Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. CK69597. Sherri Sobel, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Jesse F. Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
JACKSON, J.
INTRODUCTION
Sandi C. appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating its jurisdiction over her son D.J. and giving D.J.’s nonoffending, noncustodial father, John J., who lives in Georgia, joint legal custody and sole physical custody of D.J. Sandi C.’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court should have retained jurisdiction over D.J., in that there was a need for further supervision. We affirm the order.
John J. is not a party to this appeal.
BACKGROUND
Sandi C. is an alcoholic with a long history of alcohol abuse. On August 15, 2007, Sandi C. and a male companion were arrested in connection with the severe beating of a homeless man in Culver City. D.J., who witnessed the violent crime, was taken into protective custody and placed in a foster home. At the time, D.J. had not been properly fed and was inappropriately dressed.
On August 20, 2007, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of D.J. On September 6, the petition was dismissed and superseded by a first amended petition, alleging that D.J. was a dependent child within the meaning of subdivisions (b) and (g) of section 300. More specifically, the operative petition alleged that Sandi C. was incarcerated on a charge of robbery and failed to make an appropriate plan for D.J.’s care and supervision (Pet., pars. b-1 & g-1), she failed to provide D.J. with adequate food and clothing on August 15 (Pet., par. b-2) and she has a long history of alcohol abuse and frequently consumes alcohol and uses illicit drugs (Pet., par. b-4). With respect to John J. the petition alleged his whereabouts were unknown and he failed to supervise and protect D.J. and failed to provide the child with the basic necessities of life (Pet., pars. b-3 & g-2).
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
DCFS eventually located John J. in Georgia. When John J., who had had no contact with D.J. since January 2006, learned about the dependency proceedings, he asked for custody of D.J.
On October 29, 2007, Sandi C. and John J. submitted to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The court sustained paragraph b-4 of the operative petition as amended. Specifically, the court found that D.J.’s “mother Sandi C[.] has a history of alcohol use and is a frequent user of alcohol. The mother’s alcohol use limits [her] ability to provide regular care for the child. Further, mother was unable to prevent the child from witnessing a violent act when they were together at the park. The Child’s mother’s use of alcohol places the child at risk of harm.” The court dismissed the section 300, subdivision (g), allegations in the interest of justice and struck the remaining counts alleged pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b).
The court granted John J. unmonitored contact with D.J. while in this state and unmonitored telephonic contact from Georgia. The court also authorized D.J. to visit his father in Georgia during the Thanksgiving holiday.
On November 19, 2007, a children’s social worker accompanied D.J. to Georgia for a visit with his father. En route to Georgia, D.J. was “quiet, reserved and kept his sweatshirt hood on the entire time.” By the second evening with his father, D.J. “had relaxed completely.” John J. related to the social worker that D.J. would “tense up and wait for some type of punishment” if he accidentally broke a glass. When D.J. asked his father why he never punishes him, John J. explained to D.J. that he had done nothing wrong. During the trip back to California, D.J. “was ‘very energetic’, running, happy, and demonstrated some anxiety like he could not sit still.” The social worker maintained contact with the family during the visit.
According to D.J.’s foster mother, D.J. “responded positively to his visit with the father.” D.J. was “‘happy’” when he returned to California. D.J. stated his “‘hometown was awesome’” and his father’s home was “‘good.’” While in Georgia, D.J. called his foster parents every day.
On December 5, 2007, the disposition hearing was continued to January 3, 2008 for a contest. The court noted that if it did not return D.J. to his mother, John J. was asking for “a family law order and exit out of the case.”
D.J. asked for a 29-day visit with his father to include Christmas vacation. When Sandi objected that D.J.’s absence would frustrate her visitation and efforts at reunification, D.J.’s counsel informed the court that D.J. “wishes to go with his father.” Counsel noted, however, that “arrangements for appropriate telephone contact and also for holiday contact” were needed. John J.’s counsel reported to the court that in anticipation of D.J.’s visits, John J. already had talked to Sandi C. to make arrangements for such contact.
The court granted permission for D.J. to go to Georgia with his father. The court continued: “He will be available for telephonic standby for the trial. He does not need to be present in California any longer unless . . . the court returns him to his mother for the dispositional portion of the case.” The court ordered DCFS to ensure that D.J. have monitored telephonic contact with his mother.
