Opinion
Case No. 19-12126
04-17-2020
In Re: JAMES CHRISTOPHER DAVIS AMY MARIE DAVIS Debtors
Chapter 13
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER DENYING CONFIRMATION OF THE CHAPTER 13 PLAN
Deere & Company and John Deere Financial (referred to collectively as "John Deere Financial") object to confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan of James Christopher Davis and Amy Marie Davis (the "Debtors"). John Deere Financial asserts that § 1325(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code does not allow the Debtors to bifurcate its claim secured by several items of farming equipment obtained through loans that all had security agreements which included cross-collateralization clauses (sometimes referred to as "dragnet" clauses) in them.
According to John Deere Financial, the Debtors must exercise one of two mutually exclusive options under §§ 1325(a)(5)(B) and (C) relative to its secured claim against certain pieces of farm equipment, and neither of these options allows them to surrender some of the equipment while retaining and cramming down the rest unless John Deere Financial accepts such treatment—which it most certainly does not. When boiled down to its essence, John Deere Financial's objection is that § 1325(a)(5) requires the Debtors' Plan to treat all of the collateral secured by its various loans containing cross-collateralization clauses consistently. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with John Deere Financial and DENIES confirmation of the plan.
I. BACKGROUND
This matter is before the Court on confirmation of the Second Amended Chapter 13 Plan (the "Plan") (Doc. 60) filed by the Debtors on December 17, 2019; the standing objection to confirmation of the Plan (the "Objection") (Doc. 31) filed by John Deere Financial on August 6, 2019; and the briefing submitted by the Chapter 13 Trustee, Margaret Burks (the "Trustee") (Doc. 53), John Deere Financial (Docs. 54 and 59), and the Debtors (Doc. 55). To aid in resolution, the Debtors and John Deere Financial have stipulated to the value of each individual item of farm equipment, totaling $217,500 (Doc. 47).
II. UNDISPUTED FACTS
Debtor James Davis is a co-owner of Moo Moo Valley Farms, Inc., located in West Union, Ohio, a rural farming community southeast of Cincinnati. Beginning in July 2015, Mr. Davis entered into ten separate contracts with John Deere Financial for the purchase of fifteen pieces of farming equipment and a multi-use credit line. Each of the ten contracts contains the following cross-collateralization clause:
Security Interest: You grant us and our affiliates a security interest in the Equipment (and all proceeds thereof) to secure all of your obligations under this Contract and any other obligations which you may have to us or any of our affiliates or assignees at any time and you agree that any security interest you have granted or hereafter grant to use or any of our affiliates shall also secure your obligations under this Contract.(Doc. 54, p. 2) (emphasis added). Prior to filing this case, the Debtors defaulted on loan payments to John Deere Financial. As a result, John Deere Financial repossessed four pieces of the Debtors' farm equipment. However, several pieces of farming equipment still remain in the Debtors' possession.
The so-called "Special Provision" of the Debtors' proposed Plan sets forth their treatment of John Deere Financial's claim. It would bifurcate the claim, secured by all fifteen pieces of the farming equipment, adopting a hybrid approach under §§ 1325(a)(5)(B) and (C), surrendering some of that collateral and retaining and paying the cramdown value on the rest:
Attached to this Order as Appendix A is a table providing a summary of the various contracts between the Debtors and John Deere Financial, including a description of the collateral and its stipulated value, the amount due as of the petition date, and the proposed treatment of the collateral under the Plan.
Debtor, James Christopher Davis, is indebted on multiple claims owed to John Deere Financial (hereinafter the
"Creditor"). The claims of the Creditor are secured by numerous items of farm equipment (hereinafter the "Farm Equipment") as identified on Schedule A/B and in Paragraph 5.1.4 and Paragraph 6 of this Plan above. The aggregate value of all the Farm Equipment, per the Stipulation (Doc. 47) filed by the Debtors and the Creditor, is $217,500.00.(Doc. 60, ¶ 13).
