Opinion
No. 99-951, c/w 99-984 1346
June 2, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Trico's and Diamond B's Motions to Enjoin State Court Action and for Expansion of Restraining Orders. For the following reasons, the Motions are DENIED.
A. BACKGROUND
These consolidated cases arise from the March 25, 1999 collision of Trico Marine's downbound vessel, the OSV CANE RIVER, and Diamond B Marine's upbound vessel, C/B MISS BERNICE, while operating in the fog on the Mississippi River below Venice, Louisiana. The issue now presented is whether this Court may enjoin a concurrent state court proceeding arising out of the same accident.
Because this matter has already occasioned several written rulings, discussed below, familiarity with the facts is assumed. The Court shall set forth only those facts necessary to the instant motions.
Following the March 25, 1999 collision of the CANE RIVER and the MISS BERNICE, three cases were filed in federal court. First, Trico filed suit in federal court against Diamond B for damages in admiralty. Subsequently, both Trico and Diamond B filed petitions for exoneration and/or limitation of liability, and these proceedings were consolidated with Trico's original suit. Lonnie Fontenot, Wayne Thibodaux and Alan LeBlanc, all of whom were passengers aboard the MISS BERNICE at the time of the collision, filed claims in both of the limitation proceedings, individually and on behalf of their dependent children. The passengers' wives filed similar claims. The Court shall refer to the Fontenot, Thibodaux and LeBlanc claimants collectively as the "passenger claimants" and to Trico and Diamond B collectively as the "petitioners."
"Trico" refers collectively to Trico Marine Assets, Inc. and Trico Marine Operators, Inc., the owners/operators/owners pro hac vice of the CANE RIVER. See Trico's Memorandum in Support, p. 2 n. 2.
"Diamond B" refers to Diamond B Marine Services, Inc., the owner and operator of the MISS BERNICE.
Elizabeth Fontenot, Janet Thibodaux and Kathleen LeBlanc.
Fontenot, Thibodaux and LeBlanc were all Texaco employees at the time of the accident. On April 7, 2000, Texaco Exploration Production Inc. ("Texaco") and Cigna and/or Ace U.S.A., Texaco's compensation carrier, moved for leave to file a petition of intervention, which was granted on May 17, 2000. Because he owns stock in Texaco, Judge Schwartz, to whom these proceedings were initially assigned, recused himself, and the consolidated actions were reallotted to this section on April 11, 2000. Before his recusal, Judge Schwartz issued several written rulings, which are central to the instant dispute, and the Court shall discuss them in some detail.
First, on January 14, 2000, Judge Schwartz denied the passenger claimants' Motion to Bifurcate and Sever the determination of damages from the limitation/liability phase of the case. Judge Schwartz found that separate trials would be counter to the ends of justice, cause multiplication of proceedings, inconvenience the parties, increase litigation expenses, and prejudice the petitioners. Second, on February 23, 2000, Judge Schwartz denied the passenger claimants' Motion to Amend to assert claims for punitive damages. In denying the motion, Judge Schwartz determined that nonpecuniary losses are not recoverable under the general maritime law, and, consequently, that the proposed amendments would be futile. On March 23, Judge Schwartz denied two Motions for Temporary and Limited Lift of Stay Order to allow the filing of protective suits in state court. In refusing to lift the stay, Judge Schwartz rejected the claimants' contention that protective suits were necessary to avoid potential prescription problems and discerned "no difficulty in having all of the issues tried in the context of these consolidated proceedings." "In fact," found Judge Schwartz, "it makes sense to do so and tends to avoid the eventuality of inconsistent judgments." Finally, on March 27, 2000, Judge Schwartz granted petitioners' Joint Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which sought dismissal of all claims asserted by the passenger claimants' family members. Relying on his February 23, 2000 decision, Judge Schwartz held that the family members could not recover on any of their claims, all of which sought nonpecuniary damages.
These motions were filed by the passenger claimants and by James Bennett, the captain of the MISS BERNICE, and his wife, both of whom were permitted to file claims in the limitation proceedings.
