Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County Super. Ct. No. DP009374, John C. Gastelum, Judge.
Nicole Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Alexandra G. Morgan, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
OPINION
O’LEARY, J.
I
Kyle M. appeals from the findings and orders terminating dependency jurisdiction of his 18-year-old daughter, Danielle M. He argues the juvenile court failed to obtain a report from the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) verifying compliance with Welfare and Institutions Code section 391, subdivision (b), before terminating jurisdiction. In this unpublished opinion, we need not decide the issue of Kyle’s standing to raise the above contention because neither party addresses the issue. Proceeding on the assumption he has standing to appeal, he does not prevail on the merits. We affirm the order.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.
II
In November 2003, 14-year-old Danielle was taken into protective custody by SSA after Kyle physically and verbally abused her in a church parking lot. Danielle reported other incidents of abuse and said she was afraid and depressed. The petition alleged Danielle was being neglected as well as being physically and emotionally abused by her parents. It was also alleged both parents had substance abuse problems.
Kyle had legal custody of Danielle, but she had only lived with him for approximately six months of her life. When Danielle was in the seventh grade, she said she obtained a restraining order against her mother, after they had gotten into a fight. She primarily received care from her maternal grandfather and uncles.
As a result of the November incident, Kyle was arrested and incarcerated. In January 2004, the court ordered custody be removed from both parents and ordered the parents to participate in reunification services. Danielle went to live with her grandfather and uncle.
Over the next six months, Danielle’s mother failed miserably at her case plan. She submitted positive drug tests and did not keep in contact with the social worker. Kyle fared slightly better with his case plan requirements, but Danielle adamantly refused to have any contact with him. Moreover, the criminal court had issued a restraining order prohibiting him from having contact with his daughter. Danielle wanted to be returned to her mother.
In a report prepared for the 12-month review hearing, the social worker indicated Danielle had moved to a different home. She was now living with Leif and Kris M., the parents of a friend. Mother’s compliance with her case plan continued to be unsatisfactory. As for Kyle, the criminal court judge had modified the restraining order to permit contact in limited circumstances. However, Danielle steadfastly refused to visit him. Danielle told the social worker she did not want to receive letters from him, and she would not comply with his request for photographs of her. Her therapist opined it would be detrimental to force Danielle to have contact with Kyle.
Then 15-year-old Danielle also expressed anger about being “in the system” and wanted to be returned to her mother’s care even if she was not “clean.” The social worker stated Danielle had offered several persuasive arguments and had “demonstrated sufficient maturity in her decisions, while previously living with [her] mother and in the dysfunctional family home of her previous placement. . . . The undersigned does have some sympathy for the child’s position and even accepts some of her arguments. For example, her school performance has remained good in spite of very unsettling circumstances and there have not been any obvious signs of substance abuse. Further, she is very mature for her age and the debate as to whether she would be better off in her mother’s home or in her presently unsettling circumstances is perhaps a valid one.”
Nevertheless, because the social workers reasonably harbored concerns about the safety of the teenager staying with her drug addicted mother, the social worker concluded there were no “attractive alternative solution to offer the child and . . . her best hope still lies in her mother’s ability to change, but so far there appears to be little hope of change there also.” The social worker recommended that services be terminated and a permanent plan of long-term foster care be implemented. However, the court continued services for an additional six months and scheduled an 18-month review hearing.
Before that hearing, Kyle filed a section 388 modification petition, requesting a court order for conjoint therapy between him and Danielle. The court summarily denied the petition. Danielle still did not want anything to do with her father. Kyle failed to present evidence showing it would be in her best interests to force contact between them.
Meanwhile, Danielle continued to experience placement difficulties. She was removed from her grandfather’s home because of several factors, including domestic violence. When she moved into Leif and Kris M’s home, she again “encountered serious marital difficulties,” and she was removed from that setting “with mutual consent and much haste.” Next, she was temporarily placed in a foster home, but within weeks was sent to Orangewood Children’s Home (Orangewood).
The social worker opined placement was difficult because Danielle had expressed “extreme resist[ance] to going into a foster or group home, as well as to the CASA Youth Shelter in Los Alamitos.” Danielle told the social worker “she would like to emancipate at this time and that she would like her involvement with [SSA] to cease.” The social worker opined Danielle “is quite an opinionated and independent teenager, and is perhaps more mature than others her age . . . . She is resilient but she can also be very stubborn.”
