In re Direct Satellite Communications, Inc.

13 Citing cases

  1. In re Direct Satellite Communications

    96 B.R. 507 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989)   Cited 15 times
    In Direct Satellite, supra, this court exercised its pendent jurisdiction to hear the third-party claims in issue, based upon analysis of the considerations expressed in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); and 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶ 18.07, at 18-65 to 18-66 (2d ed. 1993).

    However, the matter did not achieve adversary proceeding stature until December 24, 1987, when the Debtor filed a Complaint in the nature of a Counterclaim to Dechert's Proof of Claim. Therein, the Debtor not only contested Dechert's claim, but also sought millions of dollars of damages from Dechert. We have issued three published Memoranda arising from the pre-trial gyrations in this matter, reported at 91 B.R. 7 (September 23, 1988), 91 B.R. 5 (June 30, 1988), and 86 B.R. 390 (February 29, 1988). The first of these arose in our denial of the Dechert's motion to dismiss this proceeding in its entirety based upon, inter alia, the pendency of a parallel, prior state court proceeding concerning the same facts, and upon the failure of the Debtor to join Carpenter, allegedly an indispensable party, in this action.

  2. Halvajian v. Bank of New York, N.A.

    191 B.R. 56 (D.N.J. 1995)   Cited 19 times

    See, e.g., In re South Bay Medical Associates, 184 B.R. 963, 969 (Bankr.C.D.Cal. 1995) (citing cases); In re Direct Satellite Communications, Inc., 91 B.R. 5 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. 1988). See also In re Cuyahoga Equip., 980 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating in dictum that a district court could exercise jurisdiction supplemental to its bankruptcy jurisdiction).

  3. In re Alpha Steel Co., Inc.

    142 B.R. 465 (M.D. Ala. 1992)   Cited 18 times
    Intimating that bankruptcy courts lacked supplemental jurisdiction

    The bank contends that the bankruptcy court has pendent jurisdiction over the two fraud counts based on its independent "relating to" jurisdiction over the constructive-trust claim. Although a number of bankruptcy courts have held that the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction are applicable to bankruptcy courts, see Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 111 B.R. 162 (N.D.Ill. 1990); In re Aerni, 86 B.R. 203 (Bankr.D.Neb. 1988); In re Direct Satellite Communications, Inc., 91 B.R. 5 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1988); In re Tidewater Group, 63 B.R. 670 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. 1986); In re Coral Petroleum, Inc., 62 B.R. 699 (Bankr.S.D.Tex. 1986); In re Wood, 52 B.R. 513 (Bankr.N.D.Ala. 1985); In re WWG Ind., Inc., 44 B.R. 287 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. 1984), this court is not altogether convinced that these doctrines should be used to extend the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts to claims which are beyond the "arising in" and "relate to" scope of § 1334(b). No appellate courts have yet ruled on this question, and the bankruptcy court decisions relied upon by SouthTrust Bank invoke notions of judicial economy and procedural convenience as principal justifications for extending to themselves the authority to exercise this kind of supplemental jurisdiction.

  4. Rudisill v. Combs (In re Designline Corp.)

    Jointly Administered: Case No. 13-31943 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Feb. 15, 2017)

    When weighing whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts generally engage in a three-part inquiry. First, "the federal claim must be substantial." Cooper, 409 B.R. at 786 (citing Dechert Price & Rhoads v. Direct Satellite Commc'ns (In re Direct Satellite Commc'ns), 91 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988)). "Second, the pendent claim must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact, and must be of the sort normally triable in the same proceeding as the federal claim." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). "

  5. Finley Group v. Working Media Group Atlanta, LLC (In re Redf Marketing, LLC)

    536 B.R. 646 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2015)   Cited 5 times

    When weighing whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts generally engage in a three-part inquiry. First, “the federal claim must be substantial.” 222 S. Caldwell, 409 B.R. at 786 (citing Dechert Price & Rhoads v. Direct Satellite Communications (In re Direct Satellite Commc'ns), 91 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988) ). “Second, the pendent claim must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact, and must be of the sort normally triable in the same proceeding as the federal claim.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

  6. In re 222 South Caldwell Street, Ltd. Partnership

    409 B.R. 770 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2009)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that when an adversary proceeding is pending at the time of plan confirmation and settlement, jurisdiction is retained over the proceeding under section 1334

    In analyzing whether pendent jurisdiction exists, first, the federal claim must be substantial. Dechert Price & Rhoads v. Direct Satellite Communications (In re Direct Satellite Communications), 91 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988). Here, the federal claim (Deposit claim) is a core bankruptcy proceeding over a substantial federal claim.