The Debtors shall retain the items of Farm Equipment identified in Paragraph 5.1.4 of this Plan above which have an aggregate value, per the above-referenced Stipulation, of $92,500.00 which shall be paid pursuant to Paragraph 5.1.4 of this Plan above. The payment set forth in Paragraph 5.1.4 is reduced because the Plan payment steps-up in November of 2019 and shall increase after the Plan payment steps-up.
The Debtors shall surrender the items of Farm Equipment identified in Paragraph 6 of this Plan. The balance of the Creditor's secured claim in the amount of $125,000.00, over and above the $92,500.00 being paid pursuant to Paragraph 5.1.4, shall be paid, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 1322(b)(8), with property of the estate consisting of the items of Farm Equipment being surrendered to the Creditor pursuant to Paragraph 6 which have an aggregate value, per the above-referenced Stipulation, of $125,000.00. Confirmation of the Plan shall transfer title of the surrendered Farm Equipment to the Creditor who, thereafter, shall be entitled to retain or dispose of the same as the Creditor sees fit free and clear of any claim of the Debtors.
The Debtors' Plan, if confirmed, would: (1) limit the amount of John Deere Financial's total secured claim in the farming equipment to $217,500, the aggregate stipulated value for all fifteen pieces of the collateral; (2) allow the Debtors to retain eight pieces of farm equipment, worth a stipulated value of $92,500; (3) return seven items of farming equipment to John Deere Financial, worth a stipulated value $125,000; and (4) cram down John Deere Financial's secured claim to the value of the retained collateral, or $92,500, with the remainder, $125,000 being treated as a general unsecured claim.
Indeed, the last two sentences in the Special Provision state specifically that: "The balance of [John Deere Financial's] claims, not otherwise addressed herein, shall be paid as a General Unsecured, Non-Priority claim in accordance with the provisions of this Plan applicable to such claims and released upon discharge. Upon completion of the Debtors' Plan and the issuance of a Discharge, [John Deere Financial] shall release any liens encumbering the items of Farm Equipment identified in Paragraph 5.1.4 of this Plan above." (Doc. 60, ¶13).
Were this Plan to be confirmed, it would have binding effect upon all creditors and parties in interest even if it violates the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See United Student Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010). "[B]ankruptcy courts have the authority—indeed, the obligation—to direct a debtor to conform his plan to the requirements of [the Bankruptcy Code]." Id. at 277.
III. PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
John Deere Financial takes issue with the "Special Provision" of the Plan, contending that the treatment of its claim violates § 1325(a)(5). Citing the majority view, including the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, John Deere Financial argues that the Bankruptcy Code does not provide the Debtors with the right to adopt a combination of the options offered under § 1325(a)(5)—namely subsections (B) (retention of collateral and payment of the cramdown value) and (C) (surrender of collateral). Stated another way, John Deere Financial asserts that § 1325(a)(5)'s options are mutually exclusive and that the plan must provide for the same treatment for all of the collateral securing its loan contracts which contain cross-collateralization clauses.
See Williams v. Tower Loan of Miss., Inc. (In re Williams), 168 F.3d 845 (5th Cir. 1999).
Conversely, the Debtors contend that § 1325(a)(5) should be interpreted to create nonexclusive alternatives for treatment of a claim secured by multiple pieces of collateral. They maintain that the Plan, which would allow them to surrender some collateral and retain and pay the cramdown value on the remaining collateral is confirmable under § 1325(a)(5). See United States v. White, 340 B.R. 761, 765-66 (E.D.N.C. 2006) (allowing partial surrender); In re McCommons, 288 B.R. 594, 596-97 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002) (same).
Surprisingly, the Debtors' argument also finds support from an unlikely source. In a seeming switch from its previously held views, the editors at Collier on Bankruptcy recently opined that "[w]hen there are multiple items of collateral, the debtor may decide to surrender some items and retain others." 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1325.06[4] (16th ed. 2018); contra 8 Colliers on Bankruptcy ¶ 1325.06[2][c] (15th ed. 1997) ("A chapter 13 plan otherwise meeting all of the confirmation standards and requirements must be confirmed if it satisfies any one of the three alternative tests with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan—acceptance of the plan by the holder of the claim, compliance with the chapter 13 cram down provisions, or surrender of the collateral to the holder of the claim.").
As cited in Williams, 168 F.3d at 847.