On March 23, 2000, the passenger claimants filed a Petition for Damages in Louisiana state court against the captain of the MISS BERNICE, the captain and mate of the CANE RIVER, and Texaco. In most respects, the state court Petition mirrors the federal court claims. For example, in paragraph 16 of the state court Petition, claimants allege loss of consortium and loss of society, and in paragraph 18, claimants allege punitive damages. Indeed, the only important distinction between the federal court claims and the claims set forth in the state court Petition is that the former were brought against the petitioners while the latter are brought against employees of the petitioner and against Texaco. Additionally, in paragraph 3 of the state court Petition, claimants allege that they are invoking Louisiana tort law where certain causes of action are not allowed under the general maritime law.
Trico and Diamond B now move this Court to enjoin the state court from entertaining the passenger claimants' suit. The gravamen of their argument is that the passenger claimants are attempting to avoid several unfavorable federal court rulings by relitigating them in state court. Trico sets forth three legal bases for the injunction, and Diamond B sets forth one. The Court examines each ground below.
B. LAW AND ANALYSIS 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19
Trico's first argument is that the Court should enjoin the state court suit under the authority of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. In Trico's view, Rule 19 requires the joinder of everyperson materially interested in an action who is subject to service of process and could be joined without depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the passenger claimants are subject to service of process and because this Court would have jurisdiction over their claims, Trico argues that the Court "should enjoin the state court action, and order that if the passenger claimants wish to pursue claims against the state court defendants, they must seek leave to make the state court defendants parties to the federal court action."
Trico's Memorandum in Support, p. 16.
The fatal flaw in Trico's argument is that Rule 19 does not authorize injunctions. Under its plain terms, Rule 19 authorizes a court to order that a person be made a party, to dismiss a party, and to dismiss an action. Therefore, the Court shall not enjoin the state court suit on Rule 19 grounds.
Although Rule 19 does not authorize injunctions, petitioners still might be able to avail themselves of Rule 19's benefits.
2. Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act
Trico's second argument is that the Court should enjoin the state court suit under the authority of the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 181 et seq. ("Limitation Act"). However, because the state court suit is against the captain of the MISS BERNICE, the captain and mate of the CANE RIVER, and Texaco, the Court cannot comply with Trico's request.In Zapata Haynie Corp. v. Arthur, 926 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1991), the Fifth Circuit made clear that the benefits of the Limitation Act, including the stay orders, "are, by their plain terms, conferred on ship owners only" Id. at 485. Nonetheless, Trico suggests two routes around the Zapata holding. First, relying on one sentence of the Zapata decision — that "§ 187 requires us to hold that a state court suit against a master need not be stayed pending a decision in a shipowner's limitation proceeding in federal court," id. at 487 (emphasis added) — Trico argues that the Court has discretion under § 187 to extend the current stay. This argument, however, runs counter to the clear teaching of the Zapata opinion. Mincing no words, the Fifth Circuit stated in Zapata that
46 U.S.C.App. § 185 provides that, when the ship owner files a petition for exoneration from or limitation of liability and tenders an adequate bond, "all claims and proceedings against the owner with respect to the matter in question shall cease." Section 187 provides that
[n]othing in sections 182, 183, 184, 185 and 186 of this title shall be construed to take away or affect the remedy to which any party may be entitled, against the master, officers, or seamen, for or on account of any embezzlement, injury, loss, or destruction of merchandise, or property, put on board any vessel, or on account of any negligence, fraud, or other malversation of such master, officers, or seamen, respectively, nor to lessen or take away any responsibility to which any master or seaman of any vessel may by law be liable, notwithstanding such master or seaman may be an owner or part owner of the vessel.
[t]he various provisions of the Act are not ambiguous, nor are they in conflict with one another: the Act requires stays of proceedings against ship owners; it does not permit stays of proceedings against masters.Id. at 486. Thus, the Court cannot accept Trico's argument that it has discretion to stay the state court suit against the captains, the mate, and the non-ship-owning employer.
