Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County Nos. 509237, 509238, 509239, 509240, 509241. Nancy B. Williamsen, Commissioner.
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
John P. Doering, County Counsel, and Carrie M. Stephens, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Vartabedian, A.P.J., Dawson, J., and Hill, J.
OPINION
This appeal arises from a contested Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing at which the juvenile court terminated appellant mother’s parental rights to her five children and selected a permanent plan of adoption. Appellant argues the court’s ruling was erroneous because the law provides an exception to the statutory preference for adoption where, as in her case, termination of parental rights would cause a substantial interference with the siblings’ relationships. We will affirm the judgment.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
In June 2006, appellant’s five children, her 10-year-old daughter D.R. and 9, 7, 4 and 3-year-old sons, A.R., I.R., E.D., and I.D. respectively, were taken into protective custody by the social services agency (agency) after appellant continued to expose them to her drug use and leave them unattended. The father of the three eldest children (father 1) lived in another city and maintained telephone contact with them. The father of the two youngest children was serving a six-year prison sentence.
The juvenile court ordered the children detained and the agency placed them separately in four foster care homes. In August 2006, the court exercised dependency jurisdiction and ordered reunification services for appellant and father 1 only. As part of the services offered, the court ordered the agency to arrange sibling visitation twice a month and visitation for all five children with appellant and father 1 twice a month.
In July 2007, following a contested 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing to consider a permanent plan of adoption for all five children with their respective caregivers. The court also reduced visitation to once a month.
Neither appellant nor father 1 sought writ relief from the court’s setting order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.)
At this point in the proceedings, the children were living in three separate homes. D.R. was living with Mr. and Mrs. R. where she had been since November 2006. A.R. and I.R. were placed together in the home of Mr. and Mrs. L. in January and March 2007 respectively. E.D. and I.D. were placed with Mr. and Mrs. V. in March 2007. All three foster families knew each other from church, which the R. and L. family still attended. Consequently, D.R., A.R. and I.R. saw each other three to four times each week. The V. family no longer attended that church so the only contact the older three siblings had with E.D. and I.D. occurred during visitation at the agency. Even then, E.D. and I.D. resisted visiting with appellant and their older siblings. In its report for the section 366.26 hearing, the agency described how I.D. cried and refused to go into the visiting room for the August 2007 visit. He said to his foster mother, “I don’t want to go in there Mommy.” The following month, both E.D. and I.D. refused to go into the visiting room. In October, a family member managed to coax them into the visiting room but they were not comfortable and appellant made no attempt to engage them.
In its report, the agency stated that the foster parents were willing to adopt the children and ensure continuing sibling contact. In addition, the children were bonded to their caregivers and agreed to be adopted by them.
In January 2008, the juvenile court conducted the contested section 366.26 hearing, the focus of which was whether termination of parental rights would detrimentally interfere with each child’s sibling relationship pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) so as to overcome the statutory preference for adoption. Appellant’s brother testified that he lived with appellant and the children from 2001 through 2005 and observed a close relationship between the children. The caseworker testified E.D. and I.D. were not interested in visiting their older siblings during the preceding six months. However, he observed the children together before the hearing hugging and laughing.
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) is presently codified in subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v).
D.R. and A.R., then 12 and 10 years old respectively, testified they wanted to be adopted. D.R. stated she missed the “babies,” a reference to E.D. and I.D., “like the whole world” and both she and A.R. said they would be sad if they were not allowed contact with E.D. and I.D., but believed their foster parents would make sure they got to see them. I.R., then nine-years-old, was not quite sure what it meant to be adopted and did not know if he wanted to be adopted but believed his foster parents would allow him to see his siblings.
Mrs. R., Mr. L., and Mrs. V. all testified and affirmed their commitment to making sure the siblings had continuing contact. Mr. L. also testified the V.’s had never contacted him to arrange an outing between the four boys nor had he taken A.R. and I.R. to the V.’s home to see E.D. and I.D. Mrs. V. testified she initiated contact with Mrs. R. several months after E.D. and I.D. were placed with her but she and Mrs. R. were never able to schedule a time to get the children together. However, she remembered two times where the children had contact other than their visits at the agency. One contact occurred when she took the boys to the park. Another time, the children had lunch together.
Following testimony and argument, the court found the evidence did not establish an exception to adoption pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) and termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the children. Accordingly, the court terminated appellant’s parental rights, as well as those of the two fathers involved, and selected adoption as the children’s permanent plan. This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
Because appellant’s children were likely to be adopted, the law required the court to terminate parental rights, unless one of the specifically designated circumstances, set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), provided a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to them. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 (Celine R.).) Appellant bore the evidentiary burden of showing termination would be detrimental under one of the exceptions. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809.)
On appeal, we review the juvenile court's rejection of appellant's detriment claim for abuse of discretion. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) On the facts of this case, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding termination of appellant’s parental rights would not substantially interfere with her children’s relationships.
For the sibling relationship exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) to apply, a court must find:
“There would be substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.”
Here, the children fall into two clusters-the three oldest children and the two youngest. The oldest children share a strong bond by virtue of the many years they spent together before their detention and their frequent contact thereafter. However, E.D. and I.D. were only four and three years old when separated from their siblings. Consequently, they did not attach to their older siblings the way their older siblings attached to them. Rather, E.D. and I.D. bonded to their foster parents. This is evident in their refusal to separate from their foster mother and visit with appellant and their older siblings. Therefore, given the continuing contact between D.R., A.R. and I.R., and E.D. and I.D.’s lack of attachment to them, the juvenile court properly determined separation by adoption would not interfere with the children’s relationships with each other.
But even assuming all five children shared a strong sibling bond, the juvenile court was nevertheless correct in its determination because the prospective adoptive parents all stated their commitment to maintain contact among the siblings. Appellant doubts Mr. and Mrs. V. will honor their commitment given the few contacts E.D. and I.D. had with their siblings. Therefore, she advocates legal guardianship with mandated and regular visitation. Unlike appellant, we see no reason to doubt the V.’s intentions in that regard. Mrs. V. testified she “absolutely” intended to allow E.D. and I.D. to visit their siblings, stating “I believe it’s important for the children to be together as much as they can.”
Further, even if the V.’s had no intention of facilitating contact among the siblings, we would still find no error. Ultimately, the juvenile court must weigh the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by gaining a permanent home through adoption, even if adoption would interfere with a strong sibling relationship. (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 61.) In this case, the benefit to E.D. and I.D. of gaining a permanent home with the V. family to whom they were bonded far outweighed the benefit of opting for a less permanent placement just to promote a continuing but tenuous sibling relationship.
DISPOSITION
The orders terminating appellant’s parental rights are affirmed.