After a lengthy stay at Orangewood, Danielle was placed with a non-relative, Syndi M., who was Danielle’s boyfriend’s adult sister. Danielle and Syndi signed a contract stating they would both abide by several rules, including their agreement Danielle would have no in-person contact with her boyfriend in Syndi’s home. It was reported Danielle’s time at Orangewood was very challenging. The social worker was concerned Danielle would run away, and it was noted Danielle was extremely depressed.
At the end of his report, the social worker informed the court it was unfortunate the case was being transferred to a different social worker after he had “perhaps gain[ed] her trust,” but “it appear[ed] that the child has come through a difficult period intact, and she is mature enough to know that much of what happens from now on (such as with placement, school grades, and preparation for emancipation) rests in her own hands and on the decisions she makes.” At the 18-month review hearing in May 2005, the court terminated reunification services. It determined Danielle was not adoptable, there was no one willing to accept legal guardianship, and Danielle should remain in long-term foster care.
In July 2005, the newly assigned social worker met with Danielle at her new placement. Two days later, a different social worker made an unannounced home visit. Danielle was not home. That social worker smelled marijuana, and Syndi admitted “pot was being smoked,” but maintained it was “not an everyday occurrence.” When later questioned about this incident by the assigned social worker, Syndi recognized it was inappropriate to use drugs while Danielle was in her care.
In her report to the court, the social worker recommended Danielle remain with Syndi. She opined the current placement had not proven to present imminent harm to the child, and “in the short time she has known her, the [social worker] has found the child in question to be intelligent, insightful, and perceptive to the potential impacts of certain decisions and situations . . . and it is the belief of [the social worker] that [Danielle] should be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that she can succeed in this placement as she states that she can.” The court disagreed, and on July 27 ordered Danielle be returned to Orangewood.
On the same day Danielle was returned Orangewood, she ran away. On August 3, 2005, a protective custody warrant was issued. Later that month, Danielle and the social worker spoke twice on the telephone. Danielle reassured the social worker she was doing well and had a place to live. Danielle stated she enjoyed her life without anyone from SSA “checking up on [her].” Danielle was working and was deciding whether to keep working or enroll in high school.
In September, the social worker was contacted by an administrator at Los Alamitos High School. Danielle had attempted to enroll, but left the campus after being informed she would need proof of her placement and the school would call Orangewood for confirmation.
The following month (October 2005), the police brought Danielle back to Orangewood. The active warrant was discovered during a traffic stop of her uncle’s car. Danielle was a passenger. The social worker interviewed Danielle and reported, “She stated that she [was] doing very well and feeling good.” She denied having any feelings of sadness or depression, as she had experienced in the past. Danielle stated she was enjoying the freedom of not having to “prove herself” to SSA and was “largely reluctant to remain in placement because she knows that the court will order her to see her father, whom she does not want to see.” Danielle said she was currently attending cosmetology school to obtain her hairdresser’s license and she planned to study for her G.E.D. exam when she turned 17 years old. After just five hours at Orangewood, Danielle ran away again.
At the warrant review hearing in November, the court ordered the protective custody warrant would remain outstanding, but no further hearings would be scheduled due to Danielle’s “AWOL status.” In March of the following year, police searched for Danielle at her grandfather’s home based on a tip from an anonymous caller. They did not find her. In April, Danielle happened to answer her mother’s home telephone when the social worker called. Danielle reported she was fine, but refused to disclose where she was living. She told the social worker her father was incarcerated. The social worker later confirmed Kyle had been arrested for possessing marijuana for sale, a probation violation, and a misdemeanor traffic violation.
In August 2006, Danielle was returned to Orangewood after she was discovered riding in her mother’s car. The social worker spoke to Danielle and learned she was in good health and had been staying with friends. Danielle said she planned to soon begin working on her high school diploma. She asked many questions about when the runaway warrant would be lifted. When the social worker said it would remain active until dependency jurisdiction was terminated, Danielle said she might go to the next scheduled interim hearing in October, “to show the judge that she [was] doing well.” After less than a day at Orangewood, Danielle again ran away.