This apparent switch stands in marked contrast to other major treatises addressing this topic which have either cut the opposite direction or simply noted the court split. See, e.g., Ginsberg & Martin on Bankruptcy § 15.05[C][3][b] (5th ed. 2015) ("Generally, a plan may not propose to surrender a portion of the collateral in partial satisfaction of the secured claim and cram down the remaining secured claim as it relates to the retained collateral."); Keith M. Lundin, Lundin On Chapter 13, § 74.6, at ¶ 3, LundinOnChapter13.com (last visited April 8, 2020) ("There is also the question whether a Chapter 13 debtor can surrender part of the collateral for a debt and keep part. There is a split of authority in the pre-BAPCPA case law addressing this issue. One post-BAPCPA decision seems to allow partial surrender."); Bloomberg Law: Bankruptcy Treatise, pt. 7, ch. 232, at § III(F)(3) (Samir D. Parikh et al. eds., 2020), available at www.bloomberglaw.com/content/bankruptcytreatise ("[T]here is a question of whether a partial surrender is appropriate. . . . Courts are divided on the issue.").
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Cross-collateralization clauses such as the one in John Deere Financial's contracts are enforceable under Ohio Law.
Before diving into the Bankruptcy Code, we must first briefly address the threshold question: Are cross-collateralization provisions enforceable in Ohio? It is well-settled that state law governs whether a security agreement creates a lien against a particular asset or set of assets. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) ("Property interests are created and defined by state law."). Ohio law is equally clear that cross-collateralization provisions can be used to create liens against property presently owned by the borrower or after-acquired property.
Ohio Rev. Code § 1309.204(C) provides, "A security agreement may provide that collateral secures . . . future advances or other value, whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment." As noted in the official U.C.C. comment to that section:
Under subsection (c) collateral may secure future as well as past or present advances if the security agreement so provides. This is in line with the policy of this Article toward security interests in after-acquired property under subsection (a). Indeed , the parties are free to agree that a security interest secures any obligation whatsoever. Determining the obligations secured by collateral is solely a matter of construing the parties' agreement under applicable law. This Article rejects the holdings of cases decided under former Article 9 that applied other tests, such as whether a future advance or other subsequently incurred obligation was of the same or a similar type or class as earlier advances and obligations secured by the collateral.Ohio Rev. Code § 1309.204 cmt. 5 (emphasis added).
It is worth noting that Comment 5 is not without controversy. Prior to the issuance of Comment 5, courts frequently relied upon the "relatedness rule," which provided that "such clauses should only be enforced when the different loans involved are sufficiently related or of the same class such that an intent of the parties that the collateral should secure past and future debts can be inferred." Ryan A. Hackney, Ripping Holes in the Dragnet: The Failings of U.C.C. § 9-204(c) as Applied to Consumer Transactions, 87 Tx. L. Rev. 1249, 1251 (2009). Despite Comment 5's clear statement that the assets secured by cross-collateralization provisions need not be related to be enforced, many courts have continued to apply the relatedness rule. Id. This Court refrains from wading into the controversy because whether we apply a strict reading of Comment 5 or the relatedness rule, the cross-collateralization clauses at issue here would still be enforceable. As one of the drafters of Article 9 of the U.C.C. stated, dragnet clauses are "abused when a lender, relying on a broadly drafted clause, seeks to bring within the shelter of his security arrangements claims against the debtor which are unrelated to the course of financing that was contemplated by the parties." Id. (quoting 2 Grant Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 35.2, at 920-21 (1965)). In this case, it is clear that the cross-collateralization provisions at issue all related to the operation of Moo Moo Valley Farms, Inc., and the various pieces of farming equipment needed for that purpose. It is, thus, clear that the parties intended to encumber all of these related items.
The terms of the cross-collateralization clauses in the various contracts are unambiguous in each and every contract. Moreover, they clearly encompass all of the property at issue here. The parties, without question, intended for all of the property to be subject to John Deere Financial's lien. Therefore, the lien is enforceable against all of the subject property.
B. This Court finds the line of cases which interpret § 1325(a) as creating mutually exclusive alternatives more persuasive and adopts their approach.