  7. In re Transcolor Corp.

    Case Nos. 98-65483-JS, Adv. Pro. No. 05-9103-JS (Bankr. D. Md. Oct. 5, 2007)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that the subject matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court extends to only those disputes "related to" the bankruptcy estate that affect the amount of property available for distribution or the allocation of property among creditors

    E.D. Cal. 1991) (in suit brought by trustee against debtor and third party to recover fraudulent transfers, bankruptcy court had "related to" and pendent jurisdiction to hear third party claim brought by transferee against nondebtor for malpractice.); Dechert Price Rhoads v. Direct Satellite Communications, Inc. (In re Direct Satellite Communications, Inc.), 91 B.R. 5, 6-7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (in suit by debtor that was core proceeding, bankruptcy court could exercise pendent jurisdiction over claims against third-party defendants, where claims arose out of a "common nucleus of operative facts" as debtor's "core" claims against defendant.). See also Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A General Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. MARY L.REV. 743, 854 (2000).

  8. Hospitality Ventures/LaVista v. Heartwood 11, L.L.C. (In re Hospitality Ventures/LaVista)

    358 B.R. 462 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007)   Cited 22 times
    Finding that "§ 157 authorizes referral of a core-related supplemental claim because it is 'related to' the bankruptcy case by its nexus with the Debtor's primary claim arising under the Bankruptcy Code..." even when that claim does not meet the conceivable effect test

    Under the principles of these cases, this bankruptcy judge would have authority to hear Heartwood's third-party claim. See, e.g., National Westminster Bancorp N.J. v. ICS Cybernetics, Inc. ( In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc.), 123 B.R. 467, 472 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1989); Aerni v. Columbus Fed. Savings ( In re Aerni), 86 B.R. 203, 205 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988); Dechert Price Rhoads v. Direct Satellite Communications, Inc. ( In re Direct Satellite Communications, Inc.), 91 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Sonnyco Coal, Inc. v. Bartley ( In re Sonnyco Coal, Inc.), 89 B.R. 658, 665-68 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 131 B.R. 799 (S.D. Ohio 1990); Petrolia Corp. v. Elam ( In re Petrolia Corp.), 79 B.R. 686, 692-93 (Bankr.

  9. In re Remington Development Group, Inc.

    180 B.R. 365 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1995)   Cited 42 times
    Holding that supplemental jurisdiction bestowed on the district courts under 11 U.S.C. § 1367 does not extend to bankruptcy courts via the district court delegation provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)

    The bankruptcy courts that invoke supplemental jurisdiction generally do so with self-restraint, intending only to bring all related claims to a comprehensive and consistent conclusion. See In re Marine Iron Shipbuilding Co., 104 B.R. 976, 985-87 (D.Minn. 1989); In re Summit Airlines, Inc., 160 B.R. at 923 (commenting that "most" courts will exercise supplemental jurisdiction, but should not do so except where it is "clearly appropriate"); In re Feifer Industries, 141 B.R. at 452-53; In re Direct Satellite Communications, Inc., 91 B.R. 5 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1988); In re John PetersonMotors, Inc., 56 B.R. at 592-93. See also Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox (Cary Metal Products, Inc.), 158 B.R. 459, 464-65 (N.D.Ill. 1993), aff'd, 23 F.3d 159 (7th Cir. 1994) ("strictly limiting" a bankruptcy court's exercise of ancillary jurisdiction to "unusual circumstances").

  10. In re Summit Airlines, Inc.

    160 B.R. 911 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993)   Cited 25 times
    Embezzling client funds

    1986). Jurisdiction found present: In re Salem Mills, Inc., 148 B.R. 505, 510 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1992); In re Eads, 135 B.R. 387, 397-98 (Bankr.E.D.Cal. 1991); and In re Direct Satellite Communications, Inc., 91 B.R. 5, 6-7 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1988). The facts of the cases in which the courts chose to exercise jurisdiction over third-party complaints were clearly distinct from those of the instant case.