The following month, Danielle called the social worker and indicated she was doing well and hoped to start school soon. She would not reveal where she was living, and she reaffirmed she did not wish to have any contact with her father. In October, Danielle telephoned the social worker and asked if they could meet at a restaurant in Long Beach. Danielle requested the return of her belongings she had left behind in Orangewood. The social worker reported 17-year-old Danielle “appeared to be in good health, was well groomed and seemed [to be] in good spirits.” Danielle said she was working, but refused to say where or disclose the location of her residence. She told the social worker she would return to Orangewood if her living situation became unstable or unsafe.
In March 2007, the social worker filed a report stating the child’s whereabouts were unknown. She recommended the warrant remain outstanding but that a termination review and warrant review be scheduled for June 2007 (Danielle’s 18th birthday). The court agreed, and so ordered.
In a report prepared for the hearing, the social worker stated Danielle’s whereabouts were still unknown. In early May 2007, Danielle called the social worker to find out what would happen to her case once she turned 18. Kyle had also called the social worker and expressed frustration that Danielle would not suffer any consequences for running away. He opined SSA should have done more for Danielle. Closer to the hearing date, Danielle twice called the social worker to say she would like to attend the termination review hearing. She said she wanted to show the judge she was doing well. She indicated an interest in pursuing her education, but realized she would have to wait until the active warrant for her arrest was vacated. Danielle agreed to meet with the social worker and take “an emancipation binder, which would assist the child in seeking various services post-emancipation.”
The social worker’s report dated June 21, 2007, contained a checklist, titled “Adequacy of services provided to the child pursuant to [section] 391.” All the boxes on the list were checked “pending/in progress.” In her concluding remarks, the social worker summarized Danielle had been AWOL since July 2005 and she “has been unable to provide the child with much of the documentation, information, and referrals pursuant to [section] 391. The undersigned intends to provide the child with as much of this information as possible on the date of her hearing, which she states that she will attend.” The social worker stated Danielle was not interested in receiving any contact information about her father. She recommended termination of dependency jurisdiction.
At the hearing, the court considered argument from the parties. Danielle was not present. Kyle’s counsel objected to the social worker’s recommendation. He argued the agency had done very little to prepare Danielle for adulthood. He pointed out that nothing on the section 391 checklist had been accomplished. Kyle was not suggesting Danielle should be detained in any way, but that the case should remain open to make certain services are provided to help transition Danielle into adulthood.
Danielle’s counsel responded the only reason Danielle was in the system was because Kyle had physically and emotionally abused her. Her counsel stated it was not in Danielle’s best interests to have an outstanding warrant because if she was picked up she would be placed in adult custody. Counsel added she had met with Danielle that morning and she appeared “healthy, clean, well-put together. She told me she has a job . . . [but] she does not want her father to know where she’s working.” Counsel said Danielle was apologetic for having violated the court’s order and going AWOL, however, “she felt the stresses of social services and the court and her father pressuring her to visit with him were too much for her to handle . . . .” Counsel added Danielle met with the social worker “and went over the emancipation binder with Danielle. She further went over to Orangewood with Danielle so that she can be wired her [school] credits while she stayed [there].” Danielle’s counsel concluded, “She has all the information that she needs. I don’t know what else the agency can do for her at this point. And given her past behavior, it indicates that if this court does not terminate her case, the minor will not avail herself of the agency services, and will not be available to this court.” County counsel concurred with minor’s counsel’s assessment of the case, concluding it would be in Danielle’s best interest to terminate the dependency. Mother’s counsel stated mother agreed with this recommendation.
The court recalled the warrant and ordered the child dependency proceedings to be terminated. It stated, “I’m asking myself, what possible services could I offer to this child through the agency that she might actually be willing to avail herself [of.] And the answer I’m getting from [SSA] or county counsel is probably nothing more really than what has been offered to her at this time.” The court recognized Kyle was frustrated at the situation, and shared some of his same concerns about Danielle, “but looking at what’s happened here, it appears that this child has actually been able to successfully maintain herself for the past two years, almost two years, and that’s even without [SSA’s] assistance. She apparently has a job [and] a place to live. She’s received her emancipation binder with . . . relevant documents she’ll receive as a young adult. She’s reached the age of 18. . . . I think this is a young lady, who has proven through her conduct the last couple of years that she is able to take care of herself, [although] not in the way that anyone would want it to occur, surely not the court.” The court concluded, “I don’t know what else meaningfully that we can give her that would help her beyond what she has now. And I have no real guarantee or assurance that she would even accept that assistance if it were offered to her. . . . If I thought there was something, I would definitely want to keep this case open to make sure that she got it. Minor’s counsel [is] telling me that she is not aware of anything else further that I could offer to her client . . . and county counsel is telling me, on behalf of the agency, that they [are] not aware of anything else that they can offer this child of any assistance. . . . There isn’t any justification for me to keep this case open if there’s no other way for me to help.”