The Debtors cannot pick and choose which collateral to retain and surrender. Sec. 1325(a)(5) provides, in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) the court shall confirm a plan if—
. . . .
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)
(i) the plan provides that—
(I) the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim until the earlier of—
(aa) the payment of the underlying debt determined under nonbankruptcy law; or
(bb) discharge under section 1328; and
(II) if the case under this chapter is dismissed or converted without completion of the plan, such lien shall also be retained by such holder to the extent recognized by applicable nonbankruptcy law;
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim; and
(iii) if—
(I) property to be distributed pursuant to this subsection is in the form of periodic payments, such payments shall be in equal monthly amounts; and
(II) the holder of the claim is secured by personal property, the amount of such payments shall not be less than an amount sufficient to provide to the holder of such claim adequate protection during the period of the plan; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder.
Section 1325(a)(5)(A) is not at issue as John Deere Financial has objected to the Plan.
The majority of courts addressing this issue, including those from this District, have construed § 1325(a)(5) to create mutually exclusive alternatives. See Williams v. Tower Loan of Miss., Inc. (In re Williams), 168 F.3d 845 (5th Cir. 1999), In re Elkins, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2900 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005) (Hoffman, J.), In re Covington, 176 B.R. 152 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1994), In re Schwartz, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 74 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998).
The courts which have gone the other direction rely on either or both of two factors: (1) "One of the fundamentals concepts underlying all debtor-creditor law is the debtor's ability to surrender his rights in collateral at any time[;]" and (2) "the plain language of Section 1325(a) allows partial surrender." In re McCommons, 288 B.R. at 596-97; see also United States v. White, 340 B.R. at 765-66; In re Stevens, 368 B.R. 5, 9 (Bankr. D. Neb. Apr. 9, 2007).
However, a recent decision out of the Northern District of Georgia clearly explains why partial surrender is improper under § 1325(a)(5):
The plain language of "the property securing such claim" in Section 1325(a)(5)(C) does not expressly provide for surrender of "some" or "part" of the property, but instead appears to provide for "the entire collateral." This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that Section 506(a) does not provide a means to bifurcate a single oversecured claim into several smaller secured claims.In re Lemming, 532 B.R. 398, 406 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2015) (internal citations omitted). This analysis is reinforced by a policy and textual understanding of § 1325:
Surrender is a process that for the most part requires no bankruptcy court supervision, and serves as a valuable tool for debtors to satisfy the claims secured by property they no longer need or to provoke cooperation from creditors who would prefer a steady cash flow to repossession. It does not, however, provide a means for a debtor to pick and choose from non-exempt assets to retain, subject to lengthy contested valuation procedures. This is so regardless of how "or" is interpreted in Section 1325(a)(5)—if "the property securing such claim" means all of the collateral, "picking two" will still require surrendering all of the collateral.Id.
Construing § 1325(a)(5) to create mutually exclusive alternatives is clearly the better approach. It avoids courts determining the minutiae of what can be and cannot be surrendered and valuing individual pieces of collateral and subdividing such value from cross-collateralized claims. To hold otherwise, the Court believes, would require us to disregard the creditor's rights created under Ohio's version of the U.C.C. which favor the use of cross-collateralization clauses in contracts or loan documents among parties engaged in commercial transactions within this State, while at the same time read into the statute language that simply does not appear. See Discussion of Ohio Rev. Code § 1309.204 cmt. 5, in Part A, above. As noted, § 1325(a)(5)(C) specifically states: "the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder"—as opposed to the debtor surrenders only part of the property securing such claim to such holder—property in this instance of the debtor's own choosing.
This Court is not alone in adopting this straight-forward and plain meaning approach. In Williams, for example, a debtor had a loan in the amount of $1,068.70, secured by a number of different pieces of property, including a camera, a gold chain, and two televisions. 168 F.3d at 846. On a motion to modify her bankruptcy plan, the debtor attempted to surrender some of the collateral, while paying the cramdown value on the retained collateral. Id. The bankruptcy court denied the modification, and the district court affirmed the decision. Id. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the debtor contended that § 1325(a)(5) should be read to create nonexclusive alternatives. Id. at 847. The court concluded that Congress did not "intend [] the word 'or' to create a fourth alternative [under § 1325]." Id.
