Opinion
No. 1-944 / 01-0034.
Filed January 28, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, KARLA J. FULTZ, Associate Juvenile Judge.
Ursula B. appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Pamela Vandel, Des Moines, for appellant-mother.
Tamara Knight, Des Moines, for appellant-father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Jennifer Navis, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Michelle Miller of the Youth Law Center, Des Moines, for minor child.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Ursula B. appeals the termination of her parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(c) , (d), (e) (1999). Ursula argues the district court erred in terminating her parental rights because the grounds for termination were not proven by clear and convincing evidence and termination was not in the children's best interests. We affirm.
c. The court finds that both of the following have occurred:
(1) The court has previously adjudicated the child to be a child in need of assistance after finding the child to have been physically or sexually abused or neglected as the result of the acts or omissions of one or both parents, or the court has previously adjudicated a child who is a member of the same family to be a child in need of assistance after such a finding.
(2) Subsequent to the child in need of assistance adjudication, the parents were offered or received services to correct the circumstance which led to the adjudication, and the circumstance continues to exist despite the offer or receipt of services.
d. The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(2) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for a period of at least six consecutive months.
(3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parents have not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child during the previous six consecutive months and have made no reasonable efforts to resume care of the child despite being given the opportunity to do so. For the purposes of this subparagraph, "significant and meaningful contact" includes but is not limited to the affirmative assumption by the parents of the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent. This affirmative duty, in addition to financial obligations, requires continued interest in the child, a genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case permanency plan, a genuine effort to maintain communication with the child, and requires that the parents establish and maintain a place of importance in the child's life.
e. The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in section 232.102.
Ursula has five children, who at the time of the termination hearing were between the ages of four and thirteen. She began receiving services in April 1997, following a report that she struck her oldest child, D.B., repeatedly with a belt, leaving belt-loop marks on D.B.'s back and arm. In June 1998 Ursula consented to the removal of her children after she tested positive for cocaine and marijuana and her youngest child, then less than two years old, also tested positive for cocaine. On April 3, 2000, a no-contact order was entered following a confirmed report that Ursula again struck D.B. repeatedly across the back with a belt, this time also striking her once in the face.
Upon our de novo review, we find Ursula's parental rights were properly terminated under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e). See In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997) (review of termination proceedings is de novo); see also In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996) (where district court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds to terminate under one of the sections cited to affirm). The only element of this section challenged is whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the children could not be returned to Ursula's care. At the October 13, 2000 termination hearing Ursula testified that she had been drug free since April 2000. This assertion, however, cannot be substantiated because Ursula failed to regularly submit to the required drug screenings. Ursula also refused to comply with services, denying the need for counseling and failing to maintain contact with her caseworker despite the no-contact order, which prevented her from seeing her children for six months prior to the termination hearing. More importantly, Ursula's testimony reflects that she blames D.B. for the family's problems and fails to recognize that her method of punishment is inappropriate and dangerous. Under these circumstances, we find the children cannot be returned to Ursula's care.
Based on these factors, we also find termination is in the children's best interests. See In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994) (court must consider the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the children in evaluating their best interests). Ursula's children have been removed from her care since June 1998. We view plans that extend the twelve-month statutory period with a sense of urgency. In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Iowa 1987); see also In re A.Y.H., 508 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993) (court must reasonably limit time for parents to be in a position to assume care of children; patience with parents can soon translate into intolerable hardship for children). The children should not be forced to wait any longer while Ursula attempts to create a stable home. See In re D.A., 506 N.W.2d 478, 479 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993) (crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to own problems).
The district court is affirmed in its entirety.
AFFIRMED.