After a break in the proceedings, and after Kyle had left the courtroom, Danielle and her mother appeared before the judge. The court inquired if they had anything to say. Danielle replied, “I’m about to be enrolled in school. I just got my credits from Orangewood. I’m going to go to Cypress College [and] finish up my credits and get my diploma. And I work now. I work at Marie Callender’s pretty much full time, and I’m going to start college in the fall. I’m going to be a cosmetologist. I wanted to say thank you. I appreciate it.” The court asked Danielle if she was homeless or had a safe place to live. Danielle said she had a safe place to live with her mother in Seal Beach. The following exchange then took place:
“The Court: Any assistance that this court could provide you that you would like?
“[Danielle]: I have a 3:00 [p.m.] appointment to get my [driver’s] license. I’m really focusing on getting my life together right now. I know I have that warrant pulling me back.
“The Court: Let [] me ask you this. If I were to keep this case open today and offer you services, would you take advantage of that?
“[Danielle]: I want the services, as far as Medicare, and, like, dental, and things like that.
“The Court: Those are not, in particular, social services’ programs. But other than insurance-type medical assistance?
“[Danielle]: No. I feel no need.
“The Court: All right. Danielle, I’m sorry that you’ve spent the last couple of years staying away from the court. If you had come in, I would have tried to do anything I could to help you . . . .”
III
General Legal Principles Regarding Terminating Jurisdiction
“While the juvenile court may not acquire jurisdiction over a person who is 18 years of age or older, once it has obtained jurisdiction of a minor it may retain jurisdiction until the dependent child turns 21. Under section 303, ‘[t]he court may retain jurisdiction over any person who is found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court until the ward or dependent child attains the age of 21 years.’ Conversely, under section 390, the dependency petition may be dismissed any time before the minor reaches age 21 ‘if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the minor require the dismissal, and that the parent or guardian of the minor is not in need of treatment or rehabilitation.’” (In re Holly H. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1330 (Holly H.).)
“Jurisdiction is rarely retained through the age of 21, however, ‘in part due to the extensive efforts to either return the child to the custody of a parent or to implement a permanent plan of adoption or legal guardianship if reunification efforts fail.’ (Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2002) § 2.31, p. 2-55). Another reason jurisdiction is rarely retained past the age of 18 appears in the legislative history of section 391, which we discuss in detail below. ‘Although the juvenile court has the authority to retain jurisdiction over a dependent child until the age of 21, the reality is that federal funding for foster youth ends at the age of 18 and common practice is for the juvenile court to terminate jurisdiction at that time.’ (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 686 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 29, 2000.)” (Holly H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330.)
“In 2000, the Legislature added section 391 to the Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 391 was enacted in response to concerns that dependent children who had reached the age of 18 were being removed from the dependency system before they had adequate skills or resources to support themselves, and evidence that 45 percent of these young persons became homeless within a year after leaving the foster care system. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analysis, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 686 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 29, 2000.) The Youth Law Center, which sponsored the legislation, posited that ‘[h]omelessness is not merely a housing issue, but is related to poor education, lack of a support system, estrangement from family, lack of marketable skills, poor employment prospects and lack of community linkages. Emancipation of foster youth before they are ready to live independently creates significant costs--both to the youth and to the state.’ (Ibid.)” (Holly H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1330-1331.)
Section 391 provides, “At any hearing to terminate jurisdiction over a dependent child who has reached the age of majority the county welfare department” is obligated to fulfill two requirements. First, SSA must, “Ensure that the child is present in court, unless the child does not wish to appear in court, or document efforts by the county welfare department to locate the child when the child is not available.” (§ 391, subd. (a).) Second, SSA is required to “[s]ubmit a report verifying that” certain “information, documents, and services have been provided to the child . . . .” (§ 391, subd. (b).)
