Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. YJ27207, Irma J. Brown, Judge.
Murray A. Rosenberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Stacy S. Schwartz, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MALLANO, P. J.
D.G. appeals from the order continuing wardship entered following a finding at a contested adjudication that he committed misdemeanor battery. A previous disposition of home on probation was ordered to remain in effect. The minor contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the battery finding. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Testifying at the adjudication on direct examination, E.S. stated that around 3:00 p.m. on September 28, 2007, he was walking on the street in the Lennox area of Los Angeles County when a group of boys ran up behind him, one of whom hit E.S. in the back. E.S. almost lost his balance, but managed to start running away. After taking a couple of steps, one of the boys hit E.S. in the back of the head, this time causing E.S. to fall to the ground. The blow made E.S. feel “kind of dizzy.” As E.S. got up from the ground, he noticed there were five boys around him. One of the boys tried to stop E.S. from getting up by pulling at E.S.’s shirt, ripping it on the side. E.S. was able to get away and started to run again. As E.S. was running, one of the boys got in front of E.S., blocking his path. The boy said he was trying to save E.S. At that point, all five boys ran away.
In response to a question regarding how many of the boys’ faces he was able to see, E.S. testified, “I just saw two of them.” One was directly to E.S.’s left when he got up after being hit a second time. The other face E.S. recognized was of the boy who said he was trying to save E.S. E.S. further testified that he was taken to a field show-up later that day, where there were several boys. There, E.S. “recognized three of them, and then the other one, I wasn’t sure.” E.S. recognized the first boy who had hit him and the one who blocked his path, saying he was trying to save E.S. E.S. also recognized the minor, explaining, “I recognized him because he was, like, kind of laughing at me, and then I turned around, and then I saw his face.”
Following this testimony, E.S. identified the minor at the adjudication as one of his assailants. As E.S.’s testimony continued, he said he did not recall whether the minor was the one who blocked his path.
Officer Stephen Mayoral testified that he took E.S. to the field show-up. E.S. identified the minor as the one who blocked his path and said he was trying to save him. E.S. also told Mayoral that the minor had grabbed his shirt, ripping it, in an effort to prevent E.S. from leaving the scene. Mayoral further testified that he wrote a report on the incident, that he believed the report was accurate, and that the report reflected that E.S. identified three boys other than the minor as the ones who had, respectively, blocked his path, hit him in the back, and hit him in the head.
Testifying in his own behalf, the minor admitted that he was with the group of boys who hit E.S. But the minor denied that he had hit, grabbed, or otherwise touched E.S. He further asserted that he was the one who blocked E.S.’s path and said he would save E.S., explaining that he did this because his grandmother lived nearby and the neighbors knew him.
The juvenile court found that the minor had committed battery, “both based on E.S.’s testimony and the statement that he gave to Officer Mayoral at the time of the incident.”
DISCUSSION
The minor contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he committed battery because “the testimony of [E.S.] is confusing and contradictory to the point of being implausible as to the details of how he was attacked and who hit him.” Thus, asserts the minor, “What is abundantly clear from the evidence presented . . . is that because of the attack on [E.S.] coming without warning and from behind and his being dizzy and disoriented after being struck in the head, [E.S.] never got the opportunity to accurately observe what role the individuals played among the group of males he found himself amongst and the obvious confusion the situation caused him was reflected in both his statement to Mayoral at the field showup and his testimony at the adjudication hearing, rendering both implausible.” The contention is without merit.
Evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction where, upon review of the entire record, it is found to be reasonable, credible and of solid value. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318–319 [99 S.Ct. 2781]; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576–577.) “In making this determination, the reviewing court must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432.) “‘“Although an appellate court will not uphold a judgment or verdict based upon evidence inherently improbable, testimony which merely discloses unusual circumstances does not come within that category. [Citation.] To warrant the rejection of the statements given by a witness who has been believed by a trial court, there must exist either a physical impossibility that they are true, or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions. [Citations.] Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.]”’” (People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 150; accord, People v. Mejia (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 86, 98.) “Further, a [trier of fact] is entitled to reject some portions of a witness’ testimony while accepting others. [Citation.] Weaknesses and inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony are matters solely for the [trier of fact] to evaluate.” (People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616, 623.)
Although the minor’s arguments on appeal highlight evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer the minor’s innocence, the contention that E.S.’s testimony was “confusing,” even if accepted, does not provide a basis for reversing the juvenile court’s finding. E.S.’s testimony at the adjudication, albeit sometimes inconsistent, did not evince a physical impossibility or a falsity apparent from the record. Accordingly, the minor’s contention of insufficient evidence must be rejected.
DISPOSITION
The order under review is affirmed.
We concur: ROTHSCHILD, J., HASTINGS, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.