Opinion
01-23-00603-CV
07-02-2024
IN RE ARACELI DENOVA, Relator
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus
Panel consists of Landau, Countiss, and Guerra Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Julie Countiss, Justice.
Relator, Araceli Denova, has filed a petition for writ of mandamus, challenging the trial court's July 28, 2023 order granting the motion for new trial filed by real party in interest, Maria Perez. In two issues, relator contends that "[t]he trial court's order granting [real party in interest's] motion for new trial is facially invalid" and "[relator] has no clear and adequate remedy by appeal." We conditionally grant the petition.
The underlying case is Maria Perez v. Araceli Denova, Cause No. 1180961, pending in the County Civil Court at Law No. 2 of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Jim F. Kovach presiding.
This Court requested a response to the mandamus petition from real party in interest, but no response was filed.
Background
The underlying proceeding arises out of a car collision. In her original petition, real party in interest alleged that she "was attempting to safely change lanes, [when] she was suddenly and without warning struck in the rear by [a car] driven by [relator]." Real party in interest brought a negligence claim against relator and asserted that she had suffered personal injuries.
During a jury trial, both parties testified about the car collision and photographs of the damage sustained by the cars were admitted into evidence. The jury also heard deposition testimony from real party in interest's physician, and real party in interest's medical records and bills were admitted into evidence.
At conclusion of trial, the jury returned the following unanimous verdict:
QUESTION NO. 1:
Did the negligence, if any, of the persons named below proximately cause the occurrence in question?
Answer "Yes" or "No" for each of the following:
a. [RELATOR] yes
b. [REAL PARTY IN INTEREST] yes
Because the jury found that the negligence of both parties proximately caused the car collision, the jury answered Question No. 2.
QUESTION NO. 2:
What percentage of the negligence that caused the occurrence do you find to be attributable to each of those found by you, in your answer to Question 1, to have been negligent?
The percentage you must find must total 100 percent. The negligence attributable to a person named below is not necessarily measured by the number of acts or omissions found.
a. [RELATOR] 50
b. [REAL PARTY IN INTEREST] 50
Total 100%
Because the jury answered "Yes" for relator on Question No. 1 and answered fifty percent or less for relator on Question No. 2, the jury answered Question No. 3:
QUESTION NO. 3:
What sum of money, if now paid in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate [real party in interest] for his/her injuries, if any, that resulted from the occurrence in question?
. . . .
1. Physical pain sustained in the past. Answer: []$0
. . . .
2. Mental anguish sustained in the past.
Answer: $0
3. Physical pain that, in reasonable probability, [real party in interest] will sustain in the future.
Answer: $0
4. Mental anguish that, in reasonable probability, [real party in interest] will sustain in the future.
Answer: $0
5. Physical impairment sustained in the past.
Answer: $0
6. Physical impairment that, in reasonable probability, [real party in interest] will sustain in the future.
Answer: $0
7. Reasonable expenses of necessary medical care incurred in the past.
Answer: $0
8. Loss of earnings sustained in the past. Answer: $0 On April 26, 2023, the trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict as follows:
On the [5th] day of April . . . 2023, came on to be heard the above entitled and numbered cause of action. [Real party in interest] . . ., appeared in person and by her attorney of record and announced ready for trial. [Relator] . . ., appeared in person and by her attorney of record and announced ready for trial. A jury having been demanded, six good and lawful jurors were duly empaneled and the case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the evidence, all matters of fact and things in controversy were submitted to the [j]ury. The [c]harge of the [c]ourt was given to the [j]ury and the [j]ury returned its verdict. That verdict is incorporated herein by reference.
It appearing to the [c]ourt that the verdict of the [j]ury was for the [relator] and against the [real party in interest], [j]udgment should be rendered upon the verdict in favor of the [relator] and
against . . . [real party in interest]. The [c]ourt, after hearing and considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, is of the opinion that [real party in interest] is entitled to recover of and from [relator] the sum of $-0-.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by this [c]ourt that [real party in interest] have and recover $-0- from [relator].
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by this [c]ourt that all costs of [c]ourt expended or incurred in this cause of action are hereby adjudged against [real party in interest].
All writs and processes for the enforcement and collection of this judgment or the costs of [c]ourt may issue as necessary. All other relief not expressly granted herein is denied.
On July 24, 2023, real party in interest filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's April 26, 2023 judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1. On November 16, 2023, real party in interest's appeal was dismissed for nonpayment of required fees and want of prosecution. See Perez v. Denova, No. 01-23-00543-CV, 2023 WL 7778622 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 16, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Real party in interest then moved for a new trial. Although she, in her motion for new trial, did not challenge the jury's liability determination, she argued that "the jury's decision to award [her] $0.00 for pain and suffering and [its] refusal to award her 50% of her medical bills was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence" because "the evidence presented at trial . . . unequivocally established [that she] was injured in the [car collision]." In her response to the motion for new trial, relator asserted that real party in interest's assertion that her injuries were "uncontroverted" and "undisputed" was a "mischaracterization of the evidence." Relator further argued that the jury's "verdict[,] indicating that [it] did not believe that the[] [car collision] caused [real party in interest's] injuries," was reasonable because "[t]he jury reviewed photo[graphs] of the crash showing minimal damage, listened to testimony from [real party in interest] in which it could be reasonably assessed that she exaggerated her injuries[,] and reviewed unreliable medical records that included inaccurate dates and missing records." After real party in interest filed a reply, the trial court granted her motion for new trial.