The Legislature grouped the required information needed for the section 391 report into four categories as follows: “(1) Written information concerning the child’s dependency case, including his or her family history and placement history, the whereabouts of any siblings under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, . . . directions on how to access the documents the child is entitled to inspect under section 827, and the date on which the jurisdiction of the juvenile court would be terminated. [¶] (2) The following documents, where applicable: social security card, certified birth certificate, a health and education summary, . . . identification card, death certificate of parent or parents, and proof of citizenship or residence. [¶] (3) Assistance in completing an application for Medi-Cal or assistance in obtaining other health insurance; referral to transitional housing, if available, or assistance in securing other housing; and assistance in obtaining employment or other financial support. [¶] (4) Assistance in applying for admission to college or to a vocational training program or other educational institution and in obtaining financial aid, where appropriate.” (§ 391, subd. (b).)
Under section 391, subdivision (c), the court has the discretion to “continue jurisdiction if it finds that the county welfare department has not met the requirements of subdivision (b) and that termination of jurisdiction would be harmful to the best interests of the child. If the court determines that continued jurisdiction is warranted pursuant to this section, the continuation shall only be ordered for that period of time necessary for the county welfare department to meet the requirements of subdivision (b).”
Section 391, subdivision (c), also provides, “[t]he court may terminate jurisdiction if the county welfare department has offered the required services, and the child either has refused the services or, after reasonable efforts by the county welfare department, cannot be located.” “The legislative history reveals that this final language was added to clarify that section 391 ‘does not intend to prohibit the juvenile court from terminating jurisdiction if the child is absent or the county welfare department fails to provide the documents and services because the child has refused the services, or the child cannot be located after reasonable efforts by the county welfare department.’ (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 686 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 20, 1999.)” (Holly H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1331-1332.)
From the handful of cases we found discussing the issue of terminating jurisdiction over a young adult, the following rules have emerged: “The burden of proof on the issue of termination rests with the party seeking to terminate jurisdiction.” (In re Robert L. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 789, 794 (Robert L.).) “In determining whether to terminate jurisdiction over a child in long-term foster care, the issue to be addressed is the best interest of the child.” (Id. at p. 793; Holly H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1332-1333.) We review a decision to terminate a dependency for an abuse of discretion. (Holly H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4that p. 1327.)
We will discuss three cases we found particularly instructive. First, Robert L., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 789, was decided before the enactment of section 391, but its analysis of whether the court abused its discretion in terminating jurisdiction is still pertinent. (See Holly H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1332 [concluding the Robert L. opinion articulates the standard to be applied in deciding whether to terminate the jurisdiction of the juvenile court after a dependent child turns 18].)
The case involved Robert and his sister, who were placed with their maternal grandparents in long-term foster care. (Robert L., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 791.) Both children did well in school and were employed part-time during high school. While still living with his grandparents, Robert began attending state college. Just prior to Robert’s 20th birthday, SSA recommended termination of jurisdiction. SSA maintained Robert was a high functioning adult because he had graduated from high school, successfully completed two years of university, and lived in a stable home. Robert objected to termination because his grandparents needed the foster care benefits to help defray educational and living expenses. (Id. at pp. 791-792.)
The trial court in Robert L., retained jurisdiction through three more review hearings. At the final hearing, Robert testified “if the grandparents did not receive foster care funding he would not be able to afford to graduate from college and society would benefit more if he paid higher taxes from increased earnings available to college graduates.” (Robert L., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 792.) The trial court continued jurisdiction and SSA appealed. The court of appeal reversed the order, reasoning that “[i]n determining whether to terminate jurisdiction over a child in long-term foster care, the issue to be addressed is the best interest of the child,” and concluded the “exercise of jurisdiction must be based upon existing and reasonably foreseeable future harm to the welfare of the child. [Citation.] Similar factors should come into play in determining whether jurisdiction should extend beyond the age of majority.” (Id. at pp. 793-794.) The court determined that Robert did not face existing or reasonably foreseeable future harm simply because he might not be able to afford to complete his college education, stating, “the sole basis for extension of jurisdiction was to afford special assistance to Robert [and his sister] to allow them to complete their college education. We are aware of no legislative mandate that the dependency system is to be utilized to subsidize higher education. . . . Absent any evidence of current or future threatened harm to . . . Robert [and his sister], the juvenile court abused its discretion in extending jurisdiction over [them].” (Id. at p. 797.)
