent interest in belonging to a family unit [citation], and they have compelling rights to be protected from abuse and neglect and to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child. [Citation.] The interests of the parent and the child, therefore, must be balanced.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306.)
The trial court in this case chose to place the accent on a stable and permanent placement and on the commitment that the H.’s have made to D. There is no question that this was a correct assessment of D.’s needs.
Viewing this case in that light, we find the evidence that supports the trial court’s ruling is uncontradicted. The evidence of turmoil and upheaval in D.’s life is certainly uncontradicted. So are the consequences thereof, as is shown by the sad confusion in D.’s mind about who his parents are. There is also no contest about the circumstance that Mr. and Mrs. H. provide a good home for D. and that they will do well as his parents.
Given this evidence, it would have been indefensible to defer the permanent and loving home that the H.’s offer D. for yet another round with mother. We intend no disrespect for mother, who has suffered a wrenching loss, but this is not a case where she did not have a second chance to remain D.’s parent. She did have such a chance, only to throw it away within months of receiving D. back in her home. And it was no small matter just how that chance was thrown away there was serious physical abuse of the boy. The trial court was not required to gamble yet again that mother would be a fit and caring parent.
Because the evidence that supports the ruling is not contradicted, it is not necessary for us to decide whether the appropriate standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion or whether the ruling is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351; see generally 10 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Parent and Child, § 690, p. 856.) The ruling on appeal more than satisfies both standards.
2. There Is No Merit to Appellant’s Contentions
Mother contends that she has shown that there was a real parent-child relationship between her and D., taking this situation out of the family of cases where the parent has simply shown a good relationship with the child.
Unfortunately for mother, there is some truth to this, which makes the loss even harder to bear for mother. But this dimension cannot be viewed in a vacuum. The serious, repeated and dangerous physical abuse of D. and the extreme instability of his life are not only powerful considerations, as we have already noted, they outweigh whatever the relationship was between mother and D.
Mother also contends that there was a significant bond between her and D. and that terminating this bond harmed D.
There was no easy way out in this case. Either way, the decision had its emotional cost. The decision that was made cost D. his natural mother and for mother, it meant the loss of a child. If the decision had gone the other way, D. would have lost a permanent, safe and loving home and parents and he would have been plunged into a renewed cycle of uncertainty and very possibly renewed physical danger.
Mother cites In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 689-691, where the mother made valiant efforts to overcome her problems, where the children were firmly bonded to her and where social workers thought that the mother’s visits with the children should continue; the appellate court reversed the termination order.
In this case, as the trial court recognized, mother clearly made solid efforts to improve as a parent. But, as we have repeatedly noted, this case has other aspects to it, as well. And, much unlike In re Amber M., other than mother herself, in this case everyone was of the opinion that parental rights should be terminated.
Finally, mother states that there was no “bonding study” and no therapist’s report about the benefits of continuing visits. The reason that there were no such reports and studies is that matters had progressed past the point when these studies might have been useful. When the contested section 366.26 hearing arrived, the question was whether D.’s wanderings should cease and whether he should finally have parents and a home. As the record reflects, the trial court was armed with the information it needed to answer this question.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order) is affirmed.
We concur: RUBIN, Acting P. J., GRIMES, J.