On July 28, 2023, the trial court signed an order, stating:
The [c]ourt, having considered [real party in interest's] [m]otion for [n]ew [t]rial, and after considering said motion and argument of counsel[,] rules as follows. The motion is hereby:
X GRANTED;
_ DENIED.
The trial court also entered an order setting a new trial for August 21, 2023.
On August 17, 2023, relator filed a petition for writ of mandamus, requesting that this Court grant her petition and direct the trial court to vacate its July 28, 2023 order granting real party in interest's motion for new trial. In connection with her petition for writ of mandamus, relator filed a motion for emergency stay of the trial setting, requesting that this Court issue an order "staying the trial court's August 21, 2023 trial setting" while the Court considered relator's petition for writ of mandamus. On August 21, 2023, we granted relator's request for temporary relief and stayed the trial setting.
Standard of Review
"Mandamus relief is warranted when a trial court clearly abuses its discretion and the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal." In re YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). "A trial court abuses its discretion when [its] decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference to guiding principles." See In re A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 282 (Tex. 2019) (internal quotations omitted). Further, "[t]rial courts have no discretion in determining what the law is or in the application of the law to the facts." In re Fox River Real Est. Holdings, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding).
New Trial
A. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Entering a Facially Invalid Order
In her first issue, relator argues that the trial court erred in granting real party in interest's motion and ordering a new trial because the trial court's order "fails to provide an understandable, reasonably specific explanation of the trial court's reasons for setting aside the jury's verdict, and therefore is facially invalid."
While trial courts have traditionally been afforded broad discretion in granting new trials, the authority of trial courts to do so is "not limitless." In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 210 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding). Notably, parties to a jury trial "are entitled to an understandable, reasonably specific explanation why their expectations are frustrated by a jury verdict being disregarded or set aside, the trial process being nullified, and the case having to be retried." Id.; see also In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d 289, 299 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding).
To be facially valid, an order granting a new trial must be "cogent," "legally appropriate," "specific enough to indicate that the trial court did not simply parrot a pro forma template," and issued "only after careful thought and for valid reasons." In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 688-89 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding). In other words, "a new-trial order based on a factual-sufficiency review must indicate that the trial [court] considered the specific facts and circumstances of the case at hand and explain how the evidence (or lack of evidence) undermines the jury's findings." In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (internal quotations omitted). "An order that does not satisfy these requirements may be corrected by mandamus." In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 757 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding); In re Iftikhar Ahmed, P.A., No. 01-19-00584-CV, 2020 WL 894460, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 25, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) ("When a new trial order fails to satisfy facial requirements, we need not normally conduct a merits review of the order and may grant mandamus relief directing the trial court to vacate its new trial order and issue a new order specifying its reasons for ordering a new trial.").
Here, the trial court's order granting real party in interest's motion for new trial only states that the court considered the motion for new trial and the arguments of counsel, without providing any reasons for its ruling. As such, the trial court's order fails to satisfy the facial-sufficiency requirements. In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d at 299 ("[I]t is an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial if the order is not accompanied by meaningful reasons."); In re Cook, 356 S.W.3d 493, 494 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (mandamus relief warranted because trial court granted motion new trial "without stating the reasons for doing so"); In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d at 206, 213 (granting new trial "in the interests of justice and fairness" was insufficient); In re Sanchez, No. 01-23-00309-CV, 2024 WL 2061673, at *5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 9, 2024, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (reasons stated for granting new trial "lack[ed] clarity and reasonable specificity"). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in granting real party in interest's motion for new trial without providing a reasonably specific explanation.
We sustain relator's first issue.
B. Relator Has No Adequate Remedy by Way of Appeal
In her second issue, relator argues that she has no clear and adequate remedy by appeal because "she will lose substantial rights by being required to re-try th[e] case after the jury determined that [real party in interest] did not suffer any compensable damages as a result of the [car collision] at issue."
"The Texas Supreme Court has recognized that an erroneous grant of a new trial presents an extraordinary circumstance warranting mandamus relief." In re Iftikhar Ahmed, P.A., 2020 WL 894460, at *3 (citing In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 407 S.W.3d at 759). As such, "absent mandamus review, [parties] will seemingly have no appellate review of [an] order[] granting new trial." In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d at 209. Because we have held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting real party in interest's motion for new trial, we hold that relator lacks an adequate remedy by way of appeal and mandamus relief is appropriate.
We sustain relator's second issue.
We decline to grant relator's request to direct the trial court to affirm its "April 26, 2023 . . . [j]udgment based on the jury's verdict." Because, without an order providing the trial court's reasons for ordering a new trial, we cannot determine whether relator is entitled to that relief. See In re Sanchez, 2024 WL 2061673, at *6.
Conclusion
We conditionally grant relator's petition for writ of mandamus. We direct the trial court to vacate its July 28, 2023 order granting real party in interest's motion for new trial and enter a new order specifying the reasons it ordered a new trial. We deny relator's request that we direct the trial court to enter a final judgment on the jury's findings. We are confident that the trial court will comply with this Court's ruling, and the writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply. We dismiss any pending motions as moot. We withdraw our August 21, 2023 order staying the August 21, 2023 trial setting.