In stark contrast to Robert L., the minor in Holly H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th 1324, had rejected any assistance from the court or SSA and desired emancipation. The court discussed in depth the policies and principles behind treating minors differently from adults. It reasoned the overriding standard in deciding whether to terminate jurisdiction was what is in the 18 year old’s best interests and “[i]n light of the indeterminancy of this standard and the autonomy to which a person over 18 is entitled, once a young person has reached majority the juvenile court must give substantial deference to the youth’s wishes before deciding to retain jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 1327.)
The trial court in Holly H., terminated dependency jurisdiction over Holly. (Holly H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329.) Holly had not appeared at the hearing, but her counsel argued dependency should not be terminated because there was a continuing risk of harm. SSA presented evidence it had made many attempts to help Holly, but she had not taken advantage of any of these services. In making its ruling, the court stated, “‘she fails to meet the department halfway. I just don’t see the department can do any more. . . .’” (Ibid.)
In Holly H., the appellate court found no abuse of discretion. “Despite her attorney’s arguments to the contrary, Holly has given every indication that she does not want the assistance of the juvenile dependency system. Through her attorney, Holly argues that the court abused its discretion by dismissing the petition since there was evidence that she ‘still needs the supervision, care and protection of the juvenile court.’ She points out that she has been separated from her siblings for years, and has moved from placement to placement with no hope for stability since her grandmother became too ill to care for her when she was 13. While she graduated from high school, it is undisputed that she has a serious learning disability. She has consistently failed to demonstrate that she is able to hold a job or even to complete job training. She has shown no ability to manage her finances, using the small amount of Social Security benefits that she was awarded as a result of her father’s untimely death to move out of her group home. Her school counselor noted that she had ‘no savings, no plan for where to live or how to provide for herself [and] I am afraid that she will end up on the streets when she graduates. . . .’
“Although one may reasonably conclude that these facts demonstrate a continued need for assistance, Holly has repeatedly refused to take advantage of services that have been offered to her. She failed to appear for an evaluation that might have allowed her to receive income from SSI; she failed to report for a job that the department helped to secure for her; and as just noted she left her group home when she began receiving a very small, limited-term income as the result of her father’s death. Holly’s continued participation in the juvenile dependency system cannot reasonably be expected to prevent any future harm when she has effectively rejected nearly all offers of assistance from the department. Moreover, Holly has not been charged with committing a crime, and there is no suggestion that she is subject to commitment under section 5150. Now that she has reached the age of majority and has acquired the rights and responsibilities that come with adulthood, the court may not, and should not, force her to accept its services. The trial court properly considered Holly’s unwillingness to utilize the services that had been offered to her in deciding to terminate its jurisdiction.” (Holly H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1337, fns. omitted.)
The more recent case, In re Tamika C. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1153 (Tamika C.), involved a 19-year-old girl, Tamika, who was accepting services, but still struggling to make the transition to adulthood. Unlike the college bound student in Robert L., Tamika was still in high school and attended RSP classes. She was utilizing all the services available to her. In terminating jurisdiction, the trial court relied on the fact Tamika’s caretakers stated they were willing to offer her a stable home for as long as she wanted. The appellate court disagreed, concluding, “This is certainly a generous offer by her caretakers, but they are not bound by their statements and if they change their minds or something unforeseen should happen to change their circumstances, Tamika could easily end up without a home while she is still in high school. [¶] The trial court abused its discretion when it terminated dependency over Tamika. It was in the best interests of Tamika for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction over her. There was an existing and reasonably foreseeable threat of harm to Tamika if she was not allowed to remain a dependent of the court while she finished her high school education under a normal schedule.” (Id. at p. 1168.)
In addition, the appellate court concluded the trial court had “erred in applying the wrong burden of proof to the question of whether dependency should be terminated at the request of the department. Neither the department nor the court gave consideration to the best interests of the child. . . . The department and the court erroneously misplaced the emphasis in the proceedings from Tamika’s best interests to financial considerations.” (Tamika C., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168.)