Most, and perhaps all, commentators would agree with the Court's interpretation of the Zapata decision. See, e.g., Katie Smith Matison, Comment, A Historical Trek through the Judicial interpretations of§ 187 of the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act: The Evolution of the Literal Versus the Statutory Purpose Approach, 17 TUL. MAR. L.J. 73, 85 (1992) ("The Zapata court held that § 187 divests a district court of the power to stay a state court action against a vessel's master pending the culmination of the limitation action."); Ernest N. Reddick, Supreme Court Review of Admiralty and Maritime Issues: What's on the Horizon?, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 43, 58 (1992) (in Zapata, "the Fifth Circuit . . . held that . . . the language of the statute clearly allows injunction of suits against ship owners only").
Anticipating this ruling, Trico argues in the alternative that Zapata was decided incorrectly and "expressly reserves the right to seek a change in the law. . . ." Trico argues that the Court should disregard Zapata and instead follow the Ninth Circuit's decision in In re Complaint of Paradise Holdings. Inc., 795 F.2d 756 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008, 107 S.Ct. 649, 93 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1986), that § 187 does not prevent a district court from staying a state action against a ship's master pending resolution of the federal limitation proceeding. However, because this Court is located in the Fifth Circuit, it is bound to follow Zapata, which expressly rejected Paradise Holdings. See 926 F.2d at 485-87.
Trico's Memorandum in Support, p. 19.
Yet, Trico argues, this Court has already departed from the Zapata rule in an earlier case. In In the Matter of Global Industries Offshore, Inc., 1998 WL 474102, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12417 (E.D. La. Aug. 11, 1998)(Clement, J.), a claimant in an exoneration/limitation proceeding moved this Court to amend its injunction, which was issued under the authority of the Limitation Act, to allow a separate suit against the ship owner's underwriters. Stating that it would be "way too doctrinaire to stress so heavily the terms of the [Limitation of Liability Act] . . .," id. at *2 (brackets in original) (quoting Guillot v. Cenac Towing Co., 366 F.2d 898, 906 (5th Cir. 1966)), the Court denied the claimant's motion. The Court ruled that enjoining suits against the insurer would avoid duplicative litigation, depletion of the limitation fund, and problems of collateral estoppel and res judicata. See id.
Although the Court did not cite Zapata, its ruling in Global Industries should not be seen as a retreat from Zapata's rule. As Judge Sear has repeatedly and succinctly stated, "the Limitation of Liability Act is very specific about applying only to ship owners." International Marine Terminals Partnership v. Hillmore Maritime Inc., 2000 WL 351429, *2 (E.D. La. April 3, 2000). "The court-created exceptions are extremely narrow and have been created for situations directly affecting the ship owner." Id. Specifically, "the protections of the Limitation Act have been extended only to certain [corporate] officers and insurers of the vessel." In re Waterman Steamship Corp., 1993 A.M.C. 1501 (E.D. La. 1992) (Sear, J.). This Court's decision in Global Industries falls squarely within one of the limited exceptions to the Limitation Act and provides Trico with no support.
In sum, the Court will not enjoin the state court suit on Limitation Act grounds.
3. Anti-Injunction Act and All Writs Act
Finally, Trico argues that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, permit the Court to enjoin the state court proceeding. Diamond B joins this aspect of Trico's motion in part, arguing that an injunction is proper under the so-called "relitigation exception" of the Anti-Injunction Act.
