Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. CK77802, Donna Levin, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Jeanette Cauble, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CROSKEY, J.
In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.), Pamela S., the mother of the subject dependent minor child D. H. (Mother and the minor, respectively), has appealed from a section 366.26 order that terminated her parental rights to the child. The minor’s father, Richard H. (Father), has appealed from that order as well because his parental rights were also terminated. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.200 (a)(5), Mother incorporates into her appellate presentation the argument made by Father in his opening appellate brief, to wit, that Father and the minor have a parent child relationship that is so strong and beneficial to the child that it the warrants not terminating Father’s parental rights and thus their father-son relationship meets the statutory exception to termination of parental rights found in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Additionally, Mother asserts that if Father’s parental rights are restored by this court then her parental rights must also be restored. However Father’s appeal has already been decided by this court in case B227523 and we affirmed the order terminating his parental rights.
Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to statutes are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Pursuant to Evidence Code sections 451 and 459, we granted the request of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department), for judicial notice of our non-published opinion in Father’s appeal.
Having already set out the background of this case in our opinion in Father’s appeal, we will not fully repeat it herein. However for purposes of addressing Mother’s additional arguments in her appeal, we note that by the time of the final section 366.26 hearing, the minor was two years old, he had been living with his paternal grandmother and paternal step-grandfather (paternal grandparents) more than half of his life, and the paternal grandparents had been involved in his life since he was born. He was very bonded with them and saw their home as his home. They wished to adopt him, their home study was approved for adoption, and the Department social worker opined that moving the child from the grandparents’ home would be detrimental to his well-being.
Mother contends that because the appellate record suggests that the paternal grandparents are at least in their 60’s and could be in their 70’s, placing the minor with them for adoption would not be in the child’s best interests because it is conceivable that the paternal grandparents would not be able to continue to care for the child until he becomes an adult and is able to live on his own. Mother argues that a plan of legal guardianship or long term foster care by the paternal grandparents would be a more appropriate plan for the minor because then the Department could periodically monitor the minor’s placement. Mother relies on In re Scott M. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 839, 844. However, Scott M. does not support Mother’s argument. The court in that case held that a legal impediment to adoption of a child by a particular person or persons can be examined at a section 366.26 hearing but the general “suitability” of such person(s) cannot be examined because the suitability of prospective adoptive parents is not relevant to the question whether a minor is likely to be adopted. “Rather, what is required is clear and convincing evidence of the likelihood that the children will be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective family or some other family. [Citations.]” The age of the minor’s parental grandparents is not a legal impediment in this case. Moreover, we note that there are no guarantees that any parents will live to see their adoptive or natural children reach adulthood.
Actually, the record does more than suggest that the paternal grandparents are in their 70’s. A 2009 report from the Department shows that both of them stated they are 71 years old. They also indicated they are employed as apartment managers of the apartment complex where they have lived there for over 40 years, they are in good health, and they are active and involved in their community.
As noted, the minor was two years old when parental rights were terminated and by then he had lived more than half of his life with his paternal grandparents who wished to adopt him. The record reflects that he is a happy, smart, inquisitive little boy who was reported to have a vocabulary beyond his developmental level, often spoke in sentences, and could recognize words and pictures in his books. Despite the fact that the Department reported the minor is a “highly adoptable child, ” Mother contends that because the minor loves being in the care of his grandparents and is very bonded with them, the child is therefore only specifically adoptable, not generally adoptable by anyone, because he could not safely be removed from their custody without experiencing considerable trauma. In In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, such an argument was made at the section 366.26 hearing by the attorneys who represented the two year old minor and the child’s parents. They asserted that the child was not likely to be adopted because he was bonded with his foster parents who wanted to adopt him and who were both in their 70’s. The trial court found that it was in the minor’s best interests to remain with his foster parents, and that the minor was not likely to be adopted because his foster parents were in their 70’s. Therefore, the court’s permanent plan for the child was for the foster parents to be his legal guardians. The reviewing court reversed the section 366.26 order. The court rejected the notion that a child who was developmentally normal, had no medical, emotional or behavioral problems or physical limitations, and had lived with his foster parents all his life and was very bonded with them should nevertheless not be considered adoptable because his foster parents were in their 70’s. (Id. at pp. 733-735.)
DISPOSITION
The order from which Mother has appealed is affirmed.
We Concur: KLEIN, P. J., ALDRICH, J.