The result is the same when considering § 1325(a)(5)'s sister provision, § 1225(a)(5), which was modeled upon and identical to the former for much of its history (until passage in 2005 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA") which is aimed at providing even more protections for creditors holding claims secured by chapter 13 debtor's personal property). The Second Circuit, largely relying upon case law developed under § 1325(a)(5), rejected a similar scheme as we have here under Chapter 12. See First Brandon Nat'l Bank v. Kerwin (In re Kerwin), 996 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1993). In Kerwin, the debtor attempted to surrender part of her encumbered farmland and retain the rest, functionally cramming down the bank's lien against the retained property, just as the Debtor here seeks to do. The Second Circuit stated, unequivocally, "'the property securing such claim' in (C) refers to all the debtor's collateral and that a transfer of only part of the collateral cannot be accomplished through that section." Id. at 556-57 (citing In re Townsend, 90 B.R. 498, 502 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 1988); In re Graham, 123 B.R. 330, 332 (Bankr. W.D.Mo. 1990)).
The provisions had been identical prior to the enactment of BAPCPA. See Williams, 168 F.3d at 847. Despite the amendment to § 1325(a)(5) under BAPCPA, the analogous subsections still offer the same alternatives: subsection (B) still requires a cram down and subsection (C) still requires surrender of the liened property. See Kerwin, 996 F.2d at 554 ("Subsections 1225(a)(5)(B) and (C) facilitate a family farmer's reorganization by establishing conditions under which the bankruptcy court shall confirm the debtor's reorganization plan when a secured creditor has refused to consent to the plan. See § 1225(a)(5). Section 1225(a)(5)(C) provides for the 'surrender' of the collateral to the secured lender. Section 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) alternatively provides for the 'distribut[ion]' of any property, including the collateral, over the course of the reorganization plan. Under this second option, § 1225(a)(5)(B)(i) offers protection to the lender by ensuring that the plan also provides 'that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim.' See § 1225(a)(5)(B)."). The use of the term "or" between the subsections remains the same. Moreover, the Second Circuit relied upon the case law construing § 1325(a)(5) in order to develop its understanding of § 1225(a)(5). See id. at 559-60. Given these facts, the analysis given in Kerwin is clearly applicable to the present circumstances.
The Second Circuit in Kerwin went on to state:
When the debtor elects to surrender the collateral under (C), the secured creditor takes possession of the property and sells it in accordance with non-bankruptcy law. If a sale produces a deficiency, the creditor may assert the amount of such deficiency as an unsecured claim against the debtor's remaining assets.Id.at 557. Given these differences in purpose, the Second Circuit concluded, "we read 'the property securing such claim' in (C) as referring to the entire collateral." Id. In other words, the entire collateral must be surrendered, or the entire collateral must be crammed down. Debtors seeking relief under Chapter 13 cannot do both.
. . . .
In contrast, under a (B) distribution of property a creditor's claim may be deemed fully satisfied provided the property 'to be distributed' has been valued as at least equal to the amount of that claim. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii); In re Townsend, 90 B.R. at 502. Following a (B) distribution, the bankruptcy court ceases to be concerned with whether the transferred property is held or sold or what amount such sale brings.