Of course, as with most dependency cases, our case does not exactly compare with any of the above authorities. While Danielle has repeatedly refused services, much like the minor in Holly, H., our case is distinguishable because there was no evidence Danielle was in danger of homelessness like Holly. From all accounts, Danielle had been self-sufficient for two years by finding employment and support from reliable sources. On the other hand, it cannot be said she was capable of making a smooth transition into adulthood like the college-bound dependent in Robert L. Danielle had yet to earn her high school diploma, and had only talked about her desire to obtain a cosmetology license. Yet, it cannot be said it would be in Danielle’s best interests to keep the case open until she finished high school, like the dependent in Tamika C. Here, there was no evidence Danielle was at risk of becoming homeless if her case was closed before she graduated high school. For over two years, she had maintained herself without SSA’s assistance, and there was no reason to suspect she would falter by adding school to her life. Based on the record before us, it cannot be said the trial court abused its discretion in concluding termination would not give rise to any foreseeable harm, and continuing jurisdiction would not be in Danielle’s best interests.
Kyle argues Danielle’s best interests were not served because SSA failed to show it had offered her any assistance with matters specified in section 391, subdivision (b). He points out the last report stated no referrals were provided because Danielle was AWOL, and at the hearing, counsel reported that morning Danielle was given “as much information as possible” and a social worker had “gone over” the emancipation binder. Kyle argues this is not proof all the required information was provided. He concludes jurisdiction cannot be terminated if SSA fails to meet its burden of proof. Given the circumstances of this case, we conclude SSA reported all that was required under section 391.
As discussed in some detail earlier in this opinion, a court deciding whether or not to terminate jurisdiction over a youth who has reached majority must first determine whether SSA has met its obligations under section 391. Second, it must consider if termination would give rise to a foreseeable harm to the young adult, and whether continuing jurisdiction would be in the best interests of the youth. SSA’s reporting obligations under section 391 is dependent on several factors.
Under subdivision (b), of section 391, the report must contain enough information to assure the court the youth will not become homeless after emancipation. Its ability to do this obviously depends on whether the youth at issue is accessible, receiving services, or to some degree cooperating with the agency’s social workers.
However, SSA cannot be expected to report on, or verify, facts they cannot reasonably obtain. In recognition of this scenario, the Legislature drafted subdivision (c), of section 391. If SSA provides proof the young adult cannot be located or has refused services, the court may terminate jurisdiction. “The legislative history reveals that this final language was added to clarify that section 391 ‘does not intend to prohibit the juvenile court from terminating jurisdiction if the child is absent or the county welfare department fails to provide the documents and services because the child has refused the services, or the child cannot be located after reasonable efforts by the county welfare department.’ (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 686 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 20, 1999.)” (Holly H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1331-1332.)
In Danielle’s case, the hearing was scheduled for Danielle’s 18th birthday because, at the time, her whereabouts were unknown. Certainly, having an active warrant was no longer in Danielle’s best interest as an adult. And there was no indication she wanted any further assistance from SSA or the court. To the contrary, she had adamantly refused any services offered by the juvenile dependency system. She had proven herself to be a resourceful, independent, responsible, and mature young adult, despite her difficult circumstances. “[W]hen one reaches majority the law treats the young adult as a responsible person entitled to make independent choices in conducting his or her affairs.” (Holly H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1336.) Subdivision (c), of section 339 governed SSA’s reporting obligations. The trial court properly considered Danielle’s absence and unwillingness to utilize services in deciding to terminate jurisdiction.
Kyle faults the court for terminating jurisdiction knowing Danielle was in the courthouse, but before she appeared in court. However, the record shows Danielle knew about the hearing and chose not to appear until after it was over and Kyle had left the room. As an adult, she could not have been forced to attend the hearing. The record indicates her intended purpose in making an appearance was to thank the court and assure the court she was doing fine. The court could not force her to accept services. She had not been charged with a crime, and there was no suggestion that she was subject to commitment under section 5150. (See Holly H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1337, fns. omitted.)
Moreover, Kyle questions whether the social worker adequately provided Danielle with all the information in the emancipation binder because Danielle requested assistance in obtaining medical and dental insurance. He misconstrues the record. Danielle clearly stated she was not in need of any services or assistance from SSA. Danielle told the court the only service she wanted was general governmental assistance for health insurance. As noted by the court, SSA could not provide this insurance to Danielle. There is no reason to speculate Danielle lacked the ability or maturity to complete the health insurance application on her own. And given her two years of complete independence from SSA’s supervision and services, it is unreasonable to presume she would have now accepted SSA’s help in completing the application.
IV
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J., BEDSWORTH, J.