In re Doe 4

4 Citing cases

  1. In re Doe

    19 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. 2000)   Cited 28 times
    Concluding that courts construing statutory language should give little weight to post-enactment statements made by legislators

    We do not know the percentage of judicial bypasses that the trial courts are denying. But the fiscal note's economic assumption comports with our percentage thus far. Of the two cases in which we have rendered a final decision, we granted an application in this case and denied another in In re Jane Doe, 19 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. 2000) (" Doe 4(II)"). For example, Representative Wohlgemuth, the author of the House companion to Senate Bill 30, described the judicial bypass as " an extremely low bar to begin with" and represented that "obtaining a bypass is not going to be a problem."

  2. In re Doe

    501 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. App. 2016)   Cited 3 times

    See Tex. Fam. Code § 33.003(i) and (i–1).SeeIn re Doe 10 , 78 S.W.3d 338 (Tex.2002) ; In re Doe 11 , 92 S.W.3d 511 (Tex.2002) ; In re Doe 1 , 19 S.W.3d 249 (Tex.2000) ; In re Doe 2 , 19 S.W.3d 278 (Tex.2000) ; In re Doe 3 , 19 S.W.3d 300 (Tex.2000) ; In re Doe 4 , 19 S.W.3d 322 (Tex.2000) ; In re Doe 4 , 19 S.W.3d 337 (Tex.2000) ; In re Doe 1 , 19 S.W.3d 300 (Tex.2000).

  3. In the Matter of B.S

    205 Ariz. 611 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 12 times
    Applying a "clear and convincing" standard in a judicial bypass proceeding for a minor's abortion in part because "the judicial bypass procedure impacts a parent's opportunity to participate in making a significant decision involving his or her minor daughter. The Court has recognized that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children. In a proceeding that encroaches on a parent's ability to exercise this interest, a heightened standard of proof is warranted."

    Because that person in a judicial bypass proceeding is the pregnant minor, she bears the burden of proof. See In re Petition of Anonymous 1, 558 N.W.2d 784, 787 (1997) (holding pregnant minor has burden to prove entitlement to judicial bypass in absence of legislative pronouncement to contrary); see also In re Anonymous, 833 So.2d 75, 78 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002) (acknowledging minor bears burden of proof in judicial bypass proceeding); In re Doe 4, 19 S.W.3d 337, 339 (Tex. 2000) (same). For a history of Arizona's attempts to enact constitutionally permissible provisions, see Planned Parenthood v. LaWall, 307 F.3d 783, 785-86 (9th Cir. 2002).

  4. Abrams v. Jones

    35 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2000)   Cited 14 times
    In Abrams v. Jones, 35 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2000), the Texas Supreme Court held that, "[b]ecause subsection (b) [of section 611.0045] may limit a patient's rights to his or her own records, subsection (b) can also limit a parent's or third party's right to a patient's records when the third party or parent stands in the patient's stead."

    Tex. Fam. Code §§ 33.001-.011.In re Doe 1(I), 19 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2000); In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 2000); In re Doe 3, 19 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. 2000); In re Doe 4(I), 19 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. 2000); In re Doe 4(II), 19 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. 2000); In re Doe 1(II), 19 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. 2000). Tex. Health Safety Code § 611.001(2) ("`Professional' means: (A) a person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation; (B) a person licensed or certified by this state to diagnose, evaluate, or treat any mental or emotional condition or disorder; or (C) a person the patient reasonably believes is authorized, licensed, or certified as provided by this subsection.").