See also In re Clark, 288 B.R. 237, 241-42 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003) (denying chapter 12 plan that proposed to split up collateral secured under cross-collateralization provisions); In re Chickoscky, 498 B.R. 4 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2013) (holding that debtors could not use the plan-confirmation process in order to eliminate cross-collateralization rights of lender that funded their farming operations); In re Heath, 483 B.R. 708, 709 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2012) (denying confirmation of chapter 12 plan that would modify debtor's lender's rights by severing cross-collateralization of lender loans). It is worth noting that the debtor in Kerwin was ultimately allowed to surrender only part of the collateral, but that was because the portion surrendered exceeded the value of the creditor's entire claim. Kerwin, 996 F.2d at 554 ("when the claim is satisfied the lien securing it is extinguished too, for nothing remains for it to secure."). --------
Finally, this Court finds persuasive the well-reasoned decision authored by Judge Hoffman which appears to have directly decided the issue currently before us. See In re Elkins, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2900. In Elkins, the court determined, just as Kerwin did in the context of Chapter 12, that § 1325(a)(5) requires debtors to choose only one alternative when developing their bankruptcy plan. Id. at *5. The debtors in Elkins had a loan from a bank valued $78,781.29; the loan was secured by a mobile home and the real property upon which the home sat. Id. at *3. Once in bankruptcy, the debtors attempted to surrender only the mobile home to the bank while retaining the real property and treating the remaining loan as an unsecured claim. Id. at *3-4. The debtors argued that § 1325(a)(5) must be read to create nonexclusive alternatives. Id. at *5. In denying confirmation of the plan, Judge Hoffman concluded "that § 1325(a)(5) sets forth mutually exclusive options for the treatment of secured claims, not alternatives that may be combined to form a composite remedy." Id. at *9.
As Judge Hoffman, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and a majority of other courts have ruled, this Court holds that § 1325(a)(5) creates mutually exclusive alternatives. The Debtors cannot partially surrender the equipment and pay off the remaining claim at a crammed down value. Rather, they have to decide between surrendering all of the equipment or attempting to cram down the secured claim against all of the equipment. In layman's terms, the Debtors cannot have their cake and eat it, too.
V. CONCLUSION
Having found the cross-collateralization clauses enforceable in Ohio and applying the majority interpretation and plain language of § 1325(a)(5) to the case at hand, this Court concludes the Debtors may not surrender some of the collateral and simultaneously cram down John Deere Financial's secured interest in the rest, unless John Deere Financial has agreed to such treatment under § 1325(a)(5)(A). Instead, the Debtors must decide whether to surrender all of the property subject to the cross-collateralization loan contracts under § 1325(a)(5)(C), or cram down the secured claim against all of that same property under § 1325(a)(5)(B).
FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, it is ORDERED:
1. Confirmation of the Plan is DENIED.
2. The Debtors shall have twenty-one (21) days from the entry of this Order to file an amended plan or the case may be dismissed or converted to one under Chapter 7.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/_________
Jeffery P. Hopkins
United States Bankruptcy Judge Dated: April 17, 2020 Copies to: Default List plus additional parties Douglas J. Segerman
Alexander C. Karcher
Luper Neidenthal & Logan
1160 Dublin Road, Suite 400
Columbus, OH 43215
APPENDIX A
Contract No. Description of Collateral Amount Due and Owing at Petition Date Stipulated Value of Collateral Proposed Disposition of Collateral Current Possession 8522 Great Plains 3000 Tiller $18,397.07 $24,390 Surrender Repossessed pre-petition Frontier 1008 Rake/ Thatcher $1,900 Retain Debtor Frontier 1316 Hay Tedder $2,500 Retain Debtor 8370 John Deere 6130 Utility Tractor $38,467.67 $34,785 Retain Debtor H310 Loader $2,355 Retain Debtor 6390 Great Plains 1290 Front Fold Trailer Sprayer $32,552.50 $8,050 Surrender Debtor John Deere 893 Corn Head $7,460 Retain Debtor Artsway 12x 72 Auger $3,050 Surrender Repossessed pre-petition 8770 John Deere 835 CP Rotary Mower Conditioner $21,701.45 $20,000 Retain Debtor 2919 Killbros 1820 Grain Cart $22,039.38 $15,070 Surrender Debtor 4810 John Deere 1790 Planter $51,255.13 $53,790 Surrender Repossessed pre-petition 4838 John Deere 1560 No- Till Drill $20,921.12 $14,500 Retain Debtor 5214 John Deere 8630 Four Wheel Drive Tractor $11,573.46 $6,650 Surrender Repossessed pre-petition 5371 John Deere Gator $11,953.85 $9,000 Retain Debtor 3254 John Deere 348 Square Baler $19,015.84 $14,000 Surrender Debtor 7518 Farm Plan Multi-Use Credit Line $10,858.40 0000 Master Lease Agreement $6,414.14 Returned Prepetition TOTAL $265,150.01 $217,500