Opinion
J-A21045-15 No. 622 EDA 2015 No. 623 EDA 2015
08-20-2015
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.J., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.J., MOTHER IN THE INTEREST OF: A.J., A MINOR APPEAL OF: E.J., MOTHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order entered January 20, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-DP-0002954-2014, FID: 51-FN-383670-2009 Appeal from the Order entered January 20, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-DP-0002955-2014, FID: 51-FN-383670-2009 BEFORE: ALLEN, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
E.J. ("Mother") appeals from the orders which adjudicated D.J. (born in September of 2013), and A.J. (born in October of 2014) (collectively "the Children") dependent. We affirm.
In its opinion filed March 27, 2015, the trial court set forth the factual background and procedural history of this appeal. On December 17, 2014, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services ("DHS") first became involved with the family when DHS sought an Order of Protective Custody ("OPC") for Mother's eldest child, as well as the Children. The OPC stated that DHS received a General Protective Services ("GPS") report alleging that Mother's eldest child, who was ten years old, did not feel comfortable living with her father, R.F., because her eleven-year-old cousin who lived in the home was threatening and hitting her. As a result, Mother's eldest child went to the home of maternal grandmother, B.S. The OPC further averred that on December 17, 2014, DHS visited Mother's eldest child and Mother at B.S.'s home, where DHS learned that Mother's eldest child had two siblings, the Children. B.S. would not allow the Children to continue to stay at her home. Mother resided at the home of her boyfriend, M.F., who is the Children's father ("Father"). Father would not allow DHS to visit the home where they resided. Mother did not have housing for the Children or herself. Consequently, DHS obtained the Order of Protective Custody ("OPC") for Mother's eldest child and the Children, and the eldest child and the Children were placed in foster care. On December 19, 2014, a shelter care hearing was held. The trial court lifted the OPC, with the Children to remain in foster care.
Mother's eldest child, A.J., is not subject to this appeal. --------
On December 24, 2014, DHS filed petitions seeking a finding that the Children were dependent. On January 20, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on the dependency petitions. At the dependency hearing, Deanna Crawford, the DHS social worker, testified, as did Mother. Following the hearing, on January 20, 2015, the trial court entered orders adjudicating the Children dependent, and removing them from Mother's home. On January 28, 2015, Mother filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's January 20, 2015 orders. Before the trial court ruled on Mother's motion for reconsideration, Mother filed timely Notices of Appeal on February 17, 2015, and filed Concise Statements of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). This Court sua sponte consolidated the appeals.
On appeal, Mother raises two issues:
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the [a]djudication of [d]ependency?Mother's Brief at 5.
2. Additionally, whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain removal of the Children from [Mother], and place them into [DHS]'s custody?
The relevant standard and scope of review in child dependency matters is as follows:
We accept the trial court's factual findings that are supported by the record, and defer to the court's credibility determinations. We accord great weight to this function of the hearing judge because he is in the position to observe and rule upon the credibility of the witnesses and the parties who appear before him. Relying upon his unique posture, we will not overrule [the trial court's] findings if they are supported by competent evidence.In re R.P., 957 A.2d 1205, 1211 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original).
Section 6302 of the Juvenile Code defines the "dependent child" in relevant part as one who:
(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. A determination that there is a lack of proper parental care or control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent, guardian or other custodian that places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk[.]42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.
This Court has explained our review of the statutory requirements in a dependency case as follows:
The burden of proof in a dependency proceeding is on the petitioner . . . who must show [that] the juvenile is without proper parental care, and that such care is not immediately available. A finding of dependency must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that proper parental care and control are not available. The standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. Without such evidence, a child cannot be adjudged dependent and must be returned promptly to his or her parent.In the Interest of J.M., 652 A.2d 877, 880 (Pa. Super. 1995), allocatur denied, 663 A.2d 692 (Pa. 1995) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
"The legislature defined ['dependent child'] in exceedingly broad terms precisely because it is impossible to foresee all the possible factual situations that may arise." In re R.W.J., 826 A.2d 10, 15 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted) (quotations marks and brackets in original). In a dependency case, the court must make a comprehensive inquiry into whether proper parental care is immediately available or what kind of care the parent could provide in the future. Id., at 14.
Once the court determines that a child is dependent, "the court may then make an appropriate disposition of the child to protect the child's physical, mental and moral welfare, including allowing the child to remain with the parents subject to supervision . . . ." In re M.L., 757 A.2d 849, 850-51 (Pa. 2000). A dependent child may be separated from parents only when necessary for the child's safety, welfare, or health. See In the Interest of J.O.V., 686 A.2d 421, 422 (Pa. Super. 1996); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(1), and (3).
After careful review of the record, we are satisfied the trial court properly addressed Mother's issues concerning the Children's dependency adjudication. The trial court's decision to remove the Children from the care of Mother, adjudicate the Children dependent, and place them in the custody of DHS, and also to impose conditions on Mother for reunification of the family, is supported by clear and convincing, competent evidence. Accordingly, we adopt the trial court's March 27, 2015 opinion as our own, and affirm the trial court's orders on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
Orders affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/20/2015
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