The Anti-Injunction Act forbids a federal court from granting an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except (1) as previously authorized by Act of Congress, or (2) where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or (3) to protect or effectuate its judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651. In general, these three exceptions are narrowly construed, see Next Level Communications LP v. DSC Communications Corp., 179 F.3d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146, 108 S. Ct. 1684, 100 L.Ed.2d 127 (1988), and Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970)), and any doubts as to the applicability of the Act are to be resolved in favor of allowing the state court action to proceed. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc). The Court analyzes each of the three exceptions to the injunction prohibition in turn below.
a. "Expressly Authorized" Exception
The Anti-Injunction Act permits injunctions against state court proceedings where Congress has expressly authorized such an injunction. Trico argues that, in passing the Limitation Act, Congress expressly authorized federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings. Although Trico is correct in the abstract, as discussed above, the Limitation Act authorizes a court to enjoin only state court actions brought against ship owners, corporate officers and insurers of a vessel; the Limitation Act does not authorize an injunction against state proceedings brought against captains, mates or non-ship-owning employers. Therefore, the first exception is inapplicable.
b. "Necessary in Aid of Jurisdiction" Exception
Similarly, the second exception, allowing injunctions "necessary in aid" of a court's jurisdiction, is also inapplicable. In general, the "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception has been interpreted to permit a federal court to enjoin a later state action involving properly in the custody of the federal court, but not a state action in personam involving the same subject matter, See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 47 at 283 (4th ed. 1983). Although some courts have expanded this exception to include certain subject areas not in rem, e.g., school desegregation see id. at 284, Trico has pointed to no case in which a court has expanded this exception to include all admiralty actions or all actions related to a limitation proceeding. This Court declines to expand the exception and therefore finds it inapplicable.
c. Relitigation Exception and the All Writs Act
The third exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, which permits a federal court to issue an injunction "to protect or effectuate its judgment," is commonly referred to as the "relitigation exception" because it "was designed to permit a federal court to prevent state litigation of an issue that previously was presented to and decided by the federal court. . . ." Next Level, 179 F.3d at 249 (quoting Choo, 486 U.S. at 147, 108 S.Ct. 1684). The All Writs Act serves a similar purpose. See Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 524 (5th Cir. 1994). The relitigation exception is "founded in the well-recognized concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel." Texas Employers', 862 F.2d at 499-500 (quotingChoo, 486 U.S. at 147, 108 S.Ct. at 1690); Next Level, 179 F.3d at 249 (same).
In order to determine whether the relitigation exception applies, a court must assess the "precise state of the record" in the first federal action to determine what was actually decided. Next Level, 179 F.3d at 250 (quoting Choo, 486 U.S. at 148, 108 S.Ct. 1684). The Court has done so and has set forth the pertinent rulings above.
According to Trico and Diamond B,
[m]erely by filing their state court lawsuit, the passenger claimants have directly challenged Judge Schwartz's two previous rulings that this entire case should be tried in one federal court proceeding. Furthermore, by reurging their non-pecuniary damage claims and their punitive damage claims in the state court proceeding, the passenger claimants have directly challenged Judge Schwartz's rulings on those issues, announcing on the face of their state court complaint that they seek to relitigate these claims.
Trico's Reply Memorandum, p. 2. In its own memorandum, Diamond B adopts Trico's position with respect to the relitigation exception.
In the abstract, Trico and Diamond B are clearly correct: the passenger claimants are plainly attempting to assert claims that this Court, through Judge Schwartz, has ruled they cannot assert as a matter of law; moreover, the mere filing of the state court action confounds this Court's general desire to try all issues arising from the March 25, 1999 collision in one cogent federal proceeding. Nonetheless, the Court cannot agree that an injunction is appropriate.
As noted above, the relitigation exception is founded in the concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel. To establish res judicata, Trico and Diamond B must establish that (1) the parties are identical in both suits; (2) the prior judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same cause of action was involved in both cases. See Marine Office of America Corp. v. Vulcan MV, 921 F. Supp. 368, 371 (E.D. La. 1996) (Vance, J.). Clearly, Trico and Diamond B cannot establish the first element of res judicata, as the parties are different in the two suits. Nor have Trico and Diamond B established that they are in privity with the state court defendants. See Quintero v. Klaveness Ship Lines, 914 F.2d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 1990) ("a district court may include privies of parties within the scope of its injunction") and Next Level, 179 F.3d at 250 (burden is on moving party to establish appropriateness of relitigation exception). Thus, for res judicata purposes, Diamond B is incorrect when it states that "any contention that the suit in state court . . . is against different defendants is a difference without a distinction [sic]."
Diamond B's Memorandum in Support, p. 8.
In contrast, collateral estoppel "may not always require complete identity of the parties." Next Level, 179 F.3d at 250 (quoting Meza v. General Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1273 (5th Cir. 1990)). To establish collateral estoppel, Trico and Diamond B must establish that (1) the issue at stake is identical to the one involved in the prior action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior action; and (3) the determination of the issue in the prior action was a necessary part of the judgment in that earlier action. Id. At least as to the issues of nonpecuniary and punitive damages, these elements are largely satisfied on the facts of the case at bar. This does not mean, however, that an injunction against the state court proceedings necessarily follows.
Judge Schwartz clearly, and wisely, expressed a preference for resolving all issues arising out of the March 25, 1999 collision in one cogent federal proceeding. His decisions with respect to this preference, however, must be confined to their particular context and cannot be seen as precluding a separate suit under every circumstance.
The Court can identify at least two problems with the petitioners' request for an injunction on collateral estoppel grounds. First, although Trico and Diamond B move to enjoin the state court action, they are not actually parties to that action. In every case reviewed by this Court, the party requesting a federal injunction has been the defendant in the state court suit in which the state court plaintiff has attempted to relitigate an issue decided in a prior federal action. Thus, it is not at all clear that Trico and Diamond B may avail themselves of injunctive relief. It is possible, however, that a contradictory state court ruling could nonetheless harm the petitioners' interests, e.g., by way of collateral estoppel and/or respondeat superior liability, and the Court cannot say that the petitioners are absolutely barred from obtaining injunctive relief on this ground.
This potential lack of standing has been an underlying concern throughout this order, but, because it could easily dispose of the other arguments presented by Trico, the Court only now brings it to light.
Second, and more fundamental, "[b]ecause finality is central to the concepts of both res judicata and collateral estoppel, which animate the Anti-Injunction Act, . . . a lack of finality is . . . fatal to a request for injunction under the Act." J.R. Clearwater Inc. v. Ashland Chemical Co., 93 F.3d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1996). In other words, the relitigation exception requires that the judgment in the prior action be final. of course, distinguishing between a final "judgment" and a non-final ruling is not always a simple endeavor. For purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, Wright, Miller and Cooper suggest that courts look to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a)'s definition of "judgment," which includes a "decree and any order from which an appeal lies." According to these commentators, reading this definition of "judgment" into the statute
would permit protection of truly final judgments but would also encompass interlocutory rulings, such as a preliminary injunction, that are appealable as of right, it would include a partial summary judgment that has been made final and appealable by the Rule 54(b) procedure, and, perhaps most important, it would include those orders that are appealable under the "collateral order" doctrine.
17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE § 4226 at 550 (2d ed. 1988).
The Court finds that Judge Schwartz's earlier rulings in the case at bar were not final judgments. Although Diamond B states that "[t]here are cases which discuss the anti-injunction statute with reference to judgments which have `finally adjudicated' the rights of the parties . . .," neither petitioner has cited any such case that would demonstrate that Judge Schwartz's rulings were final. The Court's research has revealed only one case, Gillespie v. United States Steel Corporation, 379 U.S. 148, 85 S.Ct. 308, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964), that would support such a proposition.
Diamond B's Memorandum in Support, p. 11.
In Gillespie, the district court held that the Jones Act supplied the exclusive remedy for the plaintiff's cause of action and therefore struck all parts of the complaint that referred to state law or unseaworthiness as well as all reference to recovery for the benefit of the decedent's siblings, whom the court found not entitled to recovery under the Jones Act while their mother was living. See id. at 150-51, 310. The Court of Appeals agreed to hear an appeal of these issues, despite the fact that the case had not concluded. Implicitly recognizing that the district court's rulings were not clearly "final judgments," the Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision to take the appeal, as it could not say "that the Court chose wrongly under the circumstances."Id. at 153, 311. The Court hold that because the case was before it, and because both parties consented to Supreme Court review, it made sense to review the district court rulings. See id.
Despite its potentially revolutionary holding, the Gillespie opinion has not substantially expanded the final judgment doctrine and, indeed, has been the subject of much criticism; several observers have concluded that Gillespie should be confined to its particular, and unusual, set of facts. See generally 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE § 3913 (2d ed. 1992 Supp. 2000). In light of the relative fragility of the Gillespie holding, the fact that the rulings at issue here ordinarily would not be considered final judgments, and the narrowness of the Anti-Injunction Act exceptions, the Court finds that Judge Schwartz's rulings were not final judgments within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act and that an injunction against the state court proceeding is, therefore, prohibited.
This finding applies to both the res judicata and collateral estoppel foundations of the relitigation exception.
Even assuming arguendo that the Gillespie decision means that Judge Schwartz's rulings were final judgments, the Court would decline to enjoin the state court proceeding. As the Fifth Circuit stated inQuintero, even where a case fits within an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, the district court must exercise discretion in deciding whether to issue an injunction. 914 F.2d at 720 (affirming then-Judge McNamara's decision to enjoin a state court proceeding). In exercising its discretion, this Court is mindful of the general proposition that "any doubts [as to the applicability of the relitigation exception] are to be resolved in favor of allowing the state court action to proceed." Texas Employers', 862 F.2d at 499. "The explicit wording of § 2283 itself implies as much, and the fundamental principle of a dual system of courts leads inevitably to that conclusion." Id. (quotingAtlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 297, 90 S.Ct. at 1748). Because of the uncertainties surrounding the petitioners' standing to request an injunction and the finality of Judge Schwartz's rulings, the Court declines to take the extraordinary step of interfering with a state court proceeding. Even if this Court improperly refuses to enjoin the state court action, the Court has confidence, especially in light of Judge Schwartz's rulings on substantially identical issues, that the state court will apply the relevant law correctly in the proceeding before it. Cf. id. at 501 n. 13 (expressing confidence that a state court can protect a litigant by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel just as well as a federal court).
For all of the aforementioned reasons, the Court shall not enjoin the state court action under the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act or the All Writs Act.
The Court notes that denial of this motion was through no effort of the passenger, claimants, whose original opposition memoranda failed to address the petitioners' Rule 19 and Anti-Injunction Act arguments. The Court ordered the passenger claimants to file a supplemental memorandum, yet, in the words of Trico, "the passenger claimants . . . failed to directly address the merits of the issues upon which briefing was requested, choosing instead to rehash the same arguments made in their original opposition." Trico's Supplemental Memorandum. Essentially, the passenger claimants asked the Court to conclude that the lack of a Rule 19 or Anti-Injunction Act based injunction in Zapata implied that such injunctions were improper. Not only is this unhelpful from a pure legal-reasoning standpoint, since these issues were not raised in Zapata, but the Court was already well aware of the existence of the Zapata decision. The passenger claimants failed to capitalize on the weaknesses that Trico and Diamond B identified in their own arguments. Even more vexing, the passenger claimants submitted their supplemental memorandum two days after it was ordered to be filed. In the future, the passenger claimants are advised to address their opponents' arguments and to comply with the Court's orders with greater care.
C. CONCLUSION
In a more perfect world, a party to a federal court action would not attempt to re-litigate an unfavorable ruling in state court. But, given the world's imperfections and our dual system of courts, such happenings are bound to occur. In the case at bar, the Court believes that the passenger claimants are, indeed, attempting to relitigate in state court several of this Court's rulings that they see as unfavorable. Nonetheless, for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 nor the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act nor the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act will allow the Court to enjoin the state court proceedings. Instead, the Court must have faith that the state court will come to the correct decision as to the issues concurrently presented in both suits.Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Trico's and Diamond B's Motions to Enjoin State Court Action and for Expansion of Restraining Orders are DENIED.