In a report prepared for the contested disposition hearing, DCFS informed the court that since the last court hearing, D.J. was “adjusting well to the home environment with the father.” According to the father, D.J. was “doing well in school and with his peers.” D.J. continued to call his former foster mother who reported that D.J. “sounds happy.” John J. noted that while D.J. “had no hopes or aspirations when I first talked to him, he now plans to be an engineer (from Cornell), and insists he is going to play in the NHL.”
DCFS voiced its concern that daily contact with his mother “may thwart or undermine the child’s stability as he transitions and adjusts to the father’s home.” It therefore recommended that the court limit mother’s telephone contact with D.J. DCFS recommended that the court find D.J. a child described by section 300, subdivision (b), and that jurisdiction be terminated with a family law order granting John J. sole legal and physical custody of D.J.
At the contested hearing, Sandi C. testified that she married John J. in May 1999. The couple separated in January 2006, at which time she commenced divorce proceedings. According to Sandi C., she was granted sole legal and physical custody of D.J. by a court in Santa Cruz. Following her divorce from John J., she was D.J.’s primary caretaker.
DCFS reports reveal that Sandi C. and John J. had a tumultuous marriage. Sandi C. claimed that John J. abandoned her and D.J. in January 2006 and thereafter she was unaware of John J.’s whereabouts. John J. claimed this was untrue and that Sandi C. knew his whereabouts as of February 2006. John J. provided DCFS with telephone records establishing his communication with Sandi C. from April 2006 to August 2006, during which he told Sandi C. he wanted to discuss child custody. Sandi C. informed John J. that there would be a court hearing, but John J. never received any documents from the court and therefore was never given the opportunity to seek custody of D.J. in family law court. John J. last spoke to Sandi C. on July 10, 2007 prior to DCFS’s involvement in this case.
Sandi C. testified that she had concerns about D.J. being placed with his father. When she proceeded to discuss events that transpired while she was married to John J., the court asked her to focus on the last six months. She was unable to identify any current concerns. Sandi then detailed her efforts at rehabilitation since August 2007, which were quite minimal. She enrolled in a detox program in Santa Cruz in September 2007 and participated for only eight days. Since the next step would have been to enter a sober living environment and there was none available, Sandi moved to Los Angeles, where she has actively been in a program but only since December 14, 2007.
Sandi C. acknowledged that she was an alcoholic but stated she no longer had a problem. She last consumed alcohol on September 21, 2007. She currently was on prescription pain medication, as well as an antidepressant. A psychotropic medication also was prescribed to help Sandi C. stop smoking.
After listening to Sandi C.’s testimony, the juvenile court noted that the case came to it after D.J. witnessed “a horrendous violent act” in the park. The court further noted that D.J.’s father “stepped up as soon as we found him and sent every single thing he possibly could to indicate to the court that he would love to have his child and would have loved to have his child and wanted his child.”
With regard to Sandi C., the court aptly noted that she did not ask for D.J. to be returned to her. It further observed: “At this particular time, I would have been looking favorably at the mother if, in fact, she had done anything at all regarding her own needs as of August. We’re in January. Mother has had every single possible excuse. She had an eight day, and now she’s been involved in a program for three weeks — or less than three weeks. She has had a reason for everything. She is not working. She has health issues. She takes a lot of medication. She may not be drinking but she takes a lot of medication” prescribed by different physicians. “Mother has a terrible, terrible problem. Her little boy has been living with that terrible, terrible problem for, my guess is, all seven years of his life. [¶] We have a father who has stepped up, who is ready, willing, and able to have his child and apparently is doing a wonderful job.”
The court declared D.J. a dependent of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b). Then, in accordance with subdivision (b)(1) of section 361.2, the court issued a custody order giving John J. joint legal custody and sole physical custody of D.J. and terminating its jurisdiction. The court granted Sandi C. monitored telephonic contact with D.J. four times per week and monitored visitation with D.J. three times per week should she travel to Georgia. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of review
When reviewing a juvenile court order terminating jurisdiction and awarding custody, we typically apply the abuse of discretion standard of review. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318; Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 300.) Such an order can be disturbed only if the court “‘“‘exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination [citations].’”’” (Bridget A., supra, at p. 300.)
B. Prior to terminating its jurisdiction, the juvenile court considered whether there was a need for continued supervision.
When the juvenile court “orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).)
