Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Catherine J. Pratt, Temporary Judge (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, § 21). Affirmed as modified., Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TJ17316
Bruce G. Finebaum, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MANELLA, J.
D.P. appeals from an order of wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) following a finding that he committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). He was placed home on probation in the home of his parents and contends substantial evidence does not support the true finding in count 1 of robbery. He also contends that if the finding is upheld, the clerk’s minute order must be corrected to delete the reference to a maximum period of confinement of five years. For reasons stated in the opinion, we order the maximum period of confinement stricken from the clerk’s minute order and in all other respects affirm the order of wardship.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 5, 2008, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Y.M. was at Locke High School in Los Angeles when a girl approached and asked the time. Y.M. removed her cell phone from her pocket to learn the time. After Y.M. told the girl the time, and while putting the phone away, the girl grabbed the phone and started walking away with it. Y.M. told her to give it back, but the girl walked toward co-minor D.B. and gave him the phone. Y.M. told D.B. to give her the phone, but he pushed her away. D.B. then put the phone behind his back, and appellant grabbed it and ran with it. Y.M. tried to follow him, but appellant ran into the building and up to the second floor. Before the girl approached Y.M., Y.M. had seen appellant standing with D.B.
M.V. was with Y.M. during the incident. M.V. had seen the co-minor and the girl looking at Y.M.’s phone, and M.V. had told Y.M. to put it away. M.V. first saw appellant when she and Y.M. tried to get the phone away from the co-minor. Appellant was present when Y.M. confronted the co-minor and when the co-minor pushed her.
In defense, it was stipulated that on March 25, 2008, Detective Parra wrote in his report that he had spoken with M.V., who said she was with her cousin when a female asked the time; the female then asked to use the phone to call her mother, and Y.M. gave the phone to the female, who then walked away and handed it to the co-minor.
Appellant testified he had nothing to do with taking the phone and had been walking around campus looking for a friend.
In concluding that second degree robbery had been established against appellant, the court noted that while neither of the minors had taken the phone from the victim, it had been in her immediate presence, and co-minor and appellant had used their “superior physical attribute[s]” to keep the victim away from her property.
DISCUSSION
I
“‘The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding, the appellate court ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence–such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence [citation] and we must make all reasonable inferences that support the finding of the juvenile court. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089.) “This standard applies to cases based on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 830.)
“‘Although it is the duty of the [trier of fact] to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the [trier of fact], not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’” [Citations.] “Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Figueroa (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1584, 1587.)
To prove a robbery, the prosecution must establish the defendant took property from the victim “by means of force or fear with the specific intent to permanently deprive him of that property.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1176-1177; People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1058; Pen. Code, § 211.) “[T]he intent required for robbery... is seldom established with direct evidence but instead is usually inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 643.) “[A]n intent to permanently deprive someone of his or her property may be inferred when one unlawfully takes the property of another.” (People v. Morales (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1391.)
“‘“[M]ere theft becomes robbery if the perpetrator, having gained possession of the property without use of force or fear, resorts to force or fear while carrying away the loot. [Citations.] In order to support a robbery conviction, the taking, either the gaining possession or the carrying away, must be accomplished by force or fear. [Citations.]”’” (People v. Torres (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1079.)
“[A] person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense[;] (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.” (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561; accord, People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 637.) “Whether a person has aided and abetted in the commission of a crime is a question of fact, and on appeal all conflicts in the evidence and attendant reasonable inferences are resolved in favor of the judgment. Among the factors which may be considered in determining aiding and abetting are: presence at the crime scene, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense. [Footnotes omitted.]” (In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
Here, the record establishes that a female grabbed Y.M.’s cell phone, refused to return it, and gave it to the co-minor. In appellant’s presence, the co-minor refused to return the property to Y.M., pushed her to prevent her from recovering it, and then passed the property to appellant, who fled with it, completing the robbery. The juvenile court reasonably concluded from appellant’s presence and actions that he knew of and shared the perpetrators’ criminal intent and aided, promoted, and encouraged the commission of the robbery.
II
Appellant contends and respondent agrees the maximum period of confinement set forth in the minute order does not conform to the juvenile court’s oral pronouncement of judgment and should be stricken. We agree.
During the disposition, the court ordered that appellant be placed home on probation. A maximum period of confinement was not ordered. (See In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 573.) The clerk’s minute order does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of the court and can be corrected at any time. (See People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471.)
DISPOSITION
The maximum period of confinement is ordered stricken from the clerk’s minute order. In all other respects the order of wardship is affirmed.
We concur:, EPSTEIN, P.J., SUZUKAWA, J.