If the juvenile court decides to place the child with the noncustodial parent, the court has three options. “The court may order the noncustodial parent to assume custody of the child, terminate juvenile court jurisdiction and enter a custody order. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1).) It may continue juvenile court jurisdiction and require a home visit within three months, after which the court may make orders as provided in subdivision (b)(1), (2) or (3). (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(2).) Or the court may order reunification services to be provided to either or both parents and determine at a later review hearing under section 366.3 which parent, if either, shall have custody of the child. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3).)” (In re Adrianna P. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 44, 55, italics omitted.)
As this court observed in Bridget A. v. Superior Court, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th 285, when deciding whether to terminate jurisdiction under section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1), the juvenile court need only determine whether continued supervision is required. (Bridget A., supra, at p. 315, fn. 19.) Stated otherwise, once the juvenile court places the child with the nonoffending, noncustodial parent, the court must “then decide[] whether there is a need for ongoing supervision. If there is no such need, the court terminates jurisdiction and grants that parent sole legal and physical custody. If there is a need for ongoing supervision, the court is to continue its jurisdiction.” (In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1134-1135; accord, In re Janee W. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1451; In re Sarah M. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1486, 1498, disapproved on another ground in In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 204.)
Sandi C. maintains that the juvenile court failed to determine whether supervision was necessary before it terminated its jurisdiction over D.J. Yet, as Sandi C. acknowledges, after the contested disposition hearing, the court specifically noted that it could “get out of the case so long as we didn’t believe that [D.J.] needed services or the parent could provide those services.” The court further observed, “Without an ICPC, the way I can place [D.J.] in the home of his father without one is for the court to believe that the father is an appropriate parent and that there is no need for further services; that, then makes me look at [section] 361.2, to determine whether or not services should be provided.”
Inasmuch as the provision of services would necessitate continued supervision, it is clear that the court was well aware of the law and its obligation to assess whether continued supervision was required. Its decision to terminate jurisdiction reflects its determination that supervision was no longer required. The only question remaining is whether the court correctly resolved the issue.
C. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in terminating its jurisdiction over D.J.
Sandi C. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in terminating its jurisdiction over D.J. under section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1), because there was a need for continued supervision. In support of this contention, Sandi C. relies upon the recommendations made by DCFS following a team decision meeting held on October 31, 2007. This meeting was held “for the father to address the possibility of the child D[.J.] being released to the father.” The team “reviewed the strengths and concerns for the father, assessed the father’s ability to care for the child, and issues to be considered for the child in the event that he was returned home to the father. The consensus of the team was that it would be in the child’s best interest to be placed with the father.” DCFS’s “action plan” included the following: “(1) Establishing tools for the father to use in working with the mother regarding visitation, phone contact, etc.”; (2) “Keeping medical, dental, and educational records on the child”; (3) “Enrolling D[.J.] in individual counseling to include conjoint therapy with the father”; and (4) “Domestic violence education and awareness (for victims) for the father to be addressed in individual therapy.” John J. “stated that he would be willing to pursue these services for D[.J.] with or without DCFS supervision.”
After this recommendation was made, however, D.J. visited his father in Georgia over the Thanksgiving 2007 holiday. By all accounts, the sullen little boy who boarded the plane with the social worker returned as an excited and happy child. His experience was so positive that he asked for an extended visit with his father over the Christmas holiday. The court granted his request and, in fact, placed D.J. with his father, explaining that he did not have to come back unless it returned him to his mother at the contested disposition hearing scheduled for January 3, 2008.
By the time of the contested disposition hearing, D.J. was thriving with his father. He was doing well in school and with his peers, and he had hopes and aspirations for the future. In its report prepared for the contested disposition hearing, DCFS no longer recommended the provision of services for D.J. and/or his father. Rather, pursuant to section 361.2, DCFS recommended the termination of juvenile court jurisdiction with a family law order granting John J. sole legal and physical of D.J. and granting Sandi C. monitored contact via telephone with D.J. outside of Georgia and monitored visitation with D.J. while in Georgia. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court abused his discretion in terminating its jurisdiction over D.J. (In re Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1134-1135.)
In light of our conclusion, we need not reach the merits of Sandi C.’s additional assertions that the court abused its discretion by failing to order continued jurisdiction with family reunification services for her and John J. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3)) and alternatively, that the court abused its discretion by failing to order that a home visit be conducted at John J.’s residence in Georgia within three months (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(2)).
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., WOODS, J.
After leaving Sandi C. in January 2006, John J. struggled to get back on his feet. He regained full-time employment in September 2007 and now resides in his paternal great-grandmother